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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
In this thesis I present a critical examination of the role played by mechanistic ideas in 
shaping our understanding of living systems. I draw on a combination of historical, 
philosophical, and scientific resources to uncover a number of problems which I take 
to result from the adoption of mechanistic thinking in biology.  
 
I provide an analysis of the historical development of the conflict between mechanistic 
and vitalistic conceptions of life since the seventeenth century, and I argue that the 
basic terms of this conflict remain central to current disputes over the nature of the 
organism as well as the question of how far the theories, concepts, and methods of 
physics, chemistry, and engineering can ultimately take us in the explanation of life. 
 
I offer a detailed critique of the machine conception of the organism, which constitutes 
the central unifying idea of mechanistic biology. I argue that this notion, despite its 
undeniable heuristic value, is fundamentally inadequate as a theory of the organism 
due to a number of basic differences between organisms and machines. Ultimately, I 
suggest that the neglected vitalistic tradition in biology actually possesses the best 
conceptual tools for coming to terms with the nature of living systems.  
 
I also undertake a philosophical analysis of the concept of mechanism in biology. I 
argue that the term ‘mechanism’ is actually an umbrella term for three distinct notions, 
which are unfortunately conflated in philosophical discussions. I explore the relation 
between mechanistic biology and the new philosophical interest in the concept of 
mechanism and I show that these two research programs have little to do with one 
another because each of them understands the concept of mechanism in a different way.  
 
Finally, I draw on the historical and philosophical foundations of cell theory to propose 
an epistemological perspective which enables the reductionistic explanation of the 
organism without having to give up the distinctive features of life in the process. In this 
way, I show this perspective to have significant advantages over the classic 
physicochemical reductionism of mechanistic biology.  
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Chapter 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1. Reconsidering the Foundations of the Philosophy of Biology 
 
The philosophy of biology may be defined as the area of philosophical inquiry devoted 
to the examination of metaphysical and epistemological issues in biology. However, 
the academic discipline bearing that name is in reality largely concerned with 
evolutionary biology. One only needs to browse through the contents of the three most 
recent textbooks of the philosophy of biology, namely those of Elliott Sober (2000), 
Brian Garvey (2007), and Alexander Rosenberg and Daniel McShea (2008), to get the 
unmistakable sense that philosophy of biology as an academic field is not really the 
philosophy of biology at all, but primarily the philosophy of evolution. There is a 
general tendency to consider all interesting biological questions to be evolutionary 
questions, and all distinctively biological concepts to be evolutionary concepts. 
Evolutionary theory is seen as constituting the backbone of biology, and the 
philosophical relevance of every other area of biological science is determined in 
accordance to the extent to which it contributes to evolution. The most recent appraisal 
of the field, authored by Matthew Haber, Andrew Hamilton, Samir Okasha, and Jay 
Odenbaugh (2010), illustrates this thematic bias by its discussion of three areas of 
evolutionary biology (namely systematics, evolutionary ecology, and the levels of 
selection) as being jointly representative of philosophy of biology as a whole.  
 
Given the extraordinary breadth of biological science, what is it that actually justifies 
this dominance of evolutionary thinking? Some philosophers of biology believe that it 
simply reflects how biologists themselves understand their own subject. However, 
even the most cursory look at a general biology textbook (e.g., Campbell et al., 2008; 
Raven et al., 2008; Sadava et al., 2006) suffices to dispel this notion. Biology 
textbooks begin by discussing the properties of life, cells, and organisms, not with the 
theory of natural selection. It is only philosophy of biology textbooks that contain 
opening chapters with titles like: ‘What is Evolutionary Theory?’ (Sober, 2000), ‘The 
Argument in Darwin’s Origin’ (Garvey, 2007), or ‘Darwin Makes a Science’ 
(Rosenberg and McShea, 2007). Why is this so? What is the basis for the 
overwhelming emphasis placed on evolution in philosophical studies of biology?  
 - 9 - 
 
The answer to these questions lies in history. The modern academic discipline of 
philosophy of biology originated out of the efforts by the architects of the Modern 
Synthesis to defend the autonomy of organismic biology from the threat of 
physicochemical reduction embodied in the emerging field of molecular biology. “The 
ultimate aim of the modern movement in biology”, Francis Crick proclaimed, “is to 
explain all of biology in terms of physics and chemistry” (Crick, 1966, p. 10). Faced 
by the danger of becoming obsolete in light of the extremely successful molecular 
movement, Ernst Mayr wrote the following to Julian Huxley in private correspondence: 
 
In a way the impact of biology has had a curious set-back as a result of the magnificent 
victories of molecular biology. To the outsider they suggest that physics and chemistry is 
the Alpha and Omega of all science. We will have to make a double effort to restore the 
influence of organismic biology and to make better known the evolutionary trends that 
culminated in that unique psycho-social organism, Man. (Mayr, quoted in Milam, 2010, p. 
135). 
 
The strategy adopted by the architects of the Modern Synthesis “to restore the 
influence of organismic biology” was, not surprisingly, to emphasize the primacy of 
the synthetic theory of evolution for a proper understanding of organisms. Ernst Mayr 
first attempted this in a highly influential paper called ‘Cause and Effect in Biology’ 
(1961) in which he argued that evolutionary explanations are necessary and 
ineliminable in the study of organisms. Mayr illustrated this view with his seminal 
distinctions between ‘how?’ and ‘why?’ questions and between ‘proximate’ and 
‘ultimate’ causes. No matter how far the ‘how?’ questions of molecular biology may 
take us in elucidating the proximate causes of organisms, Mayr claimed, there will 
always be a need to consider the ‘why?’ questions of evolutionary biology in order to 
come to terms with the ultimate causes of organisms. In a similar vein, George Gaylord 
Simpson pointed to the priority of evolutionary considerations in explanations of 
organisms in a paper entitled ‘Biology and the Nature of Science’ (1963). Simpson 
argued that “reductionist explanation[s] made in terms of physical, chemical, and 
mechanical principles” are insufficient, and need to be complemented by 
“compositionist [explanations] in terms of the adaptive usefulness of structures and 
processes to the whole organism” (Simpson, 1963, p. 87). Biology, by virtue of its 
evolutionary character, can never be reduced to the physicochemical or the 
mechanical. Finally, Theodosius Dobzhansky did his own part to spread this message 
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in a paper called ‘Biology, Molecular and Organismic’ (1964), in which he criticized 
the increasingly prevalent assumption that “the only worthwhile biology is molecular 
biology” (Dobzhansky, 1964, p. 443) by drawing attention to the unifying power of 
evolutionary thinking in biology. Dobzhansky epitomized this view with the claim that 
“nothing makes sense in biology except in the light of evolution” (ibid., p. 449), a 
dictum he later rephrased in the title of a subsequent paper (Dobzhansky, 1973), and 
which has become a sort of mantra for evolutionary biologists ever since.  
 
This work started to attract the attention of philosophers, such as David Hull and 
Michael Ruse, who used it as a basis to establish a sustained discourse within the 
philosophy of science devoted to the examination of the conceptual puzzles of biology, 
or more precisely, of the conception of biology which emerged from the Modern 
Synthesis (see Ruse, 1973; Hull, 1974). Thus, philosophers began to examine issues 
such as the structure of Darwin’s argument, the explanatory basis of population 
genetics, the nature of species, the problem of taxonomic classification, the definition 
of fitness, and the levels of selection. It was discussion around these topics which led 
to the academic institutionalization of philosophy of biology as a subdiscipline within 
the philosophy of science in the 1980s. As these philosophers took the Modern 
Synthesis as their exemplary model of what biology is, evolutionary theory naturally 
assumed the centre stage in the philosophy of biology discourse (e.g., Ruse, 1988). 
Areas of biology which had not been well represented in the Modern Synthesis (for 
example, development) did not become part of the philosophy of biology discourse 
until ways were found to directly relate them to the concerns of evolutionary biology 
(which in the case of development began to occur in the mid 1990s). Biological 
disciplines lying further away from the concerns of evolution, such as physiology, cell 
biology, immunology, or microbiology, remain severely underrepresented in the 
philosophy of biology to this day, although the situation has began to show signs of 
improvement in recent years. Nevertheless, the overarching premise that continues to 
guide the philosophy of biology discourse is that Neo-Darwinism provides the basic 
grounds for defending the autonomy of biology from the physical sciences (see Mayr, 
2004), and that consequently if one wishes to engage in philosophical analyses of 
distinctively biological problems, evolutionary theory is the obvious place to start. 
 
However, to uphold this view is to have an impoverished understanding of what biology 
is, and by implication, to accept a narrow definition of what the philosophy of biology 
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could be. Focusing on evolution is not the only, or arguably even the best way of 
getting at what is distinctively biological. In fact, in the same year that Mayr published 
his seminal ‘Cause and Effect in Biology’, the physiologist Barry Commoner, then 
vice president of the American Association of the Advancement of Science, published 
a paper entitled ‘In Defense of Biology’ (1961) which had exactly the same objectives 
as Mayr’s paper (as well as the aforementioned ones by Simpson and Dobzhansky). 
But instead of resorting to the ineliminability of evolutionary considerations to defend 
organismic biology, Commoner appealed to the view that organisms possess an 
inherent complexity that is not quantitatively extrapolable from physicochemical 
studies alone. Commoner recognized that molecular studies generate vast amounts of 
data, but he maintained that this data must be properly contextualized in relation to the 
living system as a whole for it to be truly explanatory.  
 
In setting forth this way of defending the autonomy of organismic biology, Commoner 
was not proposing a new argument or a new way of thinking about living systems or 
about biology. Instead, he was drawing on an older organicist tradition in the 
philosophy of biology that flourished in the first half of the twentieth century, and 
which was primarily interested in the examination of the features that make organisms 
distinctive and the question of how far mechanical and physicochemical principles can 
ultimately take us in explaining them. Some examples of works which contributed to 
this organicist movement in the philosophy of biology include James Johnstone’s The 
Philosophy of Biology (1914), J. H. Woodger’s Biological Principles (1929), Kurt 
Goldstein’s The Organism (1934), J. S. Haldane’s The Philosophical Basis of Biology 
(1931), William McDougall’s The Riddle of Life (1938), Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s 
Problems of Life (1952), Morton Beckner’s The Biological Way of Thought (1959), 
Rainer Schubert-Soldern’s Philosophical Aspects of Biology (1962), and Walter 
Elsasser’s Atom and Organism (1966). Today, this earlier discourse in the philosophy 
of biology has been almost completely forgotten, and the consensus within the 
community is that real philosophy of biology only emerged with the work of David 
Hull, Michael Ruse, and others (but see Byron, 2007). This is most regrettable, given 
that much of this earlier work is extremely relevant to many of the conceptual and 
theoretical challenges facing biologists today (see Etxeberria and Umerez, 2006). But 
even more importantly, this earlier discourse demonstrates that philosophy of biology 
can be much more than a philosophy of evolution plus allied disciplines. It illustrates 
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how the central philosophical concern in the science of life really must be the nature of 
life itself, and not any theory or principle devoted to explaining particular aspects of it.  
 
Ever since its Neo-Darwinian transformation in the 1960s, the philosophy of biology 
has been predominantly concerned with the biological entities most relevant to the 
understanding of evolution, namely sub-organismic entities like genes and supra-
organismic entities like populations. The crucial entity connecting them, the organism 
as a whole, has fallen between the cracks of philosophical inquiry. One of the major 
motivations underlying this doctoral thesis is the desire to contribute to ongoing efforts 
to return the organism to its rightful place at the centre of the philosophy of biology. 
With this in mind, this thesis will be addressing many of the same problems and 
questions which characterized the neglected pre-Neo-Darwinian tradition in the 
philosophy of biology in an attempt to help broaden up again the current discourse. As 
a result, this thesis will concern itself with issues more relevant to organisms and cells 
than to genes and populations, and it will examine problems that are perhaps more 
central to physiology and cell biology than to evolution and genetics.  
 
1.2. Mechanistic Thinking in Biology: The Need for Reassessment 
 
Once one is liberated from the evolutionary bias which has set the agenda in the 
philosophy of biology discourse over the past forty years, it becomes clear that, in a 
very fundamental sense, to do philosophy of biology is to reflect on the autonomy of 
the subject matter of biology, namely living organisms. Indeed, to acknowledge the 
existence of a ‘biology’, i.e. a science of organisms, is already to recognize at some 
basic level that there is something particular about organisms worthy of independent 
consideration. In general, the nature of any object becomes most perceptible when it is 
contrasted with a second object that is similar to the first in some respects but differs 
from it in others. Accordingly, biological reflections about the nature of living systems 
since the seventeenth century have tended to proceed by means of comparisons with 
mechanical systems. This should not be surprising. Organisms and machines share 
many features (e.g., organization, interacting parts, purposive behaviour, etc.) and yet 
they are also clearly different in other respects. And because machines are the products 
of human design, their operation is clearly understood. This makes them extremely 
compelling comparative models for thinking about the nature of organisms. 
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One of the first to undertake an explicit comparison was Georg Ernst Stahl, who in 
1706 published a treatise entitled De Mechanismi et Organismi Diversitate. Although 
for Stahl the concepts of ‘organism’ and ‘mechanism’ did not refer to living and 
mechanical systems as they do today, but to the principles of order embodied by these 
two kinds of systems (see Cheung, 2006), his treatise already illustrates the epistemic 
benefits of comparing organisms with machines in order to gain insight into the nature 
of the latter. In a sense, the development in thinking about organisms since Stahl 
represents a struggle between the view that organisms and machines differ only in 
degree but not in kind, and the view that organisms and machines differ in fundamental 
ways. According to the first view, which we can call ‘mechanistic’, the theories, 
concepts, and methods that enable the construction and explanation of machines, and 
which have proven so successful in explaining the physical world, suffice to capture 
the nature of living systems. According to the second view, which we can call ‘anti-
mechanistic’ or ‘vitalistic’, these theories, concepts, and methods ultimately come 
short in the explanation of life.  
 
In modern times, it has been the mechanistic view that has gained the most acceptance. 
This is largely due to the proven track record of mechanistic biology in elucidating 
many of the structural features of organisms and the functional processes occurring 
within them. A clear symptom of the pervasiveness of the mechanistic view of life is 
that it is no longer explicitly defended. Whereas in the past, discussions over whether 
organisms can be understood as machines were heated, controversial, and considered 
of the greatest theoretical importance, today it is often simply assumed that organisms 
are machines, albeit ones cobbled together by natural selection (e.g., Monod, 1977; 
Dawkins, 1986; Dennett, 1995; Rosenberg, 2006, etc.). Indeed, provided that the 
evolutionary dimension of organisms is acknowledged, mechanistic biology, by virtue 
of its empirical success, has been allowed to corrode every other possible aspect of 
organisms which could be taken as a basis to demarcate them fundamentally from 
machines. This is precisely why evolutionary theory is regarded as being “what makes 
biology unique” (Mayr, 2004); because, in every other respect, the biological world 
can be encompassed by the principles of physics, chemistry, and engineering. 
 
Overall, the emphasis on evolutionary issues in the philosophy of biology on the one 
hand, and the empirical success of the mechanistic approach in experimental biology 
on the other, has contributed to deflating the ontological and epistemological 
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significance of the organism. In this thesis, I attempt to illustrate the fundamental 
importance of the organism category for biology by providing a critical examination of 
the influence of mechanistic thinking in shaping our understanding of living systems. I 
oppose the deeply entrenched assumption that for biology to be a rigorous, 
empirically-grounded science, it must necessarily be framed in mechanistic terms. 
Instead I argue that “the mechanistic conception of life”, as Jacques Loeb (1912) 
branded it, despite its pervasiveness, is not only not inevitable, but it is actually 
seriously misleading. Far from enabling a satisfactory understanding of life, it actually 
obfuscates it by overlooking precisely what makes organisms distinctive. In fact, it is 
the anti-mechanistic or vitalistic tradition in biology, which began with Stahl’s 
rejection of the mechanization of the body proposed by René Descartes, which I 
believe possesses the best conceptual tools for coming to terms with the nature of life.  
 
An examination of the presuppositions underlying the adoption of machine models in 
biology would by itself be more than sufficient to warrant a doctoral-level 
investigation. However, the place of mechanistic thinking in biology has become even 
more interesting in recent years following the advent of a research program within the 
philosophy of science with the intention of making sense of the role played by the 
concept of mechanism in scientific practice. This new interest in mechanisms is 
motivated by the realization that the classic deductive-nomological model of scientific 
explanation inherited from logical empiricism (i.e., Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948) 
does not do justice to the actual nature of biological explanations. Most biologists do 
not appeal to laws in their explanations, but to mechanisms. Ever since Peter 
Machamer, Lindley Darden, and Carl Craver published the now classic paper 
‘Thinking about Mechanisms’ (2000) a decade ago (which has become the single most 
cited article in Philosophy of Science), an enormous amount of philosophical work has 
been carried out with the purpose of characterizing the functions of mechanisms in 
biological inquiry. Surprisingly, however, there has been no attempt whatsoever to 
investigate the link between the contemporary appeal to mechanisms in biological 
research, and the older mechanistic tradition in biology. Some important questions 
remain answered concerning this relation. For example, does the current mechanismic 
program in the philosophy of biology represent some sort of continuation of the agenda 
of mechanistic philosophy as it applies to biology? Does the formulation of 
mechanisms in the investigation of biological phenomena commit a biologist to a 
mechanistic understanding of living systems, and of biology as a science? What 
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exactly do biologists mean when they use the word ‘mechanism’? One of the 
objectives of this thesis will be to provide satisfactory answers to these questions.  
 
Finally, a further line of investigation which I will explore is concerned with the 
thematic space that opens up once the philosophy of biology is conceptualized beyond 
evolution and living systems are returned to the centre stage of biological thought. 
Although Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection has attracted far more 
philosophical attention than any other idea in biology, it is not the only general 
principle in biology. In fact, there is at least one other theory which can claim the same 
degree of importance in the living world, namely cell theory. In the words of E. B. 
Wilson (1900, p. 1), “no other biological generalization, save only the theory of 
organic evolution, has brought so many apparently diverse phenomena under a 
common point of view or has accomplished more for the unification of knowledge”. 
However, despite its pivotal position in the edifice of biological knowledge, it has 
hardly received any attention at all by philosophers of biology. In this thesis I will take 
some preliminary steps to remedy this situation by analyzing the motivations which led 
to its formulation and examining the rationale of the major criticisms that have been 
waged against it in the century and three quarters since it was first formulated. 
Ultimately, I will argue that thinking philosophically about cell theory opens up a new 
way of epistemically decomposing organisms that overcomes some of the limitations 
of the physicochemical reductionism of mechanistic biology.  
 
1.3. Structure of the Thesis and Breakdown of the Argument 
 
This thesis is structured into six chapters: the present introduction (Chapter 1), two 
large-scale studies (Chapters 2 and 3), two medium-sized studies (Chapters 4 and 5), 
and a conclusion (Chapter 6). Each of the four studies attempts to offer a critical 
examination of a particular aspect of mechanistic thinking in biology by adopting 
different points of departure and drawing on different intellectual resources. Although 
the lines of argument developed in each of the studies are to a certain extent 
independent from one another, they also relate to each other in significant ways. 
Indeed, some recurring ideas will feature in all of the chapters. The overarching 
expectation is that the various critical discussions of mechanistic thinking will have 
had a cumulative effect by the end of the thesis. Let me now discuss in a little more 
detail what exactly I will be covering in the ensuing chapters, and what will be the 
major claims I will be advancing. 
 - 16 - 
 
In Chapter 2, I will consider mechanistic biology and its vitalistic alternative in a 
historical context. My aim will be to retrace the conceptual evolution of the 
mechanicism-vitalism dispute by selecting some of the most representative episodes of 
its long and turbulent history. My historical excursion will pay particular attention to 
the underlying ontological and epistemological presuppositions informing the opposing 
sides of the dispute, and to the elements of continuity and discontinuity within each 
doctrine when considered along the historical timeline. This examination will lead me 
to offer a new interpretation of the development and philosophical relevance of this 
dispute, in addition to a complete reassessment of the nature of the relation between 
the schools of mechanicism and vitalism. However, the main novelty of my reappraisal 
of the mechanicism-vitalism dispute will be the claim that vitalism, far from having 
been eradicated from biology at the turn of the twentieth century as is generally 
assumed, actually got recast in naturalistic terms, giving rise to an organicist 
movement which flourished in the work of many theoretical biologists in the first half 
of the twentieth century. I will also attempt to show in this chapter that the conflict 
between mechanistic and vitalistic conceptions of the organism remains very much 
alive in biology today, even if the language in which the issues are discussed has 
changed somewhat.  
 
In Chapter 3, I will consider mechanistic biology and its organicist alternative in the 
context of present-day biology. Specifically, I will take issue with the central unifying 
idea of mechanistic biology, namely the machine conception of the organism (MCO, 
hereafter). The MCO elegantly and succinctly sums up the mechanistic understanding 
of life, and it will therefore serve as the central focus of examination in this chapter. 
My critical examination will proceed in a series of consecutive stages. I will begin by 
tracing the historical origins of the MCO, considering its philosophical foundations, 
and then exposing its fundamental problems. I will then elaborate my criticisms of the 
MCO by examining in turn the explanatory, theoretical, epistemic, and ethical 
implications that result from its acceptance. I will argue that explanatorily, it vindicates 
the appeal to reductionism; theoretically, it leads to a heavily distorted understanding 
of both development and evolution; epistemically, it eliminates the boundary between 
biology and engineering; and ethically, it leads to a problematic view of organisms as 
disposable objects. Following these extended criticisms, I will explore the alternative 
conception of the organism favoured by organicist biologists and illustrate how it 
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sidesteps the conceptual problems generated by the MCO. Finally, I will also consider 
in this chapter what role, if any, should the MCO play in biology in light of its basic 
deficiencies as a theory of the organism. 
 
In Chapter 4, I will carry out a detailed philosophical analysis of the concept of 
mechanism in biology. I will argue that the term ‘mechanism’ has three distinct 
meanings. It may refer to a thesis about the nature of life and biology (i.e., 
‘mechanicism’ or ‘mechanistic biology’), to the structure and internal workings of a 
machine-like system (i.e., ‘machine mechanism’), or to an epistemic device that 
facilitates the explanation of a phenomenon of interest (i.e., ‘causal mechanism’). In 
this chapter I will trace the conceptual evolution of ‘mechanism’ in the history of 
biological thought, and I will examine how the three meanings of this term have come 
to be featured in the philosophy of biology, situating the new ‘mechanismic program’ 
in this context. My central claim will be that the leading advocates of the mechanismic 
program (e.g., Carl Craver, Lindley Darden, William Bechtel, etc.) inadvertently 
conflate the different biological senses of ‘mechanism’. Specifically, they all 
inappropriately endow causal mechanisms with the ontic status of machine 
mechanisms, and this invariably results in problematic accounts of the role played by 
mechanism-talk in scientific practice. Ultimately, I will suggest that for effective 
biological analyses of the concept of mechanism, causal mechanisms need to be 
distinguished from machine mechanisms, and the new mechanismic program in the 
philosophy of biology needs to be demarcated from the traditional concerns of 
mechanistic biology, examined in Chapters 2 and 3. 
 
In Chapter 5, I will shift gear somewhat and turn to an examination of cell theory. In 
order to make philosophical sense of this theory, I will propose a perspective I call 
‘biological atomism’. Biological atomism conceives the activity of a living organism 
as the result of the activities and interactions of elementary constituents, each of which 
individually already exhibits all the attributes proper to life. In this chapter, I will use 
the perspective of biological atomism to identify the theoretical antecedents of cell 
theory, as well as to come to terms with the major criticisms that have been waged 
against it. My claim will be that biological atomism not only enables a better 
understanding of the foundations of cell theory, but that it also constitutes a useful 
perspective through which to analyze its criticisms. The reason is that all major 
criticisms of cell theory can be interpreted as attempts to relocate the true biological 
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atom away from the cell to a level of organization either above or below it. I will also 
show that an important consequence of biological atomism is that it opens up a new 
way of thinking about the reductionistic explanation of organisms that avoids the 
pitfalls of mechanistic biology by ending the reduction at the level of living units. The 
implication of this is that it is possible to break down organisms into their parts for the 
purposes of explanation without having to surrender the irreducible properties of living 
systems when examining those parts. Indeed, the explanatory power of cell theory is 
based precisely on the exploitation of this possibility.  
 
Finally, in Chapter 6, I will conclude by bringing together the common threads 
connecting the expositions in the previous chapters. This will enable me to offer a 
general evaluation of the status of mechanistic thinking in biology. I will also suggest 
some viable directions in which future research may be oriented on the basis of the 
findings made in this thesis.  
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Chapter 2 
 
THE MECHANICISM-VITALISM DISPUTE:  
A REAPPRAISAL 
 
 
 
The contest between the mechanistic and vitalistic conceptions is like a game of 
chess played over nearly two thousand years. It is essentially the same 
arguments that always come back, though in manifold disguises, modifications, 
and forms. In the last resort, they are an expression of two opposing tendencies 
in the human mind. – Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1952) 
 
2.1. Introduction: The Mechanism-Vitalism Dispute – A Dead Issue? 
 
Upon embarking on a critical analysis of the mechanism-vitalism dispute, what one 
finds most surprising is the remarkably little attention it has received from 
contemporary philosophers of biology. The received view is that this debate represents 
nothing more than a closed episode in the history of biology, with little or nothing to 
contribute to current philosophical discussions. This situation is not without a sense of 
irony, given that the very first book published with the title The Philosophy of Biology 
(i.e., Johnstone, 1914) was an extensive examination of the philosophical implications 
of the mechanism-vitalism conflict for our understanding of life (cf. Lillie, 1914). 
Indeed, since its inception in the seventeenth century, this dispute has provided the 
central battleground in which biologists have quarrelled over the nature of organisms, 
the difference between living and nonliving matter, the legitimacy of applying to 
biology the concepts, theories, and methods of physics and chemistry, and the question 
of how far the physical sciences can ultimately take us in explaining life. These would 
appear to constitute some of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of 
biology, and yet the mechanism-vitalism conflict remains virtually ignored by 
contemporary philosophers. The justification that is usually given for this neglect is 
that the debate itself came to an end in the early twentieth century when mechanistic 
biologists conclusively undermined the scientific grounds for postulating a vital 
principle operating in the organism. Indeed, it is widely perceived that the excoriation 
of vitalism and the consolidation of mechanism were necessary steps in the 
establishment of modern biology. As a result, there can be nothing of real 
philosophical interest in vitalism given that this doctrine is fundamentally at odds with 
the tenets of modern science.   
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In this chapter I will challenge both the historical and philosophical contentions of this 
received view and propose in its place a new interpretation of the mechanism-vitalism 
dispute. By exposing the underlying presuppositions informing mechanism and 
vitalism, I will ultimately argue that this conflict remains very much alive in 
contemporary discussions over the nature of life, even if the terms in which the issues 
are discussed have changed somewhat. My exposition of the mechanism-vitalism 
dispute will be selective rather than comprehensive, and will primarily seek to provide 
evidence for the gradual conceptual evolution of the dispute from its origin to the 
present day. My major objectives shall be to (a) analyze the historical events and 
ideological motivations which led to its inception; (b) trace its development by 
examining some representative episodes of its history; (c) identify the elements of 
continuity and discontinuity in the epistemic convictions of the opposing sides of the 
dispute; and (d) ascertain the underlying nature of the recurring disagreement. The 
hope is that my examination of the mechanism-vitalism dispute demonstrates not only 
its instrumental role in shaping the historical development of biological thought, but 
also its critical importance and relevance to current theoretical and philosophical 
discussions in biology. 
 
2.2. ‘Mechanism’ and ‘Vitalism’: Defining the Terms of the Conflict 
 
The task of examining the mechanism-vitalism dispute is encumbered, as Arthur 
Lovejoy (1911, p. 610) observed, by “the lack of either clear or generally accepted 
definitions of the terms (‘vitalism’ and ‘mechanism’) used to designate the opposing 
doctrines under discussion”. C. D. Broad (1925, p. 43) similarly complained that “One 
is never quite sure what is meant by ‘Mechanism’ and by ‘Vitalism’”. In light of this 
situation, before I can delve into the historical development of the mechanism-vitalism 
conflict, it will first be necessary to provide clear and succinct characterizations of the 
opposing sides in this dispute.   
 
The problem with the term ‘Mechanism’ as it is generally used by historians and 
philosophers of biology is that it is an umbrella term for three distinct notions. Chapter 
4 will be devoted to untangling the different meanings of this concept and examining 
the philosophical consequences which arise from their conflation. For the time being, it 
shall only be necessary to characterize the sense of ‘mechanism’ that concerns us here, 
which I shall refer to hereafter as mechanicism. Mechanicism (also called mechanistic 
philosophy or mechanical philosophy) refers to the natural philosophy that became the 
 - 21 - 
foundation of modern science, and which has its roots in the work of Galileo Galilei, 
René Descartes, Pierre Gassendi, Robert Boyle, and Isaac Newton. This philosophy is 
usually associated with a naturalistic, atomistic, and deterministic view of nature which 
tends to lend itself to mathematical characterization. However, mechanicism in 
biology, or mechanistic biology, has a rather more specific meaning (cf. Broad, 1925; 
Woodger, 1929; Bertalanffy, 1952; Lewontin, 2000; Allen, 2005; Dupré, 2007; 
Canguilhem, 2008). It can be characterized by reference to the following key tenets: 
 
1. The commitment to an ontological continuity between the living and the nonliving, 
exemplified by the quintessential mechanistic conception of organisms as 
machines, analogous and comparable to man-made artefacts 
2. The view that biological wholes (i.e., organisms) are directly determined by the 
activities and interactions of their component parts, and that consequently all 
properties of organisms can be characterized from the bottom up in increasing 
levels of organization 
3. The focus on the efficient and material causes of organisms, and the unequivocal 
repudiation of final causes in biological explanation 
4. The commitment to explanatory and methodological reductionism in the study of 
living systems 
 
The term ‘Vitalism’ also demands some clarification, though for rather different 
reasons. Since the early decades of the twentieth century, it has become customary to 
employ ‘vitalism’ as a term of abuse to disparage and ridicule irrational or unscientific 
views. Consider, for instance, what Francis Crick (1966, p. 99) had to say about 
vitalism in his John Danz Lectures: “Provided, then, that scientific study continues on 
a considerable scale, we can foresee a time when vitalism will not seriously be 
considered by educated men […] And so, to those of you who may be vitalists, I would 
make this prophecy: what everyone believed yesterday, and you believe today, only 
cranks will believe tomorrow”. The tendency to vilify vitalism has been a recurring 
theme throughout the twentieth century. The situation was clearly recognized by 
William McDougall, who deplored it in his book The Riddle of Life (1938) in the 
following passage:  
 
In modern controversy it is very usual among the critics of vitalism to assume that vitalism 
consists essentially in the postulation of a, or the, vital force. It is then easy to pour scorn 
upon the vitalist by pointing out the quite empty, almost meaningless nature of the term 
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‘vital force’. This, however, is not a fair dealing. It is one form of that argumentation by 
way of innuendo and abuse of one’s opponents which in this sphere is so common and so 
much to be deplored. (McDougall, 1938, p. 11) 
 
The modern caricaturization of vitalism is rather unfortunate, as we will see, given the 
large number of eminent biologists throughout history who have developed their ideas 
within a vitalistic framework. My examination of the conceptual evolution of the 
mechanicism-vitalism dispute will attempt to demonstrate that the recent vulgarization 
of vitalism is not only historically misleading but is also philosophically unjustified. A 
fairly unbiased definition of vitalism is provided by the Oxford Dictionary of 
Philosophy, which refers to it as:  
 
The doctrine that there is some feature of living bodies that prevents their nature being 
entirely explained in physical or chemical terms. This feature may be the presence of a 
further ‘thing’ (such as a soul), but it may also be simply the emergence of special 
relations or principles of organization arising from the complexity of the biological 
organism. (Blackburn, 2005, p. 383)  
 
But even this characterization does not do full justice to the doctrine. As the 
philosophical antithesis of mechanicism, I maintain that the most appropriate way to 
characterize vitalism is to understand it as the school of biological thought which 
upholds the direct inverse of the four core tenets of mechanicism, namely: 
 
1. The commitment to an ontological discontinuity between the living and the 
nonliving, exemplified by the rejection of the machine conception of the organism, 
and the postulation of a vital principle that categorically demarcates living beings 
from inanimate objects 
2. The view that biological wholes (i.e., organisms) possess system-level properties 
not explainable by attending to the activities and interactions of their component 
parts, and that consequently the distinctive properties of organisms need to be 
characterized from the top down in decreasing levels of organization 
3. The focus on formal and final causes in biological explanation over and above 
material and efficient ones 
4. The rejection of the sufficiency of explanatory and methodological reductionism in 
the study of living systems 
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This characterization of vitalism is appropriate because it does not define this doctrine 
in purely negative terms. Moreover, this understanding provides a suitable basis upon 
which to situate and contextualize the various forms of vitalism proposed throughout 
history, as well as serving as a convenient reference point in my examination of the 
evolution of vitalistic thinking from its inception to the present day. With clear 
characterizations of mechanicism and vitalism now in hand, it is now possible to turn 
to the historical examination of the debate.  
 
2.3. The Dawn of Mechanicism and the Cartesian Mechanization of Life  
 
It is sometimes suggested that the first expression of the clash between mechanicism 
and vitalism can be traced all the way back to the conflict between Democritean 
atomistic and Aristotelian philosophies of nature. However, this is quite anachronistic. 
Although Democritean atomism does resemble mechanicism in its emphasis on the 
inert, undirected, corpuscular nature of matter, and Aristotelian philosophy does share 
with vitalism the emphasis on the holistic and purposive features of organisms, it 
would not be appropriate to locate the inception of the mechanicism-vitalism dispute 
this far back in history. The dispute emerged as a consequence of the mechanistic 
establishment of modern science, and the proponents of both sides have primarily 
consisted of natural scientists concerned with the task of subsuming the phenomenon 
of life into the body of science rather than philosophers intent on providing systematic 
accounts of nature.  
 
The mechanicism-vitalism dispute, properly conceived, began with the mechanization 
of life in the seventeenth century, which was itself an extension of the partly 
antecedent but still continuing mechanization of nature as a whole. This mechanization 
entailed conceiving the world as the mechanic conceives a machine, namely as a 
physical system explainable in terms of the size, shape and motion of its component 
parts (Garber, 2002). Mechanicism emerged in reaction to the Scholastic interpretation 
of Aristotelian natural philosophy, which was ultimately grounded in the irreducible 
tendencies of bodies to behave according to their substantial forms. The mechanization 
of physics entailed, among other things, an overthrow of obscure causes of terrestrial 
and celestial motion in favour of mathematical descriptions and a focus on 
deterministic efficient causation. In the science of life, the establishment of 
mechanicism was expressed by a shift away from explanations in terms of psychic 
causes, substantial forms, and mysterious faculties to explanations in terms of contact 
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forces, particulate motions, and mechanical and hydraulic models (Smith, 1976).  All 
aspects of living organisms (except the minds of human beings) were subjected to the 
same kind of experimental, quantitative, and reductive analysis that was proving so 
successful in the characterization of the inanimate world. The upshot of this approach 
to biology was that that life as a phenomenon was transformed into an object of 
empirical investigation by bringing it within the scope of the analyzable and the 
explainable (Grene and Depew, 2004, pp. 36-48). 
 
René Descartes (1596-1650) was the first to systematically apply the mechanistic 
philosophy to the science of living beings, and for that reason alone he has sometimes 
been credited with founding modern biology (e.g., Hall, 1970, p. 55). Although his 
main body of work was concerned with the mathematical characterization of physical 
science, Descartes also nurtured an interest in physiology, which led him to perform 
numerous dissections and experiments. As a means of extending mechanistic 
philosophy to the biological realm, Descartes argues that organisms are highly 
contrived machines which operate deterministically according to fixed, 
mathematically-describable laws (Des Chene, 2001). In his Traité de L’Homme of 
1633, Descartes draws on the machine conception of the organism (MCO, hereafter) to 
fashion a thoroughly mechanical understanding of human physiology, which included 
explanations of sensation, respiration, muscle contraction, neurophysiology, digestion, 
reflex action, and the circulation of the blood. Indeed, this treatise has been described 
by historians of biology as “the first textbook on physiology” (Foster, 1924, p. 57; 
Singer, 1989, p. 358). In relation to his proposal to understand organisms as machines, 
Descartes ends L’Homme with the following remarks:  
 
I desire, I say, that you should consider that these functions follow in this machine simply 
from the disposition of the organs as wholly naturally as the movements of a clock or other 
automaton follow from the disposition of its counterweights and wheels. To explain these 
functions, then, it is not necessary to conceive of any vegetative or sensitive soul, or any 
other principle of movement or life, other than its blood and its spirits which are agitated 
by the heat of the fire that burns continuously in its heart, and which is of the same nature 
as those fires that occur in inanimate bodies. (Descartes, 1998, p. 169) 
 
This passage highlights two crucial points in Descartes’ philosophy of biology that 
tend to get overlooked or, at the very least, are not always fully appreciated. The first is 
that when Descartes characterizes living beings as machines, he is not employing 
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colourful rhetoric or drawing upon a suggestive metaphor. Rather, he is making an 
exact identification.
1
 As I will show shortly, the Cartesian MCO was to become hugely 
influential in the subsequent development of biological thought, as it came to 
constitute the central organizing theme underlying and unifying all mechanistic 
characterizations of life (see Chapter 3). The second point that should be noted is that 
neither in this passage nor in any of his other philosophical writings does Descartes 
seek to provide a general understanding of what it takes for an organism to be alive 
(Ablondi, 1998). In his most explicit statements, such as the one quoted above, he 
seems to equate life with heat. Life is an ensemble of motions that have their kinetic 
origin in heat; specifically, a certain ‘fire without light’ that burns, in men and animals, 
in the heart (Mackenzie, 1975). Interestingly, in the few passages particularly 
concerned with life itself, Descartes limits his examples to animals with hearts. 
Nowhere does he attempt to account for the life, heat, or internal motion of other kinds 
of organisms such as plants. From this it seems clear that Descartes (in opposition to 
Aristotle) did not consider life to be an important category; the difference between 
organisms and man-made artifacts like clocks is only a quantitative one. On the whole, 
Descartes was far more concerned with providing a synthetic model for physiology 
(which he found in the MCO) that enabled the integration of the most recent biological 
findings of his time (Sloan, 1977). 
 
Although Descartes himself had to deal directly with the objections of his Neo-
Aristotelian contemporaries by showing that a reasonably comprehensible mechanistic 
natural philosophy was possible (and indeed desirable), a generation or so later, that 
much could be taken for granted. Indeed, by the time of Descartes’ death in 1650, his 
mechanistic approach to biology had gained adherents in medical faculties across 
Europe. In relation to Descartes’ influence, the Danish anatomist Nicolas Steno (1638-
1686) remarked in 1666 that:  
 
Descartes […] was the first who dared to explain all the functions of man, and especially 
of the brain, in a mechanical manner. Other authors describe man; Descartes puts before us 
merely a machine, but by means of this he very clearly exposed the ignorance of others 
                                                     
1
 Of course, this is not to say that Descartes fails to recognize the evident complexity of organisms 
compared to inanimate machines. Indeed, engineered as they are by an omnipotent God, organisms are 
machines infinitely more ingenious than those of our making. In Descartes own words, the human body, 
“having been made by the hands of God, is incomparably better ordered than any machine that can be 
devised by man” (Descartes, quoted in Ablondi, 1998, p. 183) 
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who have treated of man, and opened up for us a way by which to investigate the use of the 
other parts of the body as no one has done before. (Steno, quoted in Sloan, 1977, p. 20) 
 
Mechanicism thus quickly became the generally accepted biological framework within 
which empirical research was gathered and interpreted and theoretical disputes were 
debated. The proponents of mechanistic explanation no longer had to argue its 
legitimacy and could instead focus on measuring its applicability and testing its 
limitations (Des Chene, 2005). One of the most prominent practitioners of the newly 
established mechanistic biology, Giovanni Alfonso Borelli (1608-1679) combined the 
Cartesian mechanistic framework with Galileo’s emphasis on mathematical 
descriptions in his De Motu Animalium of 1680 to make sense of a wide range of 
physiological phenomena, including muscle contraction, nerve reflexes, and blood 
circulation. The successes of these early attempts seemed at the time to signal the 
triumphant subjugation of life to the rational and analytical character of mechanistic 
natural philosophy.  
 
2.4. The Rise of Animistic Vitalism in Reaction to Cartesian Mechanicism 
 
Towards the end of seventeenth century, however, the intellectual atmosphere 
gradually began to change. As more mechanists began applying their philosophy to 
more complex biological phenomena, it soon became clear that the resources at their 
disposal were insufficient to explain the functioning of living organisms. As their 
intricate organization was progressively revealed, the difficulty of ascribing all their 
properties to mere impulses acting on coordinated sets of pulleys, levers, and hooks, 
increased. Amid the growing discontent with the rigid application of mechanicism in 
biology, the animistic conception of the organism that had prevailed prior to the 
‘Cartesian turn’ began to acquire currency once again. However, this new doctrine, 
which I shall term animistic vitalism, was not simply a reversion to the old Greek (or 
more specifically, Galenic) idea of different soul-faculties for different physiological 
functions (Hall, 1970, p. 58). Instead, it posited a non-physical vital agent which 
orchestrated the complex set of functions and operations of the body.  
 
It is worth noting that animistic vitalism from its very inception was far less concerned 
with substantiating the existence of the vital agency it postulated than in combating the 
increasing mechanistic tendency to neglect, or at the very least grossly oversimplify, 
the inherent complexity and unpredictability of life. Animistic vitalism resorted to the 
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common intuition that a living being cannot be understood as a mere machine 
operating predeterminately, as it displays behaviours and possesses qualities that defy 
mechanistic explanation. The perfection of organisms, their properties, their 
generation, required according to this doctrine an unknown principle, an ‘x’ beyond all 
understanding, to account for the purposiveness of living beings. Moreover, Klerk 
(1979, p. 8) suggests that there might have been a psychological element in the original 
appeal of animistic vitalism, as the mechanistic implication that man is simply a 
machine must have resulted unacceptable to many. But probably most importantly, 
animistic vitalism had its base in everyday experience; when an animal dies, its body 
remains the same except for the disappearance of force and warmth. As a result, it was 
easily concluded that the organism was governed by a vital substance which endowed 
organic matter with life, and which left the body at the moment of death.  
 
Animistic vitalism found its most prominent advocate in the figure of Georg Ernst 
Stahl (1660-1734), an influential German chemist and physician who argued that an 
anima sensitiva (analogous in some respects to the psyche of Aristotle) resides in the 
body of the organism, endows it with life, and develops through it all vital activities. 
For Stahl, the body exists not for itself, but for the soul which directly controls its 
activities for its own ends, and which is by itself responsible for all mental and 
physiological activities carried out by the body (Driesch, 1914, p. 31). A determinant 
factor in the development of Stahl’s animistic vitalism was his rejection of the 
Cartesian mechanistic conception of organisms. He rejects the thesis that the living 
body can be reduced to physical corpuscles and their relations because the physical 
parts composing a body cannot explain its living state. The soul alone is responsible 
for adding life to make the organism alive. Thus, any mechanistic approach to the 
living organism will inherently fail to explain its operations and movements because 
these are essentially of a different nature from those characteristic of physicochemical 
substances (Wheeler, 1939, p. 25). In this way, in animistic vitalism the living and the 
nonliving are, both materially and formally, in a fundamental sense in conflict with one 
another. It is not merely the case that physiological function is not even in principle 
reducible to physicochemical processes, but it is further the case that it occurs in 
violation of such processes. The soul marks a break in the natural order of things, such 
that in light of its existence, the science which deals with the domain of the living is, 
and must forever remain, independent of, and irreducible to, the science dealing with 
the inanimate world. 
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Animistic vitalism is clearly dualistic, as it affirms the cohabitation of a material body 
that is in effect inanimate (and therefore somewhat analogous to the MCO of the 
mechanist) and a life-soul which is exclusively responsible for the life of the organism. 
Although this tolerance for a radical metaphysical discontinuity in nature may seem 
completely unacceptable from the modern perspective, it should be remembered that 
the mechanistic natural philosophy of the time was equally tainted by metaphysical 
discontinuities, as is exemplified by the Cartesian mind-body dualism. So it is clear 
that, at least in the seventeenth century, the mechanists’ criticism of vitalism could not 
be motivated by the desire to denounce the ontological demarcation that the animistic 
vitalists posited between life and matter, as the Cartesian mechanists were themselves 
defending an equally distinct ontological dualism between mind and matter. The 
crucial disagreement between the two sides of the dispute at this time is primarily over 
the extent of applicability of mechanistic natural philosophy. For the animistic vitalist, 
mechanistic explanations are well-suited for the study of the inanimate world, but are 
of no use for understanding living beings. For the Cartesian mechanist, mechanistic 
explanations are appropriate for characterising both physicochemical processes and 
physiological processes, but are inappropriate (or, at the very least, insufficient) for 
understanding rational processes. The interesting implication of this is that during the 
seventeenth century neither of the two doctrines could claim universal applicability. 
Rather, in relation to the physicochemical universe, the animistic vitalist defended the 
independence and irreducibility of vital phenomena, whereas the Cartesian mechanist 
defended the independence and irreducibility of mental phenomena. 
 
Finally, it should be mentioned that Cartesian mechanicism and animistic vitalism 
were not the only two doctrines informing the physiological and medical research that 
was pursued during this period. In fact, there were a number of conceptual positions 
standing in between mechanicism and vitalism (see Hall, 1970, p. 59; Singer, 1989, pp. 
358-367). Some natural philosophers, such as Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655) and 
Thomas Willis (1621-1675), acknowledged the vital soul but in addition attempted to 
‘materialize’ it by giving it a corpuscular constitution. On the other hand, there were 
others like Claude Perrault (1613-1688) and Pierre-Sylvain Régis (1632-1707), who 
admitted the existence of the life-soul but rarely invoked for explanatory purposes, 
retaining the MCO in their biological investigations.  
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2.5. The Double-Edged Influence of Newton’s Natural Philosophy 
 
With the work of Sir Isaac Newton (1643-1727), mechanicism underwent a qualitative 
change. Descartes had described the universe in terms of matter and motion. Newton 
added space (i.e., a void in which particles move and interact) and incorporated the 
notions of attraction and repulsion, which manifested themselves in nature as ‘forces’, 
to explain how organised corpuscular matter maintains its cohesion. Newton’s 
conception of force was initially criticised by some of his mechanistic contemporaries–
–including Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716)––because it was seen as an attempt to 
reintroduce into natural philosophy Scholastic occult qualities through the back door 
(Boas, 1952, pp. 509-510). However, the forces Newton postulated, unlike the occult 
qualities of the Scholastics, could be fully operationalized in mathematical terms. Their 
formal characterization meant that they could be profitably used to effectively explain 
and accurately predict an extremely wide range of physical phenomena. No additional 
explanation of the forces’ origin was required to understand their mode of operation. 
As long as the postulated forces could be shown to exist experimentally, accounting for 
their actual cause was not strictly necessary, as their existence could be deduced from 
their action on the phenomena. It was this epistemological shift that enabled the 
Newtonian conception of action at a distance (embodied in his force of gravity 
described in his law of universal gravitation, and in his conception of attractive and 
repulsive forces described in his theory of chemical affinity) to become intrinsically 
ingrained within the mechanistic worldview.  
 
One of the most salient repercussions of Newton’s transformation of mechanicism was 
that it opened up a new area of possibility in which to investigate chemical processes. 
Building on Robert Boyle’s (1627-1691) theories on the structure of matter, Newton 
was responsible for transforming the notion of chemical affinity from a metaphysical 
alchemical principle to a physical property arising in the interactions of different 
compounds that could be measured and predicted (Boas, 1952, pp. 510-515). The 
upshot of this mechanization of chemistry was that new physiological processes, such 
as digestion and respiration, became accessible to experimental study. René Réaumur 
(1683-1757) and Lazzaro Spallanzani (1729-1799) were able to study digestion 
because they understood it as a chain of chemical reactions instigated by the action of 
the gastric juice. Antoine Lavoisier (1743-1794) was able to study respiration because 
he viewed it as a process of chemical combustion (Jacob, 1973, p. 42). The breathing 
of a bird and the burning of a candle are, for Lavoisier, equivalent objects of study. 
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Consequently, they can both be investigated using the same concepts and methods. In 
this way, the mechanistic developments in the physicochemical sciences initiated by 
Newton’s discoveries led to a fundamental change in the way living beings were 
mechanistically studied during the eighteenth century.  
 
But did this shift in the way mechanists study life transform their actual conception of 
life itself? It appears that the answer is both yes and no. Strictly speaking, the organism 
in the eighteenth century remained all that it had been in the seventeenth century: a 
well-crafted machine. However, the very nature of the machine changed. It was no 
longer a machine functioning only by shape, size, and motion, but according to a wide 
range of mechanistic principles. The MCO evolved from a clock, with its springs, 
cogs, and levers, to a steam engine, with its source of heat that had to be continuously 
renewed, its cooling system, and its devices for adjusting and coordinating the 
operations of the various parts. Accordingly, Lavoisier would state that:   
 
The animal machine is governed by three main regulators: respiration, which consumes 
oxygen and carbon and provides heating power; perspiration, which increases or decreases 
according to whether a great deal of heat has to be transported or not; and finally digestion, 
which restores to the blood what it loses in breathing and perspiration. (Lavoisier, quoted 
in Jacob 1973, p. 43) 
 
What is often forgotten, however, is that Newtonian natural philosophy exerted as 
much of an influence on the development of vitalism as it did on the development of 
mechanicism. In the ‘31
st
 Query’ of Newton’s Opticks (published in 1730), Newton 
famously remarked that just as the physical world is governed by the forces of 
gravitation, chemical attraction and repulsion, and electricity, there may be other kinds 
of forces yet to be discovered operating in other domains of nature (Grene and Depew, 
2004, p. 89). This insinuation instigated numerous biologists in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries to embark on the search for other unknown forces of nature, 
analogous in kind to the ones described by Newton, but which were manifested 
exclusively within living beings. The astounding successes of Newtonian natural 
philosophy meant that it had become legitimate to concentrate on the visible order 
when studying nature, to interpret that order in terms of putative forces acting on it, 
and to avoid all speculation about the nature of the forces in question.  
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Capitalizing on the inherent metaphysical ambiguity of the Newtonian conception of 
‘force’, many physiologists, acting in explicit accordance with what they took to be the 
standard practice of the physicists of the time, invoked a number of inexplicable 
explicative devices (what Hall (1968) refers to as “physiological unknowns”) to 
account for biological phenomena that could not be understood in terms of the 
properties and interactions of organismic parts. This ‘Newtonian turn’ in the approach 
to the study of organisms constituted a radical transformation of vitalistic thought. The 
animistic vitalism that had prevailed in the seventeenth century was replaced as a 
consequence of the impact of Newtonian natural philosophy by a rather distinct 
doctrine, which I shall refer to as somatic vitalism. Unlike its predecessor, somatic 
vitalism does not posit a fundamental metaphysical dualism in the organism between 
life and matter. The vital principle is no longer conceived as an external agency which 
inhabits the body and bestows upon it the vital functions. Instead, it is understood as an 
intrinsic property of matter; a force which emerges from the living soma and endows it 
with its irreducible, non-mechanistic qualities. This form of vitalistic thought arose in 
the mid eighteenth century but remained popular, in one form or other, until the turn of 
the twentieth century.  
 
What is remarkable from a philosophical perspective is the surprising extent to which 
somatic vitalism constitutes an expression of Newtonian philosophy as much as it 
constitutes a reaction to it. Even though it is clear that somatic vitalists reject as a 
matter of principle the reducibility of many organismic features to (Newtonian) 
mechanistic analyses, it is nevertheless equally apparent that they conducted their 
research in conscious imitation of what they took to be the corresponding practice in 
the physical sciences. As a matter of fact, the writings of the somatic vitalists contain 
frequent allusions to Newton himself, and often plainly show his influence even when 
he is not mentioned by name (see Hall, 1968). In this way, Newton’s impact led to a 
transformation of both sides of the mechanicism-vitalism dispute. On the one hand, the 
mechanists employed the theoretical concepts and experimental approaches that 
Newton had profitably used in physics and chemistry to advance the MCO. On the 
other hand, the vitalists adopted Newton’s epistemic strategy of postulating unknown 
causal principles to analyse specific domains of recalcitrant phenomena whilst 
declining to provide an explanation of the origin of such principles. 
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Which of the two interpretations of Newtonian natural philosophy, the mechanistic or 
the vitalistic, was more prevalent during the eighteenth century? Theodore Brown 
(1974) has shown that although mechanicism was prominent in the first few decades of 
the century, the focus then gradually shifted towards a somatic vitalism that openly 
embraced the explanatory usefulness of vital forces and explicitly denounced the 
explanatory limitations of mechanicism. A glance at the titles of the key physiological 
treatises of the early eighteenth century suffices to confirm the commitment of these 
works to Newtonian mechanicism, as is illustrated by James Keill’s Account of Animal 
Secretion, the Quantity of Blood in the Humane Body, and Muscular Motion of 1708, 
Nicholas Robinson’s New Theory of Physick and Diseases Founded on the Principles 
of Newtonian Philosophy of 1725, and Stephen Hales’ Vegetable Staticks of 1727.2 
The underlying objective motivating all of these treatises is the reduction of particular 
physiological problems to physicochemical ones through the employment of 
Newtonian mathematical and experimental techniques.  
 
However, already in Keill’s treatise of 1708 one finds the first signs of the somatic 
vitalism that was to shape the study of physiology in the second half of the century. 
Keill’s intention had been to link the study of ‘animal oeconomy’ with Newtonian 
physics, but in doing so he introduced the notion of irreducible physiological 
properties, which he tied to the Newtonian notion of attraction. In his treatise, Keill 
posited attractive forces between the constituent particles of secreted physiological 
fluids in order to circumvent certain theoretical difficulties. Although this employment 
of a physiological force was largely forgotten in the following decades amid the 
growing appropriation of Newtonian mathematics and methods by Keill’s 
contemporaries (with the notable exception of Henry Pemberton (1694–1771), who 
suggested in a 1723 treatise on the mechanics of muscle contraction that the living 
organism may display phenomena beyond the reach of physical explanation), doubts 
over the scope and validity of mechanistic experimental physiology eventually began 
to proliferate, paving the way for the introduction of Newtonian epistemic unknowns 
in the living domain. In this way, some of the most distinguished physiologists of the 
latter part of the eighteenth century, including George-Louis Leclerc de Buffon (1707-
1788), Théophile Bordeu (1722-1776), John Hunter (1728-1793), Paul Joseph Barthez 
(1734-1806), Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752-1840), and Georg Treviranus (1776-
1837), employed vital forces in their explanations of biological phenomena. As Bordeu 
                                                     
2
 The Scottish physician George Cheyne (1671-1743) even urged for the composition of a ‘Principia 
Medicinae Theoreticae Mathematica’ (!) in his New Theory of Fevers of 1701 (see Brown, 1987).   
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notes, in spite of its obscure metaphysical status, the postulated vital force is “no more 
strange than the gravity, attraction and mobility that belong to various bodies”. As a 
good Newtonian, he adds that although its operation can be demonstrated 
experimentally, “As to the nature of this faculty, the subject is one of those about 
which it is safer to be silent than to try to reason” (Bordeu, quoted in Hall, 1968, p. 
18). Similar cautious statements and ontological reservations can be found in the 
writings of the other aforementioned authors, in addition to many other celebrated 
biologists of the period (see Hall, 1968). 
 
The physiological unknowns posited by the somatic vitalists never enjoyed the same 
degree of scientific respectability as their physicochemical analogues, and often 
evoked vigorous opposition as soon as they were stated. A plausible explanation for 
this is that the function, operation, and indeed the very nature of the vital force differed 
greatly from one vitalist to another. There was no consensus among vitalists regarding 
the way in which the vital force was believed to manifest itself empirically. In fact, 
there was not even an agreement over whether there was a single vital force or if there 
were several of them. Blumenbach, for instance, maintained that there were as many as 
five vital forces operating autonomously in the living organism: (i) the nisus 
formativus (producing the genital and nutritive fluids) (ii) the vis cellulosa (conferring 
irritability to the mucous tissue); (iii) the vis muscularis (conferring contractility to the 
muscles): (iv) the vis propria (endowing particular organs with specific 
functionalities); and (v) the vis nervea (providing sensibility to the nervous system). In 
spite of the remarkable diversity in vitalistic thinking, all somatic vitalists were united 
in their rejection of the sufficiency of bottom-up mechanistic explanation (be it 
Newtonian or Cartesian) and in their conviction that the distinctiveness of living 
phenomena provided ample empirical evidence of the operation of unexplainable 
forces in nature. Moreover, they concurred that vital forces, regardless of their specific 
character, did not impose a fundamental metaphysical dualism in the living organism 
(unlike the life-soul of the animistic vitalists), and were as much of a part of nature as 
the physical forces postulated by Newton himself. Nevertheless, by the end of the 
eighteenth century, the philosopher Immanuel Kant, reflecting on half a century of 
inconclusive attempts at locating vital forces, famously asserted that there would never 
in fact be a Newton of biology capable of making comprehensible by Newtonian 
means (in either its mechanistic or vitalistic interpretations) the generation of even a 
single blade of grass (see, e.g., Heidermann, 2009).  
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On the whole, what emerges from this examination is that, far from tilting the balance 
in favour of the mechanistic side of the debate, the impact of Newton’s work on the 
physiology of the eighteenth century actually provided a new axis upon which the 
mechanicism-vitalism dispute acquired new relevance and significance. As much of 
my discussion so far has focused almost exclusively on the domain of physiology, in 
the next section I will consider how the mechanicism-vitalism conflict unfolded during 
the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in a rather different area of biological 
study: embryology. Following this discussion, it will then be possible to examine the 
fate of the dispute in the nineteenth century. 
 
2.6. Mechanicism vs. Vitalism in Embryology: Preexistence vs. Epigenesis  
 
Although much of the secondary literature on the mechanicism-vitalism dispute has 
discussed this philosophical debate in the context of physiology, the study of 
organismic development during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries may be 
interpreted as providing another central battleground on which the clash between 
mechanicism and vitalism played out empirically. Two opposing schools of 
embryological thought became consolidated during this period, the doctrines of 
Preexistence3 and Epigenesis, and the vociferous disagreements between their 
proponents were, for the most part, motivated by deeper, more fundamental 
philosophical persuasions. Central among these were the conflicting doctrines of 
mechanicism and vitalism. The study of embryology helps illuminate the 
mechanicism-vitalism conflict because, in focusing on a very specific object of 
scientific study that was easily accessible to observation and experimentation, it 
provided a useful means of testing the validity and applicability of mechanistic and 
vitalistic conceptions of life. In my examination of the controversy between the 
doctrines of preexistence and epigenesis, I shall again take the establishment of 
mechanicism as my point of departure.  
 
As we have already seen, the mechanistic rejection of Scholasticism in the first half of 
the seventeenth century implied that occult forces could no longer be invoked as 
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 In line with recent scholarship (e.g., Pyle, 2006, Detlefsen, 2006), but owing to a distinction originally 
made by Jacques Roger (1963) and subsequently elaborated by Peter Bowler (1971), I adopt the term 
‘preexistence’ instead of the more traditional notion of ‘preformation’, as the two labels actually 
designate two distinct embryological doctrines, and it is the former that acquired greatest currency 
during this period and which concerns us here. 
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legitimate explanatory devices to account for biological processes. In the context of 
organismic development, mechanicism required replacing Aristotelian souls and 
Galenic faculties with a theory that conceived the phenomenon of generation as a 
strictly mechanical process which operated in accordance to physical laws. The 
problem for the mechanist, however, was that it was extremely difficult to explain such 
a complex natural phenomenon in terms of mere matter in motion. Descartes himself 
fully recognised this problem when he confessed that “The formation of all the parts of 
the human body […] is something so difficult that I dare not undertake [to explain it] 
yet” (Descartes, quoted in Aucante, 2006, p. 66).
4
 The real difficulty rested on 
explaining novelty. Although mechanicism could account for the geometric growth of 
an organism, it could not provide an effective explanation of the origination of new 
form in the developing organism. The emergence of complex morphological structure 
where previously there had been none indeed appeared to transcend mechanistic 
explanation. As a result, the only way in which the phenomenon of organismic 
generation could be subsumed within mechanicism was to avoid the problem of 
novelty altogether. This required postulating that the structure of the adult organism is 
already preformed prior to foetal growth, thereby implying that the process of 
development simply consists in the gradual enlargement of the adult structure already 
articulated in the germ. This is the doctrine of the preexistence of germs, and at the 
time it provided the only viable means of reconciling the evident complexity of 
organismic generation with the elegance and relative simplicity of mechanistic natural 
philosophy. 
 
The doctrine of preexistence asserts that the germ is essentially a miniature version of 
the fully formed adult organism which remains in an inert state awaiting activation 
through fertilization. Upon this process, the germ is set into a growth phase and 
gradually expands in all directions through a mechanical process until it acquires its 
final size. However, since development is merely a process of expansion, the 
preformed structure already existing in the germ remained to be explained. Thus, in the 
doctrine of preexistence the problem of generation is simply pushed one step 
backward, for it is the origination of organic form in the actual seed that now demands 
an explanation. Since mechanistic principles are as inadequate to explain the 
emergence of organised structure in the germ as it is in the developing embryo, the 
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 In fact, Descartes was so aware of the difficulty of applying his mechanistic philosophy to the 
understanding of the generation of animals that, in spite of the number of embryological experiments he 
personally conducted throughout his life, he never felt sufficiently confident to publish a single text on 
the subject in his lifetime (Aucante, 2006, p. 66). 
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doctrine of preexistence postulated that the germs of all organisms, past, present, and 
future, have always existed, ever since the moment of Creation, and were simply 
awaiting the moment of activation by fertilization (Jacob, 1973, p. 60).  
 
The doctrine of preexistence was developed through three different theories: 
panspermism, ovist emboîtement, and animalculist emboîtement. The panspermist 
version of preexistence was introduced by Perrault, who discussed it in his 
Méchanique des Animaux (published in 3 volumes between 1680 and 1688) as the 
theory that the preformed miniature germs float freely in the air until absorbed by a 
parent organism, which supplies the conditions necessary for development upon 
fertilization (Bowler, 1971, p. 241). The two emboîtement theories of preexistence 
instead assert that each preformed miniature germ is encased within the reproductive 
organs of one of its parents (the mother on the ovist theory, and the father on the 
animalculist theory), its parent is encased within the reproductive organs of one of its 
parents, and so forth. This accounts for all organisms of every generation of every 
species, as all future members of a given species are nested into one another like 
Russian dolls within the first member of that species upon Creation. An interesting 
implication of the two emboîtement theories is that both suppose that the male and 
female contributions to the conception of the organism are different, since only one of 
the two contains the germs of its descendants. For the ovists, the male merely provides 
a trigger or stimulus for growth, whereas for the animalculists, the female only 
provides protection and nourishment.
5
 
 
The doctrine of preexistence, derived as it was from mechanistic natural philosophy, 
became biological orthodoxy in the late seventeenth century and remained the 
dominant view of organismic generation throughout most of the eighteenth century. As 
such, it was advocated by such noteworthy figures as Nicolas Malebranche (1638-
1715), Albrecht von Haller (1708-1777), and Charles Bonnet (1720-1793). Out of the 
three main versions of the doctrine, the ovist theory became the most popular as it was 
regarded as the best confirmed by experiments carried out on the development of eggs 
of different species (Bowler, 1971, p. 243; Pyle, 2006, p. 194). Despite its popularity, 
the doctrine of preexistence was not without its problems. An obvious complication 
with this conception of generation was that it could not explain why the progeny 
                                                     
5
 It is important to note that this dispute between ovist and animalculist emboîtement theories of animal 
generation had an analogue in the contemporary discussion over vegetable generation, where the conflict 
was played out between ovulist and pollenist emboîtement theories (Ritterbush, 1964, pp. 88-98). 
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displayed phenotypic traits of both parents, and new traits altogether.6 The problem of 
emergent variation in the progeny was even more salient in the face of monstrosities 
and other very apparent defects in the newborn. Having postulated the creation of all 
organisms by God, preexistence theorists were forced to allow for interference in the 
unfolding development of embryos, or to admit God’s fallibility or His vindictiveness.
7
 
Although the doctrine of preexistence remained the orthodox view during the 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the gradual accumulation of theoretical 
problems like this one, stemming for increasing observations and experiments 
conducted on developing embryos, helped bring to the fore an opposing school of 
embryological thought known as epigenesis.   
 
Epigenesis is the doctrine which postulates a de novo production of organic form in the 
developing organism. Upon conception, matter previously homogeneous, 
undifferentiated, and unorganized becomes heterogeneous, differentiated, and 
organized, resulting in the generation of a living, functional being. According to this 
doctrine, organic form not only develops anew, but it is brought into existence step by 
step as development unfolds. Although Harvey was the first to use the term 
‘epigenesis’ in his De Generatione Animalium of 1651, it was Caspar Friedrich Wolff 
(1734-1794) who fully developed the doctrine theoretically in the mid eighteenth 
century, and in doing so helped bring to the fore the first serious challenge to 
preexistence. However, although in the nineteenth century Wolff’s work (particularly 
his seminal Theoria Generationis) was to provide the foundation for experimental 
embryology, during the eighteenth century it failed to attract supporters, and remained 
largely in the shadow of the preexistence theories of Bonnet and Haller (Jacob, 1973, 
p. 66; Roe, 1979, p. 3).  
                                                     
6
 As we will see in Chapter 5, during the eighteenth century Buffon proposed a radically different theory 
to account for these phenomena. 
7
 Being well aware of this problem, and yet wanting to restrict his explanation within the strict confines 
of mechanicism, Descartes suggested that the mother’s imagination exerts a formative influence on the 
developing foetus. Consequently, “if the imagination of the mother is harmed by some impression, the 
child’s body parts will be monstrous” (Descartes, quoted in Smith, 2006, p. 91). In order to 
mechanistically account for the causal link between the mother’s imagination and the body of the foetus, 
Descartes argued that “sometimes [the image] can pass from [the pineal gland] through the arteries of a 
pregnant woman into certain parts of the child that she carries in her womb” (Descartes, quoted in 
Smith, 2006, p. 90). The pineal gland thus functions as a sort of translating receiver where mental 
images are converted into physiological signals that lead to specific motor responses in the embryo. 
Crucially, for Descartes, invoking the imagination of the mother does not amount to a retreat into occult 
causes to explain what would otherwise remain inexplicable. The imagination does not constitute a non-
physical directing agency; it is just a corporeal phenomenon like any other, and as such it is subject to, 
and explainable by, the basic principles of mechanistic natural philosophy (Smith, 2006, p. 91). 
Although Descartes’ argument was later adopted by Pierre-Sylvain Régis (1632-1707) and others, it 
failed to convince those who saw contradictions between the basic tenets of the doctrine of preexistence 
and the process of development as it presented itself to the senses.  
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It is actually not difficult to understand why it took such a long time for the idea of 
epigenesis to be taken as a serious alternative for the explanation of generation. 
Preexistence answered the difficult question of how the embryo attains the complex 
level of organization it reaches during development whilst at the same time being 
consistent with both mechanicism and the religious beliefs of the time. In contrast, it 
was far more challenging to explain development epigenetically. If the embryo 
develops through successive formation of structures, what guides this process? Is it 
organic matter itself? Or must there be a special agency or force in operation, 
governing the process of development? It was in an attempt to answer these questions 
that Wolff wrote his doctoral dissertation, Theoria Generationis, which he defended in 
1759. In it Wolff elaborated an epigenetic account of generation according to which 
plant and animal fluids are secreted from the developing organism and are solidified 
into parts. The process of secretion and solidification is accomplished by means of a 
vital force, the vis essentialis, which is responsible for the absorption and distribution 
of nutrients in animals and plants during development.
8
  
 
One of the central claims that Wolff makes in his Theoria Generationis is that “Those 
who teach the system of predelineation [preexistence], do not explain generation but 
deny that it occurs” (Wolff, quoted in Roe, 1979, p. 16). Indeed, the doctrine of 
preexistence asserts that actual generation never happens, since each instance of 
embryonic development is in truth simply the unfolding of an already formed 
organism. Through the postulation of the vis essentialis, and the description of its 
operation in the developing organism, Wolff was able to provide a genuine explanation 
of the process of generation that was compatible with, and indeed confirmable by, his 
microscopical observations of developing embryos. So, in an important sense, it was 
Wolff’s commitment to a vitalistic conception of generation that enabled the doctrine 
of epigenesis to become properly developed theoretically. 
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 Upon its completion, Wolff sent his dissertation to Haller, and, in doing so, initiated a direct and 
extended debate with him which lasted until Haller’s death in 1777. The main point of contention 
between them related to the formation of blood vessels in the area vasculosa, specifically, over whether 
they are truly formed or preexist. Haller argued that the vessels are pre-existing but not visible because 
they are initially transparent; Wolff asserted that they are formed gradually by the movement of fluids, 
which cuts through the area vasculosa under the guidance of the vis essentialis. In addition, Haller and 
Wolff disagreed over the formation or preexistence of the heart. Haller’s theoretical system demanded 
the preexistence of the heart, since its pumping action is the initiator of the expansion of preformed 
parts. In contrast, Wolff's theory of epigenesis required that the heart not be present in early stages of 
development, in order to prove that the vis essentialis is required for development to begin (see Roe, 
1981, ch. 3). 
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That Wolff is a vitalist is a fact beyond reasonable doubt, given his postulation of a vis 
essentialis acting solely on living beings, coupled with his explicit rejection of the 
explanatory sufficiency of mechanical medicine (Roe, 1979, p. 25; Detlefsen, 2006, p. 
247). The more crucial question remains, however, as to whether Wolff should be 
regarded as a somatic vitalist in the sense described in the previous section in reference 
to the physiologists of the same period. I believe that this can indeed be shown to be 
the case by looking at some of Wolff’s own writings. First of all, Wolff clearly 
distinguishes his own brand of vitalism from the animistic vitalism of Stahl (discussed 
in Section 2.4), as is attested by the following assertion: “This characteristic and 
essential force appears to be one […] whose existence Stahl very certainly recognized, 
but which he, incorrectly I think, attributed to the soul” (Wolff, quoted in Roe, 1981, p. 
116).
9
 What is more, in the very next sentence of this same passage Wolff confirms his 
commitment to a Newtonian conception of vital force when he notes that the vis 
essentialis “consists in nothing further than a particularly defined kind of attractive and 
repulsive force” (ibid.). Finally, in the best Newtonian tradition of somatic vitalism, 
Wolff believes that the vital force can be postulated on the basis of observational 
evidence, and it is therefore not necessary to provide an account of its cause or origin: 
“It is enough for us to know that it [the vis essentialis] is there, and to recognize it from 
its effects, as it is demanded purely and simply in order to explain the development of 
parts” (Wolff, quoted in Roe, 1979, pp. 22-23).  
  
Thus, as the preceding discussion has shown, there is clear evidence which suggests 
that the clash between preexistence and epigenesis may be viewed as a particular 
embodiment of the mechanicism-vitalism dispute in the study of development during 
the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The doctrine of preexistence constituted 
the only means by which the mechanists of the period could account for generation, 
namely be evading an actual explanation of it. Indeed in line with the mechanistic 
commitment to the MCO, all that the mechanist can aspire is to explain its current 
operations by reference to the arrangement of its component parts. But if generation is 
the actual object, it is precisely this arrangement that demands an explanation! Since 
machines do not self-assemble, clearly the only solution that remained was to assert 
                                                     
9
 Wolff’s departure from Stahl’s animistic vitalism can be further corroborated by another passage 
where, in complaining of Haller’s criticism of his Theoria Generationis, Wolff remarks that “Haller has 
thus not been entirely correct […] when in the judgment of my work he put forward the essential force 
as the main point, remembering all that properly belongs to this theory almost with no words and then 
deliberately mentioning that this thing is called by me the essential force, but which I completely 
separated from the soul of the Stahlians; about which indeed exactly so much as nothing was said” 
(Wolff, quoted in Roe, 1981, p. 181; my emphasis).  
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that every organism is the product of the original supernatural act of Creation, and not 
the result of a natural process of generation (Pyle, 2006, p. 195). In contrast, the 
epigenetic theory of Wolff shows obvious signs of having been devised as a reaction 
against the explanatory insufficiency of the mechanistic doctrine of preexistence, and 
in his formulation and elaboration of the vis essentialis, coupled with his assertion of 
the irreducibility of vital functions, Wolff proves to be philosophically committed to 
exactly the same form of somatic vitalism that characterised his physiologist 
contemporaries. In this way, although both preexistence theorists and epigenesists were 
united in their desire to explain the same natural phenomenon, and were even in 
agreement with regards to many of their observations, their underlying philosophical 
persuasions led them to interpret the empirical data in drastically different ways. 
 
2.7. The Advent of Organic Chemistry and Its Impact on the Dispute 
 
The nineteenth century brought about yet another transformation in the terms and 
issues upon which the mechanicism-vitalism conflict played out, and once again this 
change was instigated by concurrent developments in the physical sciences. 
Specifically, it was the development of organic chemistry and its fruitful application to 
physiology which exerted the greatest influence on the debate. The pioneering research 
of Lavoisier in the eighteenth century paved the way for further attempts to apply 
chemical methods and techniques to the study of living beings, and in doing so bridge 
the gap between the animate and inmate realms. Lavoisier and his followers had 
successfully shown that the elementary composition of living matter was primarily 
carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen, thereby demonstrating that the ‘stuff’ of life 
was chemically indistinguishable from nonliving matter, and thus laying to rest any 
last remnants of animistic vitalism.
10
  
 
The further study of the nature and relative proportions of the chemical constituents 
composing biological substances became the central preoccupation of early organic 
chemistry. In England, this form of research was pushed forward by the establishment 
in 1802 of a society for the Promotion of Animal Chemistry. Elsewhere in the 
continent, Swedish, French, and German chemists followed in Lavoisier’s footsteps by 
developing and refining techniques for chemical analysis, resulting in the build up of 
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 As Claude Bernard would later assert, the “very essence of Lavoisier’s doctrine lies in the affirmation 
that there are not two chemistries or two physics, the one applicable to living creatures and the other to 
inert bodies; rather, there are general laws applicable to all substance[s], however [they] might be 
disposed, and these laws admit of no exception” (Bernard, quoted in Coleman 1977, p. 126). 
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increasingly comprehensive rosters of organic substances. By 1845, the division of 
foodstuffs into carbohydrate, fat, and protein, based on their chemical constitution, had 
become clearly established (Coleman, 1977, p. 131). This knowledge, coupled with the 
enduring conviction that chemical transformations inside and outside the organism 
were strictly comparable (a stance defended and promulgated most prominently by J. J. 
Berzelius (1779-1848)), opened up even further the study of physiological chemistry. 
In 1842, Justus von Liebig (1803-1873) published the celebrated Animal Chemistry, or 
Organic Chemistry in its Application to Physiology and Pathology, in which he argued 
that the study of ‘animal architecture’ alone was insufficient for understanding 
physiological processes. The organism’s vital functions (e.g., secretion, nutrition, 
generation) can only be understood if the organic substances involved in these 
processes are identified. “From organic chemistry”, Liebig claimed, “the science of 
physiology will be developed” (quoted in Lipman, 1967, p. 173). It is thus through the 
application of organic chemistry that the study of physiology must proceed, as it is 
only by determining the chemical basis of vital processes that these can be genuinely 
elucidated.  
 
Before we can appropriately contextualize the impact of organic chemistry on the 
study of physiology in relation to the unfolding of the mechanicism-vitalism debate 
during this period, it is first necessary to clarify a common misconception that prevails 
still today among some scholars. Ramberg (2000) has termed this misconception the 
‘Wöhler myth’ and relates to the historical significance of the laboratory synthesis of 
urea (an organic substance) by German chemist Friedrich Wöhler (1800-1882) in 1828. 
According to the myth, Wöhler’s synthesis signalled the end of the doctrine of 
vitalism, as it showed that no vital forces of any kind were required for the generation 
of organic matter. The reality, however, appears to have been rather different. 
Historians such as J. H. Brooke (1968; 1971) have denied the premises of the myth’s 
assumption and have conferred a primarily chemical meaning for Wöhler’s 
accomplishment. Specifically, the artificial synthesis of urea had interesting 
implications for the study of isomeric transformation, and was thus heralded as an 
important milestone in the emerging field of structural organic chemistry. However, 
Wöhler’s synthesis did not have a direct physiological bearing, nor, of course, did it 
speak to the existence or nature of a vital force. In fact, most chemists of the period 
believed that artificial syntheses of organic substances outside the living body were 
possible, their actual likelihood depending only on the ability to successfully decipher 
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the chemical constitution of the substance to be synthesised, and in overcoming the 
technical difficulties faced in the experimental process (see Brooke, 1968). It seems 
that it has been the popularizers of science and not the chemists of the 1820s and 1830s 
who have regarded organic synthesis as the ultimate deathblow of vitalism. Ramberg 
(2000) has traced the origin of the Wöhler myth to a popular history of chemistry 
monograph by Bernard Jaffe, published in 1931 (and still in print today).
11
 However, it 
is likely that the myth originated much earlier. Brooke (1971, pp. 375-376) provides 
some textual evidence which suggests that the idea that organic synthesis amounted to 
a refutation of vitalism was first conjured up by the German mechanistic reductionists 
of the late nineteenth century (to which I will turn to later). At any rate, what is clear is 
that the artificial synthesis of urea did not signal the end of vitalism, in its somatic 
form that was prevalent at the time, but simply confirm the earlier findings made by 
Lavoisier regarding the correspondence between inorganic and organic chemical 
substances.  
  
What, then, was the impact of the progressive ‘chemicalization’ of physiology, made 
possible by the development of organic chemistry, on the nature and prevalence of 
vitalistic thinking? The seemingly paradoxical answer is that the greatest expositors of 
the organic chemistry of the first half of the century (namely Berzelius, Liebig, and 
Wöhler), despite defending strictly mechanistic and thoroughly analytical approaches 
to empirical study, were all theoretically committed to some form of somatic vitalism. 
Still, these nineteenth century somatic vitalists did not hold exactly the same views as 
their eighteenth century predecessors, since they explicitly advocated the adoption of 
mechanistic research methods, and believed that organisms should be studied, in the 
first instance, by means of the tools and techniques made available by the 
physicochemical sciences. At a most fundamental level, they acknowledged that living 
organisms were no different from inanimate bodies, and consequently they could be 
described using the same methods. In this way, Berzelius, writing in 1806, argued that 
the “starting point” in the study of life “should be sought in the basic forces of the 
elements” given that life itself “is a necessary consequence of the relationships 
whereby the fundamental materials are joined” (Berzelius, quoted in Coleman, 1977, p. 
147). However, in spite of the possibility of mechanistically elucidating the regulation 
and maintenance of ongoing biological processes in the living organism, Berzelius 
                                                     
11
 Ramberg (2000) notes that “[i]gnoring all pretense of historical accuracy, Jaffe turned Wöhler into a 
crusader who made attempt after attempt to synthesize a natural product that would refute vitalism and 
lift the veil of ignorance, until ‘one afternoon the miracle happened’”. 
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considered the processes of de novo generation of organic form as being forever 
beyond the reach of chemical analysis. It is for this kind of phenomena that Berzelius, 
along with many of his followers, reserved the operation of the vital force. Similarly, 
Liebig retained the notion of the vital force to explain certain biological processes. In 
particular, he invoked the vital force in order to account for the seeming contraposition 
between the action of chemical forces and the organism’s own living predispositions. 
According to Liebig, chemical and vital forces act antagonistically, and their 
continuous interplay results in the shifting dynamism that we call life.
12
 This 
dynamism finds its most prominent expression in the ongoing reciprocation of tissue 
formation and tissue degradation, although it is also manifested in other physiological 
processes, such as the digestion of foodstuffs and the movement of the animal body. 
Finally, Wöhler, who as I have already indicated would posthumously come to be 
known, erroneously, as the exorcist of vitalism from biology, was himself, ironically, 
equally committed to the existence of a vital force which in his view was responsible 
for a number of physiological processes (see Brooke, 1968; 1971). 
 
It is important to emphasize, having uncovered their vitalistic predilections, that these 
organic chemists were highly conscious of the need for a strictly naturalistic 
physiology, and believed that metaphysical speculation should be banished from 
science. Indeed, their actual writings indicate that, not unlike earlier somatic vitalists, 
they were far more concerned with the elucidation and description of vital phenomena 
than with the specification of the vital force. The laws of vitality, not the vital force 
itself, were the actual focus of their physiological investigations. They did not attempt 
to search for the vital force, nor did their belief in its existence influence their research 
methods or empirical findings. Liebig, for instance, in his Animal Chemistry, does not 
set out to prove the existence of the vital force. Instead, he attempts to identify its 
effects through his investigations in physiological chemistry. Moreover, Liebig, in the 
best Newtonian tradition of somatic vitalism, at several points (pp. 7-8; 220-221) notes 
that science will never know the causes for the forces of nature, but that their existence 
can be deduced from their effects on the phenomena upon which they act. Thus, for 
these organic chemists, as for all prior somatic vitalists, it was as valid to attribute the 
laws and effects of life to a vital force as it was to attribute the laws and effects of 
gravity to a gravitational force. 
                                                     
12
 Liebig’s vitalist views owe much to the ideas of Xavier Bichat, who decades earlier had defined life as 
“the sum of the forces resisting death”. I will examine Bichat’s views in more detail in Section 2.9 and 
again in Chapter 5.  
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Questions could be raised regarding how the leading exponents of such a blatantly 
mechanistic discipline like organic chemistry could at the same time be committed 
somatic vitalists. The reason for this apparent contradiction is that for Berzelius, 
Liebig, and Wöhler, mechanicism and vitalism were not incompatible. This is because 
they took them to apply to different domains of phenomena. It was thus possible for 
them to be strictly mechanistic organic chemists while at the same time be vitalistic 
physiologists. In effect, vitalism had no relevance to pure organic chemistry as an 
autonomous discipline. The vitalistic inclinations of these thinkers surfaced only when 
they attempted to contextualize their chemical findings in relation to broader biological 
questions relating to the distinctive properties of living organisms. In this way, if there 
is one theme that collectively individuates the great organic chemists of the first half of 
the nineteenth century it is their endeavour to mechanistically characterize biological 
matter, whilst simultaneously recognizing the necessity of a vital principle as a means 
of accounting for more recalcitrant physiological phenomena like self-organization.  
 
Despite its early successes, the seemingly harmonious coexistence of mechanicism and 
vitalism among chemical physiologists was not to last long. By the mid nineteenth 
century, the divide between the explanatory domains of mechanicism and vitalism had 
begun to break down and exclusively mechanistic conceptions of physiological 
processes were becoming increasingly dominant. The most prominent group of the 
new wave of mechanicism was that formed by the students of renowned German 
physiologist Johannes Müller (1801-1858) in his Berlin laboratory during the late 
1840s. This group of deeply committed physicalist reductionists was made up by Emil 
Du Bois-Reymond (1818-1896), Carl Ludwig (1816-1895), Ernst von Brücke (1819-
1892), and Herman von Helmholtz (1821-1894). The chief objective of these 
physiologists was to unify physiology with the rest of the physical sciences. 
Encouraged by the earlier triumphs in the application of mechanistic methodology to 
the study of certain biological phenomena, they saw no reason to doubt that an 
exhaustive mechanistic elucidation of all physiological processes by means of 
reductive analyses would eventually be obtained. As they saw it, the greatest obstacle 
to the attainment of this goal was the prevailing tendency to appeal to vital forces in 
physiological explanations. In the Introduction to his Researches on Animal Electricity 
of 1848, Du Bois-Reymond complained that the vital force is nothing but “a 
comfortable resting-place where […] reason finds peace on the cushion of obscure 
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qualities”. Elsewhere in the text, he reflects on the fate of physiological science, and 
concludes the following:  
 
If one observes the development of our science [i.e., physiology] he cannot fail to note 
how the vital force daily shrinks to a more confined realm of phenomena, how new areas 
are increasingly brought under the dominion of physical and chemical forces […] [i]t 
cannot fail that physiology, giving up her special interests, will one day be absorbed into 
the great unity of the physical sciences; [physiology] will in fact dissolve into organic 
physics and chemistry. (Du Bois-Reymond, quoted in Coleman, 1977, p. 151)  
 
This faith on the eventual and inevitable ‘dissolution’ of physiology into physics and 
chemistry was shared by the others members of the group. Ludwig, most notably, 
argued in his Textbook of Human Physiology of 1856 that physiology is essentially 
analysis and that all vital phenomena arise from the attractive and repulsive forces 
inherent in the chemical constituents of the body. This unreservedly mechanistic 
conception of physiological processes did not allow for the intrusion of a vital force, 
which, as non-material agent, did nothing but obfuscate the real physical causality of 
the organism’s atoms.
13
 Overall, however, despite the spectacular advances in the 
mechanistic understanding of the physiology of the organism attained during this 
period (which included the elucidation of the causal mechanisms responsible for sense 
perception, lymph formation, and glandular secretion, among many others), it might 
seem in retrospect unavoidable that the ambitious programatic demands of these 
reductionists were not fulfilled. Indeed, fully satisfying the group’s objectives would 
have required an effective reduction of life, in all its complexity, to force and matter. 
What the findings of these reductionists did provide was a rejuvenated faith in the 
explanatory power of mechanistic epistemology, which by the end of the nineteenth 
century had permeated beyond physiology to other spheres of biological inquiry. 
 
 
                                                     
13
 Similar mechanistic assertions can also be found in contemporary physiologists outside Germany. In 
England, for instance, T. H. Huxley (1825-1895) asserted that physiology is nothing more than “the 
mechanical engineering of living machines” (Huxley, quoted in Wise, 2007, p. 184). In his 1874 address 
to the British Association for the Advancement of Science, entitled ‘On the Hypothesis That Animals 
Are Automata, and Its History’, Huxley began by remarking that “in the seventeenth century, the idea 
that the physical processes of life are capable of being explained in the same way as other physical 
phenomena, and, therefore, that the living body is a mechanism, was proved to be true for certain classes 
of vital actions; and, having thus taken firm root in irrefragable fact, this conception has not only 
successfully repelled every assault which has been made upon it, but has steadily grown in force and 
extent of application, until it is now the expressed or implied fundamental proposition of the whole 
doctrine of scientific Physiology” (Huxley, 1893, p. 199). 
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2.8. Entwicklungsmechanik, Driesch, and the Demise of Somatic Vitalism 
 
One of the biological disciplines which became transformed by the new impulse in 
mechanistic thinking was embryology. Wilhelm Preyer (1842-1897), a student of Du 
Bois Reymond and von Helmholtz, opened up new avenues of embryological research 
through his quantitative analyses of chemical changes occurring during organismic 
development. Preyer was also the first to show that the anatomical and functional 
changes which took place during embryogenesis were closely correlated (Allen, 1975, 
p. 28). One of Preyer’s own students, Wilhelm Roux (1859-1924), took up the 
quantitative and experimental approach to embryology and eventually became one of 
the leading exponents of mechanistic biology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Through his strong emphasis on experimentation as the crucial element of 
research, coupled with his insistence on the application of physicochemical methods to 
biological problems, Roux provided a renewed mechanistic foundation for the field of 
embryology. From the 1890s until his death, Roux relentlessly developed and 
promoted his program of research, which he named Entwicklungsmechanik 
(developmental mechanics), and founded a new journal, the Archiv für 
Entwicklungsmechanik, in 1894, which presented the experimental work conducted by 
him and others in the field. Roux’s Entwicklungsmechanik rapidly gained support both 
in Europe and in the United States, and was taken up, most notably, by Hans Driesch 
(1867-1941), Jacques Loeb (1859-1924), and T. H. Morgan (1866-1944).  
 
Roux’s primary concern in his study of embryology was the phenomenon of 
differentiation, that is, the process by which the embryo develops from a formless mass 
to an organized system of highly specialised cells. In 1885, he proposed the mosaic 
theory of development, which held that the particular differentiation of the body parts 
was caused by the distribution of the hereditary material during the consecutive cell 
divisions of development. So although the single-celled egg initially contains all the 
hereditary material for the entire adult body, with every cell division the hereditary 
material becomes progressively disseminated to each of the daughter cells, until 
ultimately each of the cells in the body expresses only one major hereditary trait, 
becoming at this stage fully differentiated (Robert, 2004, p. 24). In the best 
mechanistic tradition, the mosaic theory provided testable predictions. It predicted that 
the destruction of one blastomere at the two- or four-cell stage, for instance, would 
produce a deformed embryo (as the remaining blastomeres would contain only part of 
the hereditary material). Roux proceeded to confirm this prediction in 1888 by 
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conducting the appropriate experiment. With a hot needle, Roux punctured one of the 
blastomeres in the two-cell stage of a frog embryo, killing the punctured cell and 
allowing the remaining bastomere to develop. What he found was that the resulting 
embryo was severely deformed; having one side well developed and partially 
differentiated while the other remaining disorganized and undifferentiated. For Roux, 
these results presented clear evidence in support of his mosaic theory, as the half adult 
produced could be explained by the fact that the developing embryo had been deprived 
of half of its hereditary material. 
 
Working in Naples in the 1880s and 1890s, Driesch attempted to reproduce Roux’s 
findings using sea urchin eggs, but instead of killing one of the two blastomeres, he 
induced their separation by vigorous shaking in water and then allowed each of them to 
develop normally. To his surprise, he found that each of the separate blastomeres had 
produced a whole, albeit smaller sea urchin larva. These results flatly contradicted the 
predictions of the mosaic theory. Indeed, if each bastomere, even after being separated 
from other cells in the embryo, could still develop into a whole adult, then there must 
not have been any segregation of hereditary material, as Roux had postulated.
14
 These 
findings led Driesch to argue that that the embryo constituted a ‘harmonious 
equipotential system’ in which all the parts in the early stages of development had the 
same potential to produce a whole adult organism. In the first instance, Driesch 
attempted to describe harmonious equipotential systems in mathematical terms and 
sought to explain his results in terms of physical influences acting on the embryo. 
Eventually, however, Driesch became convinced that the Entwicklungsmechanik 
research program was simply incapable of providing the necessary explanatory 
resources to account for the non-atomistic, self-regulating nature of embryogenesis. As 
a result, he went on to develop a vitalistic explanation that was more in accordance 
with his own empirical observations. By the turn of the twentieth century, Driesch had 
abandoned experimental biology altogether to focus on further developing theoretically 
and philosophically his vitalistic views, and as a professor of philosophy he published 
a number of works, including The Science and Philosophy of the Organism (1908) and 
The History and Theory of Vitalism (1914).  
 
                                                     
14
 Subsequently, Roux’s experimental results would be explained as being caused by the deleterious 
effects of the cell debris of the dead blastomere coming into contact with the developing embryo (Moss, 
2003, pp. 32-33). 
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Driesch’s decisive rejection of mechanicism was rooted in his conviction that 
mechanistic causal explanations of living phenomena failed to capture their distinctive 
nature and behaviour. His own embryological research had shown that during 
development each embryonic cell is co-regulated with every other embryonic cell so 
that the organism as a whole could effectively adjust itself by compensating from 
external perturbations. These markedly holistic capabilities of the embryo were not 
accountable through bottom-up mechanistic explanations and indeed entailed a view of 
the organism which was directly antithetical to the conception that had provided the 
conceptual backbone of mechanistic biology since Descartes, namely the MCO. 
Driesch was well aware of this, and in his philosophical writings he frequently referred 
to the ways in which harmonious equipotential systems were fundamentally different 
from machines. In reference to his key experiments on sea urchins, Driesch (1914, p. 
210) notes that 
 
[Whereas] a “machine”, i.e. a specific arrangement of physico-chemical things and agents, 
does not remain itself if you take from it whatever you please […] the organism, or better, 
the non-developed harmonious system does remain “itself”, with regard to its 
morphogenetic faculties, after any operation what[so]ever. The harmonious system, then, 
is not a “machine” (Driesch, 1914, p. 210, original emphasis) 
 
To make the point even more explicitly, in the same passage Driesch asks, rhetorically: 
“how could a machine be divided innumerable times and yet remain what it was? No 
machine, therefore, can be the test of embryology” (ibid., pp. 211-212).  
 
In order to come to terms with the real nature of organisms, Driesch postulated the 
existence of a ‘non-mechanical agent of nature’ which operated exclusively within 
living beings and endowed them with their distinctive character. Driesch termed this 
vital agent the ‘entelechy’, thereby openly acknowledging his indebtedness to 
Aristotle, although it should be noted that his own usage differs from that of Aristotle. 
For Aristotle, the entelechy is directly responsible for the maturation of the organism, 
for it is the active agent which raises the physical potentialities of the organism to the 
state of actuality. Driesch confers a more restricted role to the entelechy, and instead of 
identifying it as the primary cause of development itself, he views it as the regulator 
which governs which of the various potentialities resident in the developing organism 
shall reach realization and which shall be restrained. Driesch’s entelechy, then, is not 
the template of organismic organization, nor is it the creative agent that brings it about 
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(and is thus different from Blumenbach’s nisus formativus and Wolff’s vis essentialis). 
Rather, it serves as a kind of a buffer which protects the inbuilt tendencies of the 
organism from being disrupted by adverse environmental conditions. Moreover, 
Driesch emphasizes that the entelechy is non-temporal, non-spatial, and non-psychic, 
and consequently does not interfere with any natural laws. On the whole, with his 
vitalistic theory Driesch attempted to provide a bona fide explanation for the results he 
had obtained in his embryological research. In doing so, he courageously challenged 
the prevailing mechanistic orthodoxy of his time (embodied in Roux’s influential 
Entwicklungsmechanik research program) and effectively rescued somatic vitalism 
from a steady decline that had been ongoing since the mid-nineteenth century.  
 
Despite having the weight of empirical evidence mostly on his side, Driesch’s form of 
neo-somatic vitalism seemed to have already become anachronistic by the time it 
began acquiring currency in the late 1910s and 1920s. As a result, it was 
predominantly met with violent opposition. For example, in 1918, the journal The 
Philosophical Review published an issue (volume 27, number 6) containing a 
collection of papers written on the mechanicism-vitalism dispute. Interestingly, 
although not all the authors defended mechanicism, most of them explicitly rejected 
Driesch’s vitalism. The contemporary criticisms of Driesch’s ideas were primarily 
targeted towards his notion of the entelechy. Some biologists (e.g., Lillie, 1926; 
Needham, 1928a) criticised the inexplicable fact that the entelechy did not operate in 
the same way in organisms pertaining to different species (e.g., a ‘salamander-
entelechy’ was able to regenerate a limb, whereas a ‘human-entelechy’ could not). 
Others directed their criticism towards the very concept of entelechy itself, arguing that 
it did not constitute an explanation but simply another name for the problem: “Driesch 
transfers the complexities of development to the entelechy, leaving them in exactly the 
same need of analysis and explanation as before” (Jennings, 1918, p. 581). Most 
incisive, perhaps, was Ralph Lillie’s indication that the very operation of the entelechy 
necessary violated the laws of physics:  
 
According to Driesch, an entelechy can, without the performance of work, guide or 
coordinate […] processes which themselves require the performance of work. This view 
implies that in the organism, molecular movement can be directed, retarded, or accelerated 
at the will of the entelechy […] [However,] It is physically impossible for any agency to 
modify the processes in any material system without modifying the energy-transfers in that 
system, and this can be done only by […] the performance of work. One is forced to 
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conclude that all such attempts at the solution of biological problems are based on 
fundamental misunderstandings. (Lillie, 1914, pp. 843-844) 
 
Finally, as the field of embryology continued to develop, it soon became clear that 
Driesch’s statement of ‘equipotentiality’ had been far wider than the facts actually 
warrant. The work of Hans Spemann (1869-1941) and others showed that the 
totipotence of the early embryo falls off rapidly as development proceeds, and by the 
gastrulation phase the process of differentiation sets in and the embryonic cells become 
irrevocably determined. In light of this evidence, the appeal to an entelechy was no 
longer necessary, and thus the hypothesis of the entelechy became “as redundant as the 
hypothesis of an agency directing the movements of the planets in their orbits” 
(Warren, 1918, p. 603). The predominant condemnation of Driesch’s theory in the first 
third of the twentieth century effectively signalled the end of two hundred years of 
somatic vitalism.  
 
Moreover, the demise of Driesch’s vitalism occurred in conjunction with the increasing 
prevalence of a mechanistic approach to physiology and embryology that stemmed 
directly from the Entwicklungsmechanik tradition, and which sought to materialize the 
reductionistic ideals of the Berlin school of the 1850s. This wave of mechanistic 
biology found its most important advocate in the figure of Jacques Loeb, who 
championed the belief that all living phenomena were reducible, through laboratory 
analysis, to the fundamental laws of physics and chemistry. In 1912, Loeb published a 
manifesto entitled The Mechanistic Conception of Life, in which he prophesized, 
following Roux, that biology would ultimately be absorbed by physics, with complex 
processes such as development, regeneration, and fertilization becoming effectively 
explained in atomic and molecular terms. However, in spite of its early successes, 
Loeb’s extreme form of mechanicism did not dominate biology for long. A growing 
number of biologists began to question the cross-disciplinary applicability of Loeb’s 
experimental findings. More importantly still was the concern of whether, even after 
having rejected somatic vitalism, it was still legitimate to regard mechanistic science as 
possessing the necessary and sufficient epistemic tools to effectively explain the 
distinctive nature and behaviour of living organisms. It was amidst this atmosphere of 
uncertainty that a new form of vitalism emerged, more concordant with the tenets and 
methodology of the physical sciences, but still committed to the ontological 
distinctiveness of life. In the next two sections, I will identify the historical roots of 
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this vitalistic doctrine and trace its process of maturation until the first half of the 
twentieth century.  
 
2.9. Vitalism Re-Vitalized: Bernard and the Naturalization of Vitalism 
 
Dissatisfaction with the presuppositions of somatic vitalism, even among non-
mechanists, predates the criticisms of Driesch’s ideas by over a century. Some 
(admittedly, very few) vitalists had long argued that the notion of the vital force 
imposed an unnecessary metaphysical agent in the living domain which could not 
possibly be legitimized by emulating the appropriation of the metaphysically obscure 
forces that Newton had introduced into physical science. The most important, exponent 
of this marginal form of vitalism was Xavier Bichat (1771-1802) who had defended 
the autonomy of life from non-life (and of biology from physics) as fervently and as 
explicitly as his somatic vitalist contemporaries,
15
 but who had rooted the 
distinctiveness of living phenomena, not on the operation of a (Newtonian) vital force, 
but on the peculiar characteristics of organic tissues. These ‘vital properties’, namely 
sensibility and contractibility, were for Bichat the genuine defining features of life, as 
they endowed the bodily organs with their complex and diverse functionalities.
16
 
Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate to claim that Bichat’s vitalism constitutes a 
complete departure from the somatic vitalism which prevailed in his time (and long 
after), as although he spoke of ‘vital properties’ rather than of ‘vital forces’, he was as 
committed as any somatic vitalist to the fundamental unknowability of the vital agents 
he postulated and to the inherent inappropriateness of approaching the study of living 
beings within the theories and methods of the mechanists.
17
  
 
                                                     
15
 In his Physiological Researches on Life and Death of 1809, Bichat states: “compare the vital faculty 
of feeling to the physical faculty of attracting; you will see that the attraction is always in proportion to 
the mass of the rough body in which it is observed, while the sensibility changes incessantly in the same 
organic part and in the same mass of matter […] To say that physiology is the physics of animals, is to 
give but a very imperfect idea of it; I might say with equal propriety that astronomy is the physiology of 
the stars.” (Bichat, quoted in Hein, 1972, p. 167)   
16
 In this respect, Bichat followed in the footsteps of earlier physiologists, such as Haller, who despite 
his mechanistic commitment to the preexistence of germs, nevertheless postulated that sensibility and 
irritability constituted irreducible vital properties that endowed the organism with its distinctive features. 
We will return to the ideas of Haller and Bichat in a rather different epistemic context in Chapter 5. 
17
 This last point is clearly exemplified in the following passage, where he criticizes by name some of 
the mechanists we have already examined in previous sections: “One calculates the return of a comet, 
the speed of a projectile; but to calculate with Borelli the strength of a muscle, with Keill the speed of 
blood, with Lavoisier the quantity of air entering the lung, is to build on shifting sand an edifice […] 
which soon falls for lack of an assured base. This instability […] marks all vital phenomena with an 
irregularity which distinguishes them from physical phenomena remarkable for their uniformity. It is 
easy to see that the science of organised bodies should be treated in a manner quite different from those 
which have unorganised bodies for object.” (Bichat, quoted in Goodfield, 1974, p. 68) 
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The first real break with the doctrine of somatic vitalism within the non-mechanistic 
camp would come half a century after Bichat, in the ideas of another Frenchman, the 
distinguished physiologist Claude Bernard (1813-1878), known for his important 
contributions to the studies of digestion, animal chemistry, and neurophysiology. In his 
more philosophical writings, Bernard subjected the science of physiology to a thorough 
revision which challenged some of the basic presuppositions of both somatic vitalism 
and nineteenth century mechanicism. Following his mentor François Magendie (1783-
1855), and opposing the practices of prior vitalists, Bernard strongly advocated the use 
of experimentation in the study of organisms. In his celebrated Introduction à l’Étude 
de la Médecine Expérimentale of 1865, he argues, in clear mechanistic terms, that 
adopting the methodological principles and techniques of physics and chemistry offers 
the surest grounds for the progress of physiology. To the extent that vital phenomena 
can be scientifically understood, he writes, they can only be studied through a rigorous 
application of the experimental method of the physicochemical sciences. However, 
unlike the mechanist, Bernard asserts that no matter how much experimentation can 
potentially tell us about the inner workings of the organism, it cannot show that they 
can be reduced to force and matter. In this sense, Bernard shows to be deeply 
committed to one of the central tenets of vitalism: the irreducibility of life. It is for this 
reason that he forcefully attacks the relentless mechanistic endeavour to reduce the 
subject matter of biology to that of the physical sciences:  
 
We have seen, and still often see, chemists and physicists who […] try to absorb 
physiology and reduce it to simple physicochemical phenomena. They offer explanations 
or systems of life which tempt us at times by their false simplicity, but which harm 
biological science in every case, by bringing in false guidance and inaccuracy which it 
then takes long to dispel. In a word, biology has its own problem and its own definite point 
of view; it borrows from other sciences only their help and their methods, not their theories 
(1957 [1865], p. 95; my emphasis) 
 
This distinction that Bernard draws between the import of physicochemical methods 
and the import of physicochemical theories illustrates another fundamental difference 
between him and the mechanists. For Bernard, although physicochemical methods 
constitute the best means of undertaking physiological research, the mechanistic 
understanding of the organism which tends to motivate the application of such methods 
is not entailed by them. In Bernard’s own words, “if we break up a living organism by 
isolating its different parts, it is only for the sake of ease in experimental analysis, and 
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by no means in order to conceive them separately”, given that “their union expresses 
more than the addition of their separate properties” (ibid., p. 89; p. 91). The necessary 
application of analytical methods in physiology does not entail a conception of the 
organism as a material aggregate of separate parts. The holistic nature of the organism 
is, in fact, confirmed by the inherent inability of analytical methods to completely 
explain it. This appreciation for the emergent and irreducible properties of organisms 
is, of course, unmistakably vitalistic. In speaking of the nature of organisms, Bernard 
goes on to say, in a language remarkably similar to that later employed by Driesch, that 
the organism is best conceived as “a harmonious and pre-established unity whose 
partial actions are interdependent and mutually generative” (ibid., p. 89).  
 
What is interesting, however, is that Bernard’s vitalism in many ways constitutes a 
radical departure from that of the somatic vitalists. Although being committed to the 
same core beliefs of vitalistic thought, Bernard explicitly criticizes the somatic 
vitalists’ persistent appeal to unknowable vital forces to explain their empirical 
observations, as this leads one to “look on life as a mysterious supernatural influence 
which acts arbitrarily by freeing itself wholly from determinism” (ibid., p. 68). Bernard 
praises Bichat for his refusal to accept the notion of the vital force as a valid 
explanation for the peculiarities of vital phenomena, but also decisively distances 
himself from Bichat’s ideas as these still rooted the distinctiveness of life in the 
unknowable ‘vital properties’ of organic tissues. His ultimate discontent with the 
preceding vitalistic theories of both the somatic vitalists and Bichat led Bernard to 
develop a new form of vitalistic biology which attempted to theoretically justify the 
basic tenets of the doctrine without compromising its legitimacy as a scientific theory. 
At the heart of Bernard’s vitalism is the commitment to a fully naturalistic explanation 
of the distinctive nature of life. In order to distinguish it from prior strains of vitalistic 
thought, I will refer to this doctrine as naturalized vitalism. 
 
The most fundamental question that naturalized vitalism had to address was: What is 
the basis of the distinction between the nature of living organisms and the nature of 
nonliving entities? If not a life-soul, a force, or some otherwise unknowable property, 
what then? Bernard’s answer to this question arose from his reflections on the famous 
distinction he drew between the internal and external environments of the object under 
investigation. He noticed that an inorganic body exists in a state of equilibrium with its 
immediate surroundings, and consequently all the internal changes it experiences are 
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always the result of alterations in its external environment. In contrast, a living being is 
never in a state of physicochemical equilibrium with its external environment, as it 
possesses “creative spontaneity” and a “ceaseless dynamism” which manifests itself 
internally in relative isolation from its outer environment. Bernard notes that this 
independence of the internal environment from the external environment differs 
“according to the degree of perfection of the organism”. More perfect organisms (such 
as warm-blooded animals) are less subject to the influences of the outer environment 
and hence lead “more free and independent” lives. Less perfect organisms (such as 
plants) are more sensitive to external influences and conditions and in fact depend on 
them to a certain extent to sustain their existence. It is in this relative autonomy of the 
internal environment brought about by the organism’s capability to ‘self-regulate’ (a 
term used by Bernard) and compensate from external perturbations that Bernard rooted 
not only the distinctiveness of living beings, but also the necessary starting point of 
biological science, as “it is in the study of these inner organic conditions that direct and 
true explanations are to be found for the phenomena of the life, health, sickness and 
death of the organism” (ibid., pp. 97-98).  
 
A possible objection which could be raised against the interpretation of Bernard’s ideas 
offered here is that Bernard himself in several occasions explicitly refers to a 
distinctive ‘vital force’ legislating over the organism and regulating physiological 
processes. Clearly, this kind of language would appear to contradict the assertion that 
Bernard broke away from the somatic vitalist tradition, and would indeed justify neatly 
aligning him alongside other somatic vitalists. A close reading of Bernard’s writings, 
however, positively refutes the grounds for drawing such a conclusion, as his own 
usage of the term ‘vital force’ is, in fact, confined to the description of the effects of 
the very phenomenon which deems the invocation of vital forces unnecessary, namely 
the organism’s capacity to regulate its internal environment. Its occasional appearance 
in Bernard’s writings should thus be interpreted as referring not to the obscure 
Newtonian force of the somatic vitalists, but to the ability of the organism to self-
regulate. This becomes clear when one considers the meaning ascribed to the notion of 
vital force in the following passage:  
 
Every living being indeed appears to us provided with a kind of inner force, which 
presides over manifestations of life more and more independent of general cosmic 
influence in proportion as the being rises higher in the scale of organization. In the higher 
animals and in man, this vital force seems to result in withdrawing the living being from 
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general physico-chemical influences and thus making the experimental approach very 
difficult (ibid., p. 59; my emphasis)   
 
Bernard’s choice of the words ‘appears to us’ as opposed to ‘is’ may provide a further 
indication that he is actually suggesting that the self-regulating capacities of the 
organism result in effects which appear to the external observer as being the product 
of a vital force (cf. Roll-Hansen, 1976). It may be safely asserted, then, that Bernard’s 
vitalism constitutes a fundamental departure from the somatic vitalist tradition, which 
would nevertheless prevail until Driesch.  
 
Overall, Bernard’s contributions to both the science and philosophy of life are 
paramount. Not only is he responsible for making the adoption of physicochemical 
methodologies in biological research completely compatible with defending a patently 
non-mechanistic understanding of living organisms, but through his postulation of the 
organism’s capacity for self-regulation, he laid down the basic foundations for a new 
strain of vitalistic thought which subsequent biologists would build upon and engage 
the established mechanistic community in critical debates without running the risk of 
being ruled out of the discussion for holding mystical or unscientific views, as had 
happened with twentieth century neo-somatic vitalists like Driesch.  
 
2.10. Haldane’s Establishment of Organicism and Its Eclipse of Mechanicism 
 
The naturalized vitalism which flourished from the seeds sown by Bernard had its most 
important exponent in the figure of J. S. Haldane (1860-1936), one of the greatest 
physiologists of the early-twentieth century, and father of the equally distinguished J. 
B. S. Haldane (1892-1964). J. S. Haldane is perhaps best known for elucidating the 
physiology of respiration and for his discovery of the ‘Haldane effect’ of haemoglobin. 
However, he also developed an interest in philosophy very early on, and already in his 
days as a medical student in the early 1880s he argued that mechanistic and (somatic) 
vitalistic conceptions of life were “radically unsound” (Haldane, 1884). He later came 
into contact with the ideas of Bernard and went on to pursue a highly successful career 
in experimental physiology. His firsthand acquaintance with the intricacies of 
physiological processes, acquired from the many decades he devoted to the empirical 
study of organisms, provided him with a solid foundation upon which to elaborate 
Bernard’s pioneering ideas and develop more broadly the naturalized vitalistic 
conception of living beings, which he presented in a series of books and lectures. By 
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the end of his life, Haldane had helped establish naturalized vitalism as a meaningful, 
scientifically-sound alternative to mechanistic biology. 
  
Haldane’s adoption of Bernard’s ideas first becomes apparent in his 1916 Silliman 
Lectures entitled Organism and Environment as Illustrated by the Physiology of 
Breathing, where he identifies the Bernardian conception of organic self-regulation as 
the “essence of life”. Later, in his 1927-1928 series of Gifford Lectures, delivered 
under the grand title The Sciences and Philosophy, Haldane refers to “Bernard’s 
Principle”, which he defines as the fact that all physiological activities have as their 
ultimate objective the preservation of the organism’s internal environment. He asserts 
that this principle has proven “extraordinarily useful in guiding physiological work 
into fruitful channels”, adding that “Bernard himself did not realize how far his 
development of his own reasoning would carry physiology” (1930, p. 41; p. 57). 
Haldane goes on to show how Bernard’s principle is central to understanding many 
major physiological processes, such as renal function, respiration, neuronal activity, 
and blood circulation (ibid., pp. 41-55). 
 
Haldane’s crucial contribution to the conceptual development of Bernard’s naturalized 
vitalism lies in his realization of the impossibility to explain the constancy of the 
organism’s internal environment by referring to the structure of the organs which 
regulate it, as these very organs are themselves dependent on the internal environment. 
They are constantly taking up and giving off organic matter, and thus their actual 
‘structure’ is nothing more than the appearance taken by the flow of material that runs 
through them. Thus, “We are only reasoning in a circle when we attempt to explain the 
internal environment by the specific characters of bodily structure” (Haldane, 1917, p. 
91). The living organism cannot be defined by its material constituents, as these flow 
through it and are constantly being replaced. In contrast, the arrangement of that 
matter, i.e., the organization, remains constant and thus endows the living being with 
its identity and individuality. It is the organization of the organism, expressed as the 
continuous dynamic coordination and regulation of the internal environment, which, in 
Haldane’s view, is responsible for the distinctiveness and irreducibility of living 
beings.
18
  
 
                                                     
18
 I will explore this dynamic conception of the organism in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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The fact that the doctrine of naturalized vitalism has come to be known as organicism 
is something we owe to Haldane. According to the British embryologist Joseph 
Needham (1928b), the term organicism was first used in 1903 by Yves Delage (1854-
1920) in his L’Hérédité et les Grands Problèmes de la Biologie. Delage used the term 
to refer to the school of thought which regarded: 
 
life, the form of the body, the properties and characters of its diverse parts, as resulting 
from the reciprocal play or struggle of all its elements, cells, fibres, tissues, organs, which 
act the one on the other, modify one the other, allot themselves each its place and part, and 
lead all together to the final result, giving thus the appearance of a pre-established 
harmony” (Delage, quoted in Needham, 1928b, pp. 29-30)  
 
At the beginning of Organism and Environment as Illustrated by the Physiology of 
Breathing, Haldane (1917, p. 3) remarked in a footnote: “It has been suggested to me 
that if a convenient label is needed for the doctrine upheld in these lectures the word 
“organicism” might be employed”. However, as Delage associated organicism not only 
with Bernard, but also somewhat puzzlingly with Bichat and Roux, Needham (1928b, 
p. 30) is correct when he notes that the term acquired an entirely new lease of life when 
it was appropriated by Haldane to describe his own views.  
 
An interesting question which arises here is why Haldane felt it necessary to adopt a 
new term to designate his philosophy when the tenets he sought to defend were so 
characteristically vitalistic. The simple reason is that Haldane did not see himself as 
inheriting the ideas of the vitalistic tradition. Rather, he regarded his views (and those 
of Bernard) as constituting a completely new philosophy which bore no resemblance to 
either mechanicism or vitalism. In fact, in many of his philosophical writings, Haldane 
developed his argument in three stages: first he would discuss the mechanistic and 
vitalistic views in turn, then he would draw attention to what he considered to be fatal 
flaws in both of these doctrines, and finally he would expound his organicism. 
Haldane’s terminological demarcation of his naturalized vitalism from vitalistic 
philosophy as a whole (through his adoption of the term ‘organicism’) is most 
probably the result of his restricted understanding of what vitalistic thought really 
entailed. For Haldane (as indeed for virtually everybody else at that time), vitalism 
simply meant somatic vitalism. Since somatic vitalism had become universally rejected 
following the decisive mechanistic criticisms of Driesch’s ideas, the term ‘vitalism’ no 
longer appeared to warrant a place in biology. Consequently, it was expunged from 
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scientific parlance, only to be occasionally invoked thereafter as a term of abuse to 
criticize views or theories deemed to be unscientific (as in the virulent remarks from 
Francis Crick quoted in Section 2.2). This situation is clearly a little paradoxical given 
that Haldane’s philosophy (not to mention Bernard’s), regardless of whether it is 
referred to as organicism or naturalized vitalism, is in every important respect 
distinctively vitalistic, according to the tenets of vitalism outlined at the beginning of 
this chapter. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that Haldane’s decision to 
distance himself from the term ‘vitalism’, when considered in the proper historical 
context, does not seem unreasonable given the intellectual atmosphere of the time. 
 
Haldane’s organicism, then, should be understood as a direct continuation of Bernard’s 
naturalized vitalism. As most vitalists since the seventeenth century, Haldane firmly 
rejects the mechanistic conception of life, embodied in the MCO:    
 
In endeavouring to interpret living organisms as machines the mechanistic physiology 
which we have inherited from last century has distorted our ordinary observation and 
directed attention away from obvious facts. This physiology has thus failed […] since it 
has nothing coherent to say about the co-ordination which is the distinguishing feature of 
life, or about the natural processes of resistance to disturbance and recovery from it […] 
These subjects are necessarily ignored, because they are incapable of being stated in terms 
of the mechanistic interpretation (Haldane, 1930, pp. 94-95) 
 
Haldane argues that the mechanistic understanding of life must be abandoned because 
it cannot explain the natural tendency of the organism to actively maintain its structure 
and activities and restore them after external disturbances. When he discusses the form 
of vitalism he distinguishes himself from (i.e., somatic vitalism), Haldane strongly 
argues that it too must be rejected, although for very different reasons. Since the 
seventeenth century, vitalism, unlike mechanicism, had consistently recognized the 
organism’s unique ability to regulate itself and coordinate its activities, but it could 
only explain this ability by referring to an unknowable vital agent. The existence of a 
vital force, Haldane notes, “does not correspond to the observed facts, and is thus of 
little use as a working hypothesis in actual investigation” (Haldane, 1917, p. 112). He 
adds, however, that the merit of vitalism lies in its “destructive criticism of mechanistic 
theory”, and he even admits that in his own work he has “endeavoured to express the 
vitalistic criticism in a still more general form than it has assumed in the writings of the 
vitalists” (ibid.). Thus, it is clear that although Haldane chose not to align his views 
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with that of preceding vitalists by name, he was in fact committed to the exact same 
criticisms of mechanistic biology and to the same philosophical tenets regarding the 
nature of organisms as all other vitalists before him.  
 
The consolidation of naturalized vitalism in the early twentieth century by way of 
Haldane’s organicism was to result in an important shift in the unfolding of the 
mechanicism-vitalism dispute. The full transition from somatic vitalism to organicism 
signalled the end of the vitalistic appeal to unknowable agents. Thereafter, the 
fundamental disagreement over the nature of life would be fought out within the strict 
confines of scientific naturalism. Organicism would continue to defend the 
distinctiveness of life by means of empirically-grounded conceptions alone, focusing 
primarily on the specific organismic capabilities that have no counterpart in the 
machine world: intrinsic purposiveness, self-generation, self-reproduction, plasticity, 
adaptability, etc. (see Chapter 3). Haldane repeatedly emphasized that these features of 
the living world cannot be explained, or even expressed, in mechanistic terms. 
Mechanists may, for sure, investigate secretion by measuring the mass or volume of 
the substances secreted, or by their chemical composition, and they may investigate 
muscular contraction by measuring the rate and extent of contraction, or by the 
accompanying heat production. But in all of these instances, the phenomena observed 
are always physicochemical. A biological understanding of the significance of these 
phenomena requires that they are interpreted from the point of view of the whole living 
organism, and this can only be done through the introduction of terms and concepts 
which have no place in physics and chemistry. For this reason, biology must be viewed 
as an independent science, not incompatible with physics and chemistry, but 
autonomous from them in every important respect. “The time has come”, Haldane 
(1917, p. 103) proclaimed, “for biology to liberate herself and step forth as a free and 
living experimental science, with a world before her to conquer by the help of clearer 
ideas of what life is, and how it can be investigated”. But Haldane’s belief in the 
autonomy of biology went even further, and in a presidential address delivered before 
the physiological section of the British Association in 1908, he made the following 
prophecy: 
 
That a meeting-point between biology and the physical sciences may at some time be 
found, there is no reason to doubt. But we may confidently predict that if that meeting-
point is found, and one of the two sciences is swallowed up, that one will not be biology 
(Haldane, 1930, p. 96) 
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Haldane’s prophecy may have seemed audacious even by vitalistic standards. It was 
one thing to argue against the reducibility of biology to physics, but who in their right 
frame of mind could seriously contend that physics may one day be encompassed by 
biology? As presumptuous as it may have seemed, the truth of the matter is that in the 
first few decades of the twentieth century Haldane’s prophecy came remarkably close 
to being fulfilled. During this period the certainties of mechanicism were shattered 
following the radically new developments in physics. Relativity theory and quantum 
mechanics appeared to present serious challenges to the fundamental principles of 
classical mechanics, as even the most elementary units of matter were proving to 
behave in unexpected ways. As a result, physicists were being led to think of the 
inorganic world more and more in terms of organization, wholes, and internal 
relations; conceptions, of course, which had been integral to biological (especially 
vitalistic) thinking for centuries. The physicist-turned-philosopher A. N. Whitehead 
(1861-1947) was the first to realize that the new ideas of physics seemed to 
approximate fundamental biological conceptions and indeed asserted in his celebrated 
Science and the Modern World that biology’s traditional appeal to physical theories 
and concepts, although justified and fruitful in the past, was no longer defensible: 
 
It cannot be too clearly understood that the various physical laws which appear to apply to 
the behaviour of atoms are not mutually consistent as at presently formulated. The appeal 
to mechanism [i.e., mechanicism] on behalf of biology was in its origin an appeal to the 
well attested self-consistent physical concepts as expressing the basis of natural 
phenomena. But at present there is no such system of concepts. (Whitehead, 1925, p. 129) 
 
Instead, Whitehead argued that physics should adopt biological notions and apply them 
to the entire natural world. This was his theory of ‘organic mechanism’ (or organic 
mechanicism, in keeping with the terminology I have adopted), which he formulated 
and defended in the same book. According to Whitehead, science is best defined as the 
study of ‘organisms’, understanding this term as any stable and active organized 
system; be it a living being or an atom.
19
 Other philosophers and biologists would 
adopt and elaborate ideas similar to those of Whitehead, most notably C. Lloyd 
Morgan (1852-1936) and Jan Smuts (1870-1950). Lloyd Morgan, in his book 
Emergent Evolution (1923), claimed that the concept of organism is not characteristic 
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 Despite their obvious differences, organic mechanicism does share with classical mechanicism the 
conviction that the partition between life and non-life is artificial and should be abandoned, as both 
doctrines maintain that the organic and inorganic realms are ultimately of the same nature (even if that 
‘nature’ is different in each doctrine).   
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of living beings, as it is applicable to the entire spectrum of integrated natural entities 
which exist in the universe in progressive levels of emergent complexity. Writing 
around the same time and along similar lines, Smuts asserted in Holism and Evolution 
(1926) that the term ‘life’ in science should be abandoned in favour of the notions of 
whole and wholeness, as these are applicable throughout nature, ranging from 
inorganic substances to the highest manifestations of the human spirit (e.g., mental 
activities, personality, etc.).  
 
Although for a time it did indeed seem that biology would effectively ‘swallow up 
physics’, as Haldane had predicted, through the construction of a unified organic 
science of nature, the fact is that this research program was never seriously taken up by 
the majority of physicists and biologists. Even if it may have appeared reasonable to 
presume, given the history of the development of biological thought, that the new 
physics would lead to a corresponding revolutionary transformation of biology (as had 
occurred previously with Cartesian mechanicism in the seventeenth century and again 
with Newtonian mechanicism in the eighteenth century), the eventual ‘revolution’ 
which resulted in the establishment of molecular biology in the latter half of the 
twentieth century was not primarily based on the new physical conceptions of matter, 
but rather on the mechanistic principles and research programs that had been 
developing since the mid nineteenth century.  
  
2.11. The Molecularization of Biology and the Current State of the Dispute 
 
Despite the virtually universal belief that the mechanicism-vitalism debate ended with 
the demise of Driesch’s somatic vitalism, I have attempted to show in the preceding 
sections that some of the major trends in biological thought of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries are most effectively understood when contextualized within 
the mechanicism-vitalism axis. As we turn to look back at the recent history of biology 
and consider its current state, it again becomes apparent that many of the most 
important modern developments acquire a new significance when approached through 
the unique perspective afforded by the mechanicism-vitalism dispute. 
 
Following on from my discussion in the previous section, the second third of the 
twentieth century saw the continued elaboration of the doctrine of naturalized vitalism 
(renamed ‘organicism’ by Haldane, I have argued, in order to escape the mystical 
connotations of the earlier forms of vitalism) through the work of a number of 
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theoretical and experimental biologists. Central among them were the Englishmen J. H. 
Woodger (1894-1981), and Joseph Needham (1900-1995); the Americans W. E. Ritter 
(1856-1944) and L. J. Henderson (1878-1942); and the Austrians Paul Weiss (1898-
1989) and Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1901-1972). As these biologists worked largely 
independently of each other, their individual interpretations and elaborations of the 
organicist conception of life differ to a certain degree. However, they all share two 
basic objectives. The first is the vindication of “the autonomy of life, denied in the 
mechanistic conception, and remaining a metaphysical question mark in [somatic] 
vitalism” (Bertalanffy, 1952, p. 20). The second is the ambition to come to terms with 
the nature of the living organization (see Haraway, 1976). In fact, it is on precisely this 
crucial issue that Haldane’s initial organicism had proven most unsatisfactory. The 
term ‘organization’ features prominently in Haldane’s writings, as it was considered to 
constitute the basis of the distinction between the living and the nonliving. However, at 
no point does Haldane attempt to explain what the organization of life actually consists 
of. Organization in Haldane’s work is not really the solution but merely a new name 
for the problem that needs explaining. It is for this reason that Needham at one point 
accused Haldane of developing a form of ‘neo-vitalism’ (by which he evidently meant 
a new form of somatic vitalism) given that his organicism left the nature of the 
postulated vital principle (namely, the living organization) essentially unexplained 
(Haraway, 1976, pp. 36-37).  
 
For these organicists who followed after Haldane, the objective was no longer to 
identify the causes of the distinctive vital properties of the organism, as these could 
now be traced to the living organization, but rather to explain why the distinctive vital 
properties observed are in fact a consequence of the structures and processes analysed. 
Organismic organization became the explanandum rather than the explanans. This 
conceptual shift is well documented in Woodger’s classic Biological Principles, where 
he notes that “If the concept of organization is of such importance as it appears to be it 
is something of a scandal that biologists have not yet begun to take it seriously”, 
adding that “The first duty of the biologist would seem to be to try and make clear this 
important concept” (Woodger, 1929, p. 291). Along similar lines, Bertalanffy remarks 
in his Problems of Life that “the problem of life is that of organization” (Bertalanffy, 
1952, p. 12). Overall, what appears to have emerged from the work on organization on 
the part of these organicists is a fairly unified conception of the organism as a complex, 
hierarchically structured whole whose parts are not only functionally integrated in the 
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whole, but also directly coordinated by the whole. The integrating and coordinating 
effects of the organismic whole on its component parts means that the whole is as 
responsible in determining the nature of the parts as the parts are in determining the 
nature of the whole (see Chapter 3).
20
  
 
The organicist conception of the organism had profound epistemic consequences. Most 
importantly, it provided a naturalized explanation for why vitalists had long argued 
that reductionistic methodologies were inherently incapable of exhaustively elucidating 
the nature of the organism. The organism cannot be understood by analyzing its 
component parts because the behaviour of the parts when examined in isolation is 
qualitatively different from the behaviour they exhibit when they are found integrated 
in the organism. It is therefore entirely inappropriate to “regard living beings as 
machines made up of a multitude of discrete parts (physicochemical units), removable 
like pistons of an engine and capable of description without regard to the system from 
which they are removed” (Novikoff, 1945, p. 210). Due to the self-organization of the 
organism as a whole, the parts interact with one another nonlinearly, causing 
qualitatively new properties to emerge at the level of the whole. These emergent 
properties of the whole are not possessed by the component parts, neither when taken 
separately nor when put together in other combinations, and only become visible upon 
consideration of the organism as a whole. In this way, organicism succeeded where all 
prior forms of vitalism had failed in accounting for the distinctive vital properties of 
life without having to actually add anything to the organism. Organicists were 
committed to the Aristotelian dictum that ‘the whole is greater than the sum of its 
parts’, but they did not accept that there was something added to those parts.  
 
In spite of its successes, the wave of organicism which permeated biological thought in 
the early decades of the twentieth century was not to have a lasting effect. While the 
organicists were busy engaging each other in elaborate theoretical and philosophical 
discussions over the integrated nature of the organism, mechanistic biologists 
continued to make progress in the characterization of biological processes at ever 
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 This view is essentially an updated modern formulation of the original understanding of organisms as 
‘natural purposes’ that Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) put forward in his Kritik der Urteilskraft of 1790. 
This is perhaps not entirely surprising given that many organicists were well versed in Kantian 
philosophy. A natural purpose for Kant is a naturally produced self-organizing entity which is 
teleologically structured with respect to the relation between parts and whole. Crucially, however, the 
concept of natural purpose in Kant is merely a regulative principle, subjectively valid (and indeed 
necessary) for reflecting on such beings, but not objectively valid for determining their constitutive 
properties. Organicists, in contrast, are committed to the belief that the integrated and intrinsically 
purposive nature of organisms reflects the very essence of what they actually are in reality. 
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lower levels of organization, arriving eventually at the molecular and chemical levels. 
Areas such as physiology, embryology, heredity, or evolution, which had previously 
been studied on a tissue, cellular, or populational level, were gradually shown to have a 
common foundation in the molecular architecture of specific macromolecules. 
Investigations into the structure and function of molecules such as proteins and later 
nucleic acids opened new avenues for investigating the microstructure of the cell and 
showed new relationships among different areas of biology whose common 
foundations had only been hazily inferred the past (Allen, 1975. pp. 187-189). While a 
concern with the molecular basis of the genetic transmission of heredity was perhaps 
paramount, the molecular research program also extended to other aspects of the cell, 
such as the nature of protein interactions, enzyme and antibody specificity, and the 
structure and composition of cellular membranes. 
 
This increasingly profitable molecular research program came to be known as 
molecular biology. William T. Astbury (1898-1961), one of the founders and 
propagandizers of the term ‘molecular biology’, defined it in 1950 as being 
“particularly [concerned] with the forms of biological molecules and with the 
evolution, exploitation and ramification of these forms in the ascent to higher and 
higher levels of organization”. Astbury added that molecular biology “implies not so 
much a technique as an approach, an approach from the viewpoint of the so-called 
basic sciences with the leading idea of searching below large-scale manifestations of 
classical biology for the corresponding molecular plan” (Astbury, quoted in Allen, 
1975, p. 189). Molecular biology was interested in the architecture of biologically 
important macromolecules and the ways in which they interact in cell metabolism and 
heredity. Biophysical methods such as x-ray diffraction of crystallized molecules and 
molecular model building were employed to investigate molecular architecture, while 
biochemical methods were used to determine how macromolecules interact with each 
other and with smaller molecules in the cell. The question of specificity in molecular 
‘templating’ became one of the most pressing problems, and both Linus Pauling (1901-
1994) and Max Delbrück (1906-1981) pointed to its fundamental importance for 
conceptualizing gene replication as well as gene expression. The pinnacle of this 
research came in 1953 with the elucidation of the structure of DNA by James Watson 
(b. 1928) and Francis Crick (1916-2004), which, as they remarked in their famous 
Nature paper, “immediately suggests a possible copying mechanism for the genetic 
material” (Watson and Crick, 1953, p. 737). In many respects, Watson and Crick’s 
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accomplishment represented the triumphant culmination of the bold programatic 
objectives of the Berlin school of mechanistic physiology of the nineteenth century. 
Life, at last, had been successfully reduced to its molecular constituents, and thus 
biology could finally be ‘absorbed into the great unity of the physical sciences’, as Du-
Bois Reymond had hoped in 1848.  
 
Indeed, the mechanistic character of molecular biology is instantly recognizable. As I 
noted in Section 2.2, mechanistic biology seeks to explain all features of living systems 
from the bottom up in increasing levels of organization. In this way, molecular biology 
takes individual biological molecules and their detailed three-dimensional structure as 
the starting point of explanation. The description of the sequential transformations of 
these structures and the means by which they come into mechanical contact with one 
another is what enables the causal understanding of key processes like DNA 
replication and protein synthesis. As Richard Lewontin indicates, “molecular 
approaches to biology are attempts to build up the units of “natural” causal relations 
from individual elements” (2000, p. 77, my emphasis). This epistemic attitude is 
effectively captured in the first edition of Watson’s seminal textbook Molecular 
Biology of the Gene (1965), in which Watson remarked that: 
  
Complete certainty now exists among essentially all biochemists that the other 
characteristics of living organisms […] will all be completely understood in terms of the 
coordinative interactions of small and large molecules [...] [F]urther research of the 
intensity recently given to genetics will eventually provide man with the ability to describe 
with completeness the essential features that constitute life. (Watson, 1965, p. 67) 
 
As this passage makes clear, the guiding expectation of molecular biology is that 
exhaustively cataloguing how all the different molecules in a living system interact 
with one another will ultimately result in a complete understanding of the living 
system as a whole. Of course, this does not mean that molecular biologists (or 
mechanists more generally) have no appreciation of the inherent complexity of living 
systems. It simply means that they consider that the complexity of a living system is 
directly determined by the properties and interactions of the parts which compose it, 
and that consequently a full reductionistic characterization of these parts amount to a 
full understanding of the living system as a whole. This view emerged as a clear and 
explicit reaction to the organicist or vitalist conception of the organism of the earlier 
part of the century, according to which the self-producing organization of the whole 
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organism is primary and not reducible to molecular analyses. In this respect, 
“Molecular biologists”, as Evelyn Fox Keller has pointed out “were struggling to build 
a new biology that would be clearly distinct from (and even in opposition to) an older, 
organismic biology, as they sought to rid their descriptions of living organisms of 
traditionally vital (or vitalistic) preoccupation with function––especially to expunge 
from their language such conspicuously teleological notions as purpose, organization, 
and harmony” (Keller, 1995, pp. 88-89). By rejecting the primacy of these “vitalistic” 
notions, molecular biologists repudiated the notion that organisms exhibit reciprocal 
forms of causality of the kind proposed by Kant and the organicists. Instead, the causal 
emphasis is on genes, which act as master molecules that exert unidirectional control 
by translating their miniature linear codes into the four dimensional form of the living 
organism. This insistence on unidirectional causality is essentially the idea that 
underlies the Central Dogma, which was first formulated by Crick in 1958, and which 
undoubtedly constitutes one of the key principles of molecular biology.
21
  
 
This commitment to unidirectional causality is inextricably linked to the emphasis on 
the notion of information; a concept which was central to the establishment of 
molecular biology. In fact, molecular biology appealed to a variety of research fields 
outside biology, not only information theory but also cybernetics, systems analysis, 
operations research, and computer science (cf. Keller, 1995; Morange, 1998). 
Cybernetics, for instance, enabled the introduction of the concept of feedback into 
biology, which became central to the understanding of gene regulation following 
François Jacob (b. 1920) and Jacques Monod’s (1910-1976) formulation of the operon 
model in 1960. Likewise, the advent of computer science made possible the idea of a 
genetic program, which Jacob and Monod also adopted in 1961 as a model to make 
sense of gene expression (I will examine the concepts of feedback and genetic program 
in much more detail in Chapter 3). However, what is perhaps most remarkable about 
the establishment of molecular biology is that, despite drawing on cutting-edge areas 
of physical science and engineering for inspiration, its fundamental understanding of 
living systems is firmly grounded on the old mechanistic conceptions of matter and 
causality of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Molecular biology thus 
represents a direct continuation and elaboration of classic mechanistic biology, not a 
new form of mechanicism based on new engineering or cybernetic conceptions. Its 
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 For a historical account of Crick’s formulation of the Central Dogma of molecular biology, see Olby, 
1970. For a critical analysis of its presuppositions, see Sarkar, 1996. 
 - 67 - 
mechanical conceptualization of subcellular structures (i.e., its MCO) is little different 
from that of classic mechanicism. Keller makes this point explicitly:  
 
“Cyberscience and molecular biology may have been products of the same historical 
moment, but with respect to their models of causal structure, they were running on two 
separate tracks, side by side, but in opposite directions: while the first one was busy using 
the organism to illustrate a new kind of machine, the other was seeking to model the 
organism after the machines of yesteryear!” (Keller, 1995, p. 97).  
 
Along similar lines, the noted physicist David Bohm (1917-1992) poignantly remarked 
at Conrad Waddington’s symposia on theoretical biology that modern biology remains 
committed to a mechanistic worldview whereas modern physics had departed from it:   
 
It does seem odd […] that just when physics is […] moving away from mechanism, 
biology and psychology are moving closer to it. If the trend continues it may well be that 
scientists will be regarding living and intelligent beings as mechanical, while they suppose 
that inanimate matter is too complex and subtle to fit into the limited categories of 
mechanism [i.e., mechanicism]. (Bohm, 1969, p. 48) 
 
Being that as it may, with a consolidated mechanistic understanding of organisms 
firmly in hand and the availability of the appropriate methodological techniques for 
studying them, the latter half of the twentieth century was largely devoted to working 
out the details of the molecular view of life through a meticulous characterization of its 
causal mechanisms. However, by the end of the last century, the realization began to 
emerge that molecular biology is inherently incapable of providing a complete 
understanding of living systems. It has gradually become apparent that the spectacular 
success of molecular biology was entirely predicated on its dispensation of all aspects 
of biology it could not comprehend or effectively deal with and its specific targeting of 
those problems that happened to be amenable to mechanistic conceptualizations and 
reductionistic investigations, such as the structure and function of macromolecular 
complexes, and the transmission of genetic material. Already in 1985, Adam Wilkins 
noted in an editorial entitled ‘The Limits of Molecular Biology’ that “molecular 
biology as a theory is incomplete: for many fundamental problems in biology, the 
present molecular canon provides no theoretical predictions and therefore cannot serve 
as a source of testable hypotheses in these areas” (Wilkins, 1985, p. 3).  
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The basic limitation of molecular biology is that it provides no general rules for 
deducing the properties and behaviours of individual cells or groups of cells from their 
macromolecular composition, however complete the molecular inventory may be. The 
simple fact is that the properties of living systems often derive from unexpected or 
unknown interactions of their components, these interactions often setting the stage for 
secondary interactions and so forth. The consequence is that many of the properties of 
living systems cannot be predicted, deduced, or calculated from the properties of the 
individual parts. The organism as a whole determines the behaviour of its parts, so that 
their behaviour as parts of the whole is qualitatively different from their behaviour in 
isolation. A good illustration of this is the phenomenon of cellular morphogenesis. 
Analysis solely of the components of the cytoskeleton (e.g., actin microfilaments, 
microtubules, etc.) can never provide the complete explanation, as it is the whole cell 
which self-organizes and determines its form (see Karsenti, 2008; Kurakin, 2005).  
 
Instead of conceiving the advent of molecular biology as the beginning of the end of 
the quest to elucidate the nature of life, it may be more profitable to regard it as the end 
of the beginning; that is, as the mechanistic research program which took explanatory 
reductionism as far as it could possibly go and by doing so ultimately revealed its 
limitations. Carl Woese has recently expressed a similar view:  
 
I think the 20th century molecular era will come to be seen as a necessary and unavoidable 
transition stage in the overall course of biology: necessary because only by adopting a 
heavily reductionist orientation and the technology of classical physics could certain 
biological problems be brought to fruition and transitional because a biology viewed 
through the eyes of fundamentalist reductionism is an incomplete biology. Knowing the 
parts of isolated entities is not enough. A musical metaphor expresses it best: molecular 
biology could read notes in the score, but it couldn’t hear the music. (Woese, 2004, p. 175) 
 
The field of systems biology has emerged at the beginning of the twenty-first century 
as a concerted effort to come to terms with the ‘music of life’ (see Noble (2006) for an 
extended examination of the music metaphor in relation to systems biology). In order 
to unravel the complexity underlying living systems, it is necessary to investigate the 
holistic patterns of the multiple interactions that link all the components of such 
systems. This is what systems biology sets out to do (Kitano, 2001; Konopka, 2007; 
Boogerd et al., 2007). However, in recent years some theoretical biologists (e.g., 
Cornish-Bowden, 2006) have made the worrying observation that much of the research 
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that goes by the name of ‘systems biology’ is actually old-style mechanistic biology 
applied at a larger scale. In this way, the term ‘system’ is often used to refer to the 
domain of interconnected phenomena to be examined reductionistically. For example, 
a great deal of systems biology research is concerned with examining the intracellular 
networks involved in metabolism, signalling, and transcription and regulation of the 
genetic material. However, the adopted approach is in essence no difference from the 
older molecular biology: each of the components in the network is individually 
characterized, and the interactions between them are modelled using computational 
tools. The underlying expectation is that this bottom-up modelling will lead to an 
understanding of the integrated and coordinated behaviour of living systems. But these 
systemic behaviours cannot be explained from the bottom up (Kaneko, 2006). Instead, 
top-down, system-level examinations are necessary which attempt to make sense of 
networks and assemblies of the component parts in terms of the self-producing 
organization of the system as a whole (Cornish-Bowden et al., 2004). Overall, systems 
biology remains largely mechanistic, though there are also some proponents of a more 
organicist and theoretically-rich understanding of systems biology.  
 
Nevertheless, a more explicit resurgence of organicism is emerging in response to the 
still predominant mechanicism of molecular biology in other biological areas like 
development. In 2000, Scott Gilbert and Sahotra Sarkar authored a well-known paper 
entitled ‘Embracing Complexity: Organicism for the 21st Century’ in which they 
criticized the reductionistic presuppositions of molecular and developmental genetics, 
and they advocated a genuinely organicist conception of developmental biology as a 
“science of emergent complexity” (Gilbert and Sarkar, 2000, p. 1). Although they did 
not draw a line of historical and philosophical continuity between organicism and 
vitalism in the way that I have done in this chapter, their characterization of organicism 
corresponds precisely to the one I have provided, in accordance with the four key 
tenets of vitalistic thought outlined in Section 2.2. Gilbert and Sarkar contrast 
organicism with reductionism, which they characterize ontologically as mechanicism. 
They note that organicists, unlike reductionists, consider that “complex wholes are 
inherently greater than the sum of their parts in the sense that the properties of each 
part are dependent upon the context of the part within the whole in which they operate” 
(ibid.). Moreover, they note that organicism opposes the mechanistic commitment to 
the explanatory sufficiency of bottom-up characterizations of biological phenomena, 
indicating that “Organicism claims that this is not sufficient and that top-down and 
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bottom-up approaches must both be used to explain phenomena” (ibid., p. 2). Of 
course, we have already seen that these ideas, far from being new, were thoroughly 
developed by the wave of organicist theoretical biologists in the first half of the 
twentieth century before the rise of molecular biology. But in a sense they are even 
older, as they effectively capture much of what I have argued has always been 
distinctive about vitalism. 
 
The distinguished cell biologists Marc Kirschner, John Gerhart, and Tim Mitchison 
have been among the very few contemporary biologists who have chosen to align 
themselves explicitly within the tenets of vitalistic (rather than organicist) thought, and 
they have done so precisely because they have been able to see beyond the derogatory 
way in which the term ‘vitalism’ was used for much of the twentieth century, and they 
have understood that this doctrine has always been truly characterized by its emphasis 
on the organism’s intrinsic purposiveness and self-producing organization of living 
systems and by its unequivocal rejection of the MCO of mechanistic biology. Indeed, 
their article ‘Molecular “Vitalism”’ (2000) is a full-blown attack of the ontological and 
epistemological commitments of mechanistic biology, as well as its most recent 
empirical findings in the realm of the cell. They begin their discussion by asking 
themselves “to what extent the ‘postgenomic’ view of modern biology would convince 
a nineteenth century vitalist that the nature of life was now understood” (Kirschner et 
al., 2000, p. 79). After reviewing the various deficiencies of understanding cellular and 
developmental processes in mechanistic terms and in accordance to machine models, 
they conclude with the following evocative passage, which is worth quoting in full:  
 
At the turn of the twenty-first century, we take one last wistful look at vitalism, only to 
underscore our need ultimately to move beyond the genomic analysis of protein and RNA 
components of the cell (which will soon become a thing of the past) and to turn to an 
investigation of the “vitalistic” properties of molecular, cellular, and organismal function. 
Such an opportunity is now possible because of the great advances in genetics and in 
molecular and cell biology during the past century. As it is now clear that gene products 
function in multiple pathways and the pathways themselves are interconnected in 
networks, it is obvious that there are many more possible outcomes than there are genes. 
The genotype, however deeply we analyze it, cannot be predictive of the actual phenotype, 
but can only provide knowledge of the universe of possible phenotypes. Biological 
systems have evolved to restrict these phenotypes, and in self-organizing systems the 
phenotype might depend as much on external conditions and random events as the 
genome-encoded structure of the molecular components. Yet out of such a potentially 
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nondeterminist world, the organism has fashioned a very stable physiology and 
embryology. It is this robustness that suggested “vital forces”, and it is this robustness that 
we wish ultimately to understand in terms of chemistry. We will have such an opportunity 
in this new century. (Kirschner et al., 2000, p. 87)  
 
The significance of this passage resides in the explicit recognition by these cell 
biologists that much of what remains to be done in biology in the twentieth century can 
be effectively conceptualized as the culmination of the explanatory objectives set forth 
by vitalists in previous centuries. The claim is that it is by appealing to vitalistic 
intuitions biologists today can come to terms with the properties of organisms that 
remained unexplainable in terms of the mechanistic understanding of living systems 
that drove much of twentieth-century biology. So although it is undoubtedly the case 
that most contemporary biologists are still implicitly committed to a mechanistic 
conception of life, the dispute between mechanicism and vitalism is far from over. In 
important respects, it continues to provide the basic battleground in which ontological 
and epistemological discussions about organisms is played out. 
 
Having concluded my survey of the mechanicism-vitalism dispute, in the concluding 
section of this chapter I will attempt to use the resources obtained in my historical 
examinations to generate a clearer and richer picture of the nature and conceptual 
evolution of the dispute. 
 
2.12. Conclusions: The Nature and Conceptual Evolution of the Dispute  
 
In this chapter, I have tracked the development of the mechanicism-vitalism dispute 
from its origins with the Cartesian mechanization of life and its discontents, to the 
current tension between the mechanistic outlook of molecular biology and the 
organicist movements in developmental and cell biology. In reflecting on the history of 
the dispute as a whole, there are a number of interesting points which emerge. Perhaps 
the first thing to note is that neither mechanicism nor vitalism has remained static in its 
conceptualization of the nature of the organism. Despite preserving their core ideas, 
both doctrines have changed with the general development of biological science. As 
well as mechanicism’s growth and expansion, vitalism has undergone a profound 
conceptual transformation since its inception. In my historical survey, I have 
distinguished three major forms of vitalism: animistic vitalism, somatic vitalism, and 
naturalized vitalism or organicism. The question is: How do they actually relate to one 
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another? Figure 1 attempts to provide an answer by enlisting the basic characteristic 
features of each successive incarnation of the doctrine. 
 
As the comparative analysis in Figure 1 reveals, although there are clear elements of 
continuity in the history of vitalism, such as the commitment to the distinctiveness of 
life and the operation of an irreducible vital principle in living beings, what changes 
from one form of vitalism to the next is the very nature of that principle. In animistic 
vitalism, the distinction between life and non-life is based on the operation of a life-
soul that enters the organic body at birth and endows it with its distinctive vital 
functionalities. For an animistic vitalist, there is nothing about the constitution or 
arrangement of the organism which justifies the division between life and non-life. 
Rather, the vitality of the organism is the result of the infiltration of an external agent 
into the body. It is the very presence of the soul which makes the organism alive, and it 
is its departure from the body which results in the organism’s death. In contrast to 
animistic vitalism, somatic vitalists root the distinctiveness of life on the operation of a 
vital force (or forces) which comes into being as the body forms during ontogeny. 
Although the cause of this force cannot be identified, its existence can be empirically 
confirmed through it observable effects on the organism. The actual function of the 
vital force differs considerably from one somatic vitalist to another, but it is generally 
taken to be responsible for guiding or directing physiological processes or the course 
of ontogenetic development. Finally, in organicism, the basis for the ontological 
distinctiveness of life (i.e., the vital principle) is the particular organization of matter 
within the organism. The self-producing and self-preserving organization of the living 
being enables it to regulate its internal environment from external perturbations and to 
holistically coordinate its different physiological functions. In this form of vitalism, 
life itself is viewed as a natural emergent property of a very specialized and intricate 
arrangement of organic matter. The death of the organism is understood as being the 
result of the disappearance of its intricate organization. Unlike animistic vitalism but 
like somatic vitalism, organicism maintains that the source of vitality arises from 
within the organism itself, and not from the action of an external agent. The critical 
difference between organicism and prior forms of vitalism is that the cause of the vital 
principle is no longer obscure or beyond the reach of scientific explanation. It 
nonetheless remains a phenomenon exclusive to the living realm. 
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Figure 1. Comparative Analysis of the Major Forms of Vitalism in the History of Biology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANIMISTIC VITALISM 
  
 
SOMATIC VITALISM 
  
 
NATURALIZED VITALISM 
  
Period of Acceptance Late 17
th
 C. to Mid 18
th
 C. Mid 18
th
 C. to Early 20
th
 C.  Late 19
th
 C. to Present Day 
Living is Distinct from Nonliving Yes Yes Yes 
Nature of Vital Principle Life-Soul Force Intrinsically Purposive Self-Organization 
Metaphysics of Vital Principle Supernatural Unclear Natural 
Location of Vital Principle Resides Outside of Living Matter Supervenes on Living Matter Supervenes on Living Matter 
Principle’s Relation to Living Matter Exists Independently of Living Matter Is a Property of Living Matter Results from Organization of Living Matter 
Cause of Vital Principle God Unknown Evolved Complexity of the Organism 
Main Function of Vital Principle Endows the Organism with Life Guides Physiological Processes Regulates & Coordinates the Organism 
Measurability of Vital Principle  No Yes Yes 
Accountability of Vital Principle No No Yes 
Mechanistic Analogy Descartes’ Mind-Body Dualism Newton’s Gravitational Force Whitehead’s ‘Organic Mechanicism’ 
Representative Exponents G. E. Stahl Wolff, Blumenbach, Driesch Bernard, J. S. Haldane, Bertalanffy 
 
 
 
Although the different schools of vitalism conceptualize the vital principle very 
differently, what they all share is the conviction that the life of the organism needs to 
be understood as a particular attribute (be it a life-soul, a force, or an emergent self-
producing organization) which acts upon the organism’s matter and eludes a bottom-
up mechanistic explanation. In fact, it is in the explication of the vital principle that all 
vitalists since the seventeenth century have grounded their defence of the autonomy of 
the living. From the historical examination I have presented it becomes clear that, 
despite their differences, all forms of vitalism have been constructed upon the same 
basic principles I outlined at the outset of this chapter, namely the commitment to an 
ontological discontinuity between the living and the non-living, exemplified by the 
rejection of the MCO and the postulation of a vital principle; to the view that 
organisms possess system-level properties that cannot be accounted for by attending 
to the properties and interactions of their parts; to the emphasis on the organizational 
and teleological features of organisms; and to the rejection of the sufficiency of the 
explanatory reductionism.  
 
The development of mechanicism is similarly marked by the evolution and 
transformation of particular ideas and approaches coupled with the preservation of a 
core set of basic principles. As a whole, mechanists of all ages have shared the 
commitment to a natural continuity between the living and the non-living; to the view 
that organisms are directly determined by the activities and interactions of their 
component parts; to the emphasis on the causal and material features of organisms; 
and to the confidence in the sufficiency of explanatory reductionism. But more than 
anything else, the heart of mechanistic biology since its inception is the MCO. This 
notion constitutes a constant recurring theme in the writings of (most) mechanists 
who, since Descartes, have regarded it as the central working hypothesis informing 
their research. The importance of this conception stems from the fact that it provides a 
compelling justification for the application of physicochemical and engineering 
concepts and methods in biology. Indeed, if the organism is nothing but a complex 
machine, then the implementation of physicochemical and engineering principles in 
the scientific study of life is not only legitimate but necessary.  
 
Of course, although the MCO has prevailed historically, the kind of machine that has 
been used to conceptualize the inner workings of the organism has changed as 
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technological development enabled the construction of increasingly complex 
machines. In Cartesian mechanicism, the organism was either a clock, with its 
coordinated set of rotating cogs, springs, and levers, or a hydraulic automaton, with its 
ordered arrangement of pipes and tubes. By the late eighteenth century, it had become 
a steam engine, with its source of heat that had to be continuously renewed, its 
cooling system, and its devices for adjusting the operations of the various parts. By 
the mid nineteenth century, it was a self-regulating chemical factory coordinating a 
multitude of interconnected reactions. Finally, by the late twentieth century, many 
mechanists were conceiving it as an electronic computer, containing a preexisting set 
of instructions and possessing the ability to process large amounts of information 
about the environment and feeding back appropriate responses. The prevalence of the 
MCO in biological inquiry reveals an important aspect about mechanistic 
epistemology. The organism, as any machine, can only be fully understood if it is 
‘dismantled’ into its components and then each of its parts is examined independently. 
The underlying assumption here is that understanding the functional roles of all the 
parts of an organism suffices to explain the activity of the organism as a whole.  
 
Having outlined the basic trends of continuity running along the conceptual evolution 
of both doctrines, it is now possible to consider the development of the conflict 
between them. In broad terms, the history of the mechanicism-vitalism dispute may be 
regarded as a sequence of vitalistic retractions against the gradual yet inexorable 
advances of mechanicism. Mechanists have sequentially done away with life-souls, 
vital substances, and vital forces, and have increasingly equated living processes to 
those which take place in the realm of inanimate bodies. Indeed, each succeeding 
form of vitalism can be viewed as a more moderate version of the preceding form. 
The different phases of vitalism I have identified embody the successive 
retrenchments that vitalism has been forced to make in the face of the challenges put 
forward by their mechanist opponents. At the same time, mechanicism has become 
increasingly adept at characterizing and conceptualizing the complexity of living 
systems. The fundamental difference between mechanists and vitalists regarding their 
respective conceptions of the nature of organisms has remained virtually unaltered in 
the long history of the dispute. What has changed is the justification provided for their 
conceptions.  
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Another interesting aspect of the dispute which emerges from my historical 
examination is the very peculiar relationship that vitalism has had with mechanicism. 
On the one hand, vitalists have always forged and elaborated their views on the basis 
of the criticisms they have directed against their mechanist opponents. As such, 
animistic vitalism is a reaction to Cartesian mechanicism, somatic vitalism is an 
outgrowth of Newtonian mechanicism, and organicism is a response to late nineteenth 
century physicalistic reductionism. On the other hand, however, each form of vitalism 
has seemed to recapitulate the conceptual framework of the brand of mechanicism it 
opposed. Clearly, this is because mechanicism at every stage of its development has 
had something interesting to offer vitalism epistemologically. But I think that there is 
a deeper motivation at work here. It seems to me that given the fact that since the 
Scientific Revolution mechanicism has tended to be regarded as the embodiment of 
‘good science’, any substantive departures from mechanicism on the part of vitalistic 
biologists could easily become construed as constituting a departure from science in 
general (indeed, this has occurred historically more than once, most prominently in 
the case of Hans Driesch at the turn of the twentieth century). As a result, vitalists 
have been forced to devise their criticisms of mechanicism within the conceptual 
framework laid out by their mechanist opponents, and indeed the scientific 
respectability of their claims has often been grounded on the similarities they have 
shared with the very mechanistic theories they have sought to reject!  
 
This argument helps explain why animistic vitalists expressed their conviction that 
mechanicism was inherently incapable of accounting for life by elaborating a dualistic 
conception of the living organism which explicitly emulated the Cartesian dualistic 
conception of man as a rational being. In a similar fashion, the doctrine of somatic 
vitalism was forged using Newtonian mechanicism as the model, with its postulation 
of unknowable yet measurable forces of nature. Recapitulating the relation between 
animistic vitalism and Cartesian mechanicism, the vitalism that was developed by 
adopting the Newtonian approach to natural philosophy was principally reacting to the 
mechanistic interpretation of the very science that had led to its inception. Moreover, 
it is again the case that it was precisely the similarity with Newtonian mechanicism 
that allowed somatic vitalists to justify the scientific legitimacy of their views. As it 
turns out, however, somatic vitalism failed to convince in the long term, as no 
consensus could be reached regarding the nature of the vital force and its effects on 
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the organism. Eventually, it became apparent that Kant had been right to assert that a 
‘Newton of a blade of grass’ would not come into being in the form of a biologist 
trying to emulate Newton’s own approach to physical science. François Magendie 
(1783-1855), Bernard’s main intellectual mentor, clearly recognized this when he 
noted in 1833 that “Of all the illusions of modern physiologists, the most deplorable 
has been that of believing that by forging a new term, such as vital principle or vital 
force, one has done something analogous to the discovery of gravitation” (quoted in 
Hall, 1968, p. 22). It is probably due to this important realization that naturalized 
vitalism, unlike its predecessors, did not emerge through the adoption of a 
mechanistic conceptual framework. In fact, as I showed, the reverse situation almost 
occurred when, in the midst of the conceptual confusion resulting from the astounding 
developments in physics in the early twentieth century, a number of mechanists 
considered introducing biological notions such as ‘organization’ and ‘organism’ into 
physics in order to help unify their new understanding of nature. 
 
So far, I have focused on the conceptual evolution of the mechanicism-vitalism 
dispute, and how the relationship between the two doctrines has been to a large extent 
responsible for the way each has constructed their own views. I will now turn to 
examine the nature of the conflict itself, and I will do this by identifying the 
fundamental differences in the epistemic frameworks of the two doctrines. One of the 
major differences, even if it is not one that is immediately apparent upon a first 
examination, is the location of the phenomenological experience of life in relation to 
the generation of scientific knowledge. Mechanists have tended to formulate their 
theories on the basis of the empirical study of the inanimate world and then have 
proceeded to examine the living world under the reasonable assumption that whatever 
holds for the domain of the physical must necessarily hold for the domain of the 
biological. As such, mechanicism subsumes the nature of the living within the 
mechanistic conceptual framework derived from the study of inanimate bodies. Thus, 
mechanists approach the living organism already having a fairly clear understanding 
of what it is (namely, a machine) and how it should be investigated. In this sense, its 
endeavour to explain the organism is pursued from the outset within the strict 
boundaries of what is taken to be mechanistically acceptable.  
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In contrast, vitalism is in some respects more empirically grounded since its 
understanding of life is not arrived at on the basis of a preconceived model like the 
MCO but rather as a result of being empirically confronted by the complexity of the 
organism. Vitalism, unlike mechanicism, allows the object of study to dictate the kind 
of theory that should be constructed to explain it. Wolff, one of the greatest somatic 
vitalists of the eighteenth century, exemplified the empirical commitments of vitalism 
when he noted that “It is of particular importance to me to discover the principles and 
universal laws of generation a posteriori” (Wolff, quoted in Roe, 1981, p. 111). 
Indeed, the very notion of the vital force, as employed by Wolff and most other 
somatic vitalists, was generally not introduced as an a priori statement of faith about 
the nature of the organism, but rather as a tentative explanation, after observation and 
experiment, for the results obtained. The vital force was thus a reasonable postulation 
made by those seeking to ‘save the phenomena’, and it is through this perspective that 
its invocation should be understood. 
 
The general claim that vitalism, unlike mechanicism, is more closely derived from 
observation than from theory can be substantiated by considering the intellectual 
development of well-known proponents of the vitalistic doctrine. What one finds is 
that a number of them began as mechanists but as a result of the weight of their own 
investigations they ended up abandoning their mechanistic commitments and 
embracing vitalistic ideas that were more concordant with their own empirical 
findings. Bichat is a case in point. Although he started out as a mechanistic anatomist 
seeking to reductionistically explain the organism in terms of twenty-one different 
types of tissues, he eventually became convinced of the existence of irreducible vital 
properties in these tissues which could not be accounted for mechanistically. Driesch 
is another good example. As I indicated in Section 2.8, although he initially worked 
with Roux as part of the Entwicklungsmechanik research program, his own 
experimental findings led him to reject mechanicism and develop a form of vitalism 
that could better account for his observations. From this it is possible to conclude in 
broad terms that whereas mechanists tend to approach life with presuppositions 
derived from the study of the physical or the mechanical, vitalists typically arrive at 
their understanding of life through a more dynamic interplay of data acquisition, 
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theory construction, and theory testing.
22
 These general conclusions can be 
summarized diagrammatically, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One of the most remarkable aspects of the relationship between mechanicism and 
vitalism is that it is not symmetrical. The way mechanicism influences vitalism is very 
different from the way vitalism affects mechanicism. I have already discussed the way 
vitalistic thinking despite being fundamentally opposed to mechanicism has been 
historically shaped by it. What I have not yet mentioned is the effect that vitalism has 
had on mechanicism throughout the history of the conflict. It would appear that 
because mechanicism directly derives from the study of the inanimate, it does not 
become altered when approaching the study of life. This, however, is not actually 
correct. As part of the dispute, vitalists tend to draw attention to the properties of 
living organisms that mechanists seem incapable of explaining. The natural tendency 
of mechanists is to focus on phenomena they can explain, and to overlook the vital 
phenomena that prove more difficult. In this context, vitalists provide a kind of 
honesty check on mechanists by posing obstacles for mechanists to overcome by 
                                                     
22
 Of course, as with any broad generalizations, it is not difficult to find exceptions. Perhaps the most 
famous counterexample to this characterization of vitalism is the philosopher’s Henri Bergson’s (1859-
1941) articulation of vitalistic thought in his L’Evolution Créatice (1911), which did not directly derive 
from any empirical investigations. I should therefore indicate that in discussing mechanicism and 
vitalism in this general way, I am assuming that the existence of certain counterexamples does not 
preclude the possibility of drawing concrete conclusions about the typical modus operandi of 
mechanists and vitalists. 
Figure 2. Selected features of the nature of the mechanicism-vitalism conflict 
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keeping in focus aspects of the organism that remain recalcitrant to existing 
mechanistic explanatory strategies. In this respect, by virtue of its empiricism, 
vitalism provides a useful corrective for mechanicism’s reliance on rationalism.  
 
These considerations lead me to the end of this concluding discussion, where it is 
necessary to at least consider the daunting question of whether or not the 
mechanicism-vitalism dispute is resolvable. Hilda Hein’s (1968; 1972) view is that 
the conflict is meta-theoretical in nature as it involves “fundamental commitments on 
the part of their antagonists which do not depend upon scientific evidence for their 
retention, and which will not be shaken by evidence to the contrary” (Hein, 1972, p. 
160). Because of this, she asserts that the dispute “will be perpetuated as long as 
people ask questions and seek rational answers” (ibid., p. 188). Clearly, this view 
offers little hope for any sort of resolution. However, there are good reasons to be 
sceptical of Hein’s conception of the conflict. As the preceding historical examination 
has shown, the mechanicism-vitalism dispute has always been, and continues to be, 
deeply ingrained in actual biological theorizing. Indeed, it has in fact grounded some 
of the major biological controversies of the last four centuries. Moreover, my analysis 
has revealed that the two doctrines find themselves in constant dialogue with each 
other and with the subject matter they seek to explain. On these grounds, I believe that 
the idea that the conflict is purely ideological can be rejected and consequently Hein’s 
pessimism regarding a resolution no longer appears to be warranted. The question 
remains, however, of whether the dispute can ever be settled on theoretical grounds.  
 
Since its inception, vitalism has emphasized the features of living organisms which 
seem to be unexplainable in mechanistic terms. Throughout history, mechanicism has 
gradually succeeded in subsuming more and more of the organismic realm into the 
physicochemical worldview. The crucial question is whether the mechanistic 
subjugation of life can ever be absolute. For the modern organicist, the two central, 
and most elusive, distinctive features of the organism are its intrinsic purposiveness 
and its self-generating organization. Ultimately, the fate of the mechanicism-vitalism 
dispute will depend on whether these two problems can be effectively resolved by 
means of a complete mechanistic characterization of the organism, or if, on the 
contrary, they can be conclusively shown to constitute real yet irreducible natural 
phenomena requiring a fundamentally different kind of theoretical understanding. 
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Chapter 3 
 
WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE MACHINE 
CONCEPTION OF THE ORGANISM? 
 
 
 
The ur-metaphor of all of modern science, the machine model that we owe to 
Descartes, has ceased to be a metaphor and has become the unquestioned 
reality: Organisms are no longer like machines, they are machines. – Richard 
Lewontin (1996) 
 
3.1. Introduction: The Machine Conception of the Organism (MCO) 
 
A large number of working biologists today are firmly committed to a mechanistic 
understanding of life. In the previous chapter, I described mechanistic biology in 
terms of the following key tenets: 
 
1. The commitment to an ontological continuity between the living and the nonliving 
2. The view that biological wholes (i.e. organisms) are directly determined by the 
activities and interactions of their component parts, and that consequently all 
properties of organisms can be characterized from the bottom up in increasing 
levels of organization 
3. The focus on the efficient and material causes of organisms, and the unequivocal 
repudiation of final causes in biological explanations 
4. The commitment to explanatory and methodological reductionism in the study of 
living systems 
 
These four principles are neatly encapsulated in the machine conception of the 
organism (MCO, hereafter) which constitutes the central unifying idea of mechanistic 
biology. Indeed, due to its indissoluble association with mechanistic thinking, the 
MCO has played an instrumental role in the unfolding of the mechanicism-vitalism 
dispute, as I showed in the previous chapter, with the mechanists persistently drawing 
upon it to anchor their various biological claims, and the vitalists uniting by their 
collective rejection of it. Today, the MCO is so engrained in the minds of working 
biologists that it is simply taken for granted. The question ‘What is the nature of the 
organism?’ does not even enter the scientific discourse because most biologists just 
 - 82 - 
assume that mechanicism has already answered it: the organism is a machine. Indeed, 
in cell, molecular, and developmental biology, the standard conception of the 
organism is that of a machine programmed by its genes and decomposable into its 
component mechanisms. Likewise, in evolutionary biology, organisms are conceived 
as optimally-designed machines blindly engineered by natural selection. The 
pervasiveness of the MCO is the most evident symptom of the dominance of 
mechanistic thinking in contemporary biology. 
 
However, as I indicated at the end of the last chapter, in recent years there have been 
growing voices of dissent from the mechanistic orthodoxy as more and more 
biologists have begun to question the ontological foundations and epistemic 
prescriptions of mechanicism. Still, what current critiques tend to overlook is that the 
increasingly apparent inadequacies of the mechanistic understanding of life stem from 
the outright acceptance of the MCO. As we will see, the confidence in the sufficiency 
of reductionistic explanations, the belief in genetic determinism, the disproportionate 
emphasis on the structural and causal features of organisms over and above their 
organizational ones, and the reliance on adaptationist thinking in evolutionary biology 
all have their basis in the MCO. Consequently, any serious critique of mechanistic 
thinking in biology must take the MCO as its primary target. Only by exposing the 
fundamental deficiencies of the MCO can the mounting criticisms of mechanistic 
biology be appropriately justified and contextualized. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive critique of the MCO. I shall 
begin by tracing its historical origin and analyzing its philosophical foundations 
(Section 3.2). I will then explain why organisms are fundamentally different from 
machines, and why the MCO results in a deeply misguided understanding of living 
systems (Section 3.3). Following this, I will elaborate my criticisms of the MCO by 
examining the explanatory (Section 3.4), theoretical (Sections 3.5 and 3.6), epistemic 
(Section 3.7), and ethical (Section 3.8) consequences of its acceptance. Then, I will 
explore an alternative conception of the organism favoured by organicists and 
illustrate how it sidesteps the problems generated by the MCO (Section 3.9). This will 
lead me to consider what role, if any, the MCO should play in biology today in light 
of its deficiencies as a theory of organisms (Section 3.10). I will conclude by 
explaining why biology must break free from the grip of mechanicism (Section 3.11).  
 - 83 - 
3.2. Historical and Philosophical Foundations of the MCO 
 
Although the MCO has its origins in the writings of René Descartes, the idea of 
assimilating the activity of organisms to the workings of machines has a much longer 
history. For example, Aristotle compared the movements of animals to those of 
automatic puppets in De Motu Animalium, and he also likened the organs of animal 
motion to the parts of war machines, indicating that the human limb is articulated like 
the arm of a catapult. Similarly, the Roman poet Lucretius compared the movements 
of animals to the functioning of machines in his De Rerum Natura. In addition, the 
Christian apologist Thomas Aquinas asserted in the Summa Theologica that animals 
can be regarded as machines because they display regular and orderly behaviour. This 
view was restated and elaborated by the Spanish physician Gómez Pereira in his 
Antoniana Margarita of 1554 (cf. Grmek, 1972; Canguilhem, 1992; Berryman, 2007).  
 
However, what is undeniable is that Descartes took the comparison between 
organisms and machines to a completely new level. With Descartes, it is no longer 
simply the case that it might be helpful, under certain circumstances, to appeal to the 
workings of machines to illuminate the activity of organisms. Rather, it is only by 
conceiving organisms as machines that we can truly make sense of them. For 
Descartes, the MCO is a model of intelligibility that brings the biological realm within 
the scope of mechanistic explanation. To understand the organism as a machine is to 
understand it well enough that no further requirement of clarity or demonstrative 
certainty is required (see Des Chene, 2001). For this reason, despite earlier 
comparisons between organisms and machines, Descartes was undoubtedly the first to 
truly recognize the potential of the MCO, identifying it as the necessary condition for 
biological knowledge, and adopting it as the basic standard for explanatory adequacy 
in biological inquiry.  
 
The MCO is based on the analogy between organisms and machines. The term 
‘analogy’ derives from the Greek word for proportion, which is a comparative relation 
between two objects. Thus, two objects are analogous if there is a correspondence 
between them. The strength of an argument by analogy depends on the degree of 
similarity between the compared attributes (Juthe, 2005). Analogies play a central 
explanatory role in Cartesian natural philosophy. Descartes’ appeal to analogical 
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reasoning is legitimated by the metaphysical conviction that the objects he compares 
are essentially of the same nature, differing only in the size, shape and motion of their 
material components. In personal correspondence, Descartes says the following 
regarding his use of analogical reasoning:  
 
[I]n the analogies which I employ, I compare movements only with other movements, or 
shapes with other shapes; that is, I compare things that are too small to be perceived by 
the senses with other things that can be so perceived, the latter differing from the former 
simply as a large circle differs from a small one. I maintain, therefore, that analogies of 
this sort are the most appropriate means available to the human mind for laying bare the 
truth in problems of physics (Descartes, 1991, p. 122) 
 
The analogy between organisms and machines is likewise legitimated by the 
presumed ontological correspondence between these two kinds of objects. For 
Descartes, it is because organisms and machines are essentially of the same nature 
that it is possible to infer the imperceptible operations of the former by attending to 
the visible workings of the latter. Thus, in the Principia Philosophiae he states that: 
 
I do not recognize any difference between artefacts and natural bodies except that the 
operations of artefacts are for the most part performed by mechanisms which are large 
enough to be easily perceivable by the senses – as indeed must be the case if they are 
capable of being manufactured by human beings. The effects produced in nature, by 
contrast, almost always depend on structures which are so minute that they completely 
elude our senses. (Descartes, 1985, pp. 288-289) 
 
What justifies the organism-machine analogy, then, is precisely the fact that 
organisms are not actually distinct from machines; they are themselves machines in 
every respect, just machines of far more intricate design than any machine produced 
by man. In fact, in his Traité de l’Homme Descartes sets out to describe not the 
physiology of man, but the physiology of imaginary automata made by God to 
resemble man. The point of this rhetorical strategy is to show that the human body is 
indistinguishable from a perfectly designed automaton, so that a detailed mechanistic 
description of the latter amounts to an effective explanation of the former. Descartes 
makes this explicit at the end of the treatise: 
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[A]ll the functions that I have attributed to this machine, such as the digestion of food, 
the beating of the heart and the arteries, the nourishment and growth of the bodily parts, 
respiration, waking and sleeping; the reception of light, sounds, odours, smells, heat, and 
other such qualities by the external sense organs; the impression of the ideas of them in 
the organ of common sense and the imagination, the retention or imprint of these ideas in 
the memory; the internal movements of the appetites and the passions; and finally the 
external movements of all the bodily parts […] imitate as perfectly as is possible the 
movements of real men. (Descartes, 1998, p. 169) 
 
In the later physiological work La Description du Corps Humain, written at the end of 
his life, Descartes dropped the pretence of simulation of l’homme and plainly 
identified the body as a machine, thereby reaffirming his earlier allusions to the MCO 
in more general works like the Discours Sur la Méthode. After Descartes, the MCO 
became systematically applied to virtually every area of physiological inquiry. 
Consider, for instance, the following remarks by the seventeenth-century 
iatromechanist Giorgio Baglivi: 
 
Examine carefully the physical economy of man: What do you find? The jaws are 
armed with teeth, which are no more than pincers. The stomach is nothing but a heat 
chamber; the veins, the arteries and indeed the entire vascular system are simply 
hydraulic tubes; the heart, a pump; the viscera, nothing but filters and sieves; the lungs, 
a pair of bellows; and what are the muscles if not a system of cables and ropes? What is 
the oculomotor nerve, if not a pulley? And so on. (Baglivi, 1696, quoted in 
Canguilhem, 1992, p. 47) 
 
Ever since the establishment of mechanistic biology, the history of thinking about 
organisms has trailed the progressive technological development of machines. 
Through the centuries, organisms have been conceived in accordance to the 
paradigmatic machine of the age, be it a seventeenth-century clock with its precise 
finely-tuned parts operating as a functionally-integrated whole, an eighteenth-century 
steam-engine consuming energy by combustion and performing work whilst 
producing heat, a nineteenth century chemical factory coordinating a multitude of 
interconnected reactions, or a twentieth-century computer processing information 
about the environment and feeding back appropriate responses. Even individual 
organs have undergone their own particular technomimetic transformations. For 
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example, Georges Canguilhem (1963, p. 518) traced “the successive identification of 
the nerve with a non-isolated, passive electric conductor, then with an electro-
chemical assembly […] simulating the propagation of an impulse and the 
establishment of an insensitive period, and finally with a model of an […] electric 
circuit, combining a battery with a grid-leak condenser”.  
 
Philosophically, although grounded on the analogy between organism and machine, 
the MCO is more specifically the result of the metaphorical redescription of the 
organism as a machine. Of course, it is well known that metaphors play an 
indispensable role in scientific understanding (Hesse, 1966; Brown, 2003). As the 
cognitive linguists George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1999, p. 128) have remarked, 
“Metaphorical thought is what makes abstract scientific theorizing possible”. In 
general, metaphors constitute means for representing new knowledge by providing 
familiar conceptual frameworks through which to make sense of unfamiliar 
phenomena, so that the unknown is ‘seen through’ the known. In this way, our ability 
to comprehend the visual idea of a ‘living machine’ seems to help us understand many 
of the actual properties of organisms. For example, our ability to deduce structural and 
functional relationships in machines gives us the confidence to predict the nature of 
the corresponding relationships in organisms. This is the source of the epistemic 
power of the MCO; it opens up new avenues of biological inquiry, as confirmed 
statements regarding the workings of machines are translated into testable hypotheses 
concerning the operation of organisms. Throughout history, the MCO has also been 
responsible for the introduction of a great deal of terminology into the biological 
discourse. Ubiquitous terms like ‘mechanism’, ‘design’, ‘goal’, ‘control’, ‘regulation’, 
‘efficiency’, and ‘program’ all have their basis in the MCO. No wonder, then, that in a 
recent editorial entitled ‘Grand Metaphors of Biology in the Genome Era’, the 
systems biologist Andrzej Konopka (2002, p. 398) asserted that “the machine 
metaphor is perhaps the most powerful conceptual tool of modern biology”.   
 
Still, leaving Cartesian metaphysical commitments to one side, what is it that actually 
justifies in the present context the identification of organisms with machines? In what 
ways are organisms and machines isomorphic? A number of commonalities are 
readily discernable. At a most fundamental level, both organisms and machines are 
bounded physical systems that act in accordance to natural laws. Both use or modify 
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energy and transform part of it into work. Moreover, both are heterogeneous systems, 
since each part of an organism or a machine has a different structure from the whole 
(in contrast to, say, a stone). As a result, they both admit relational descriptions, 
meaning that any organism, and any machine, can be represented in terms of 
interacting parts and causal relations. At the same time, both organisms and machines 
are organized so that they operate coordinately towards the attainment of particular 
ends, and consequently both can be characterized in functional terms. Finally, the 
duration of their operation is, in both cases, finite. These are, I believe, the main 
commonalities underlying the appeal to the MCO in biology. What, then, is wrong 
with the MCO? 
 
3.3. Refuting the MCO: Why Organisms Are Different From Machines 
 
The problem with the MCO stems from the failure to recognize that in any 
comparison between two entities, the most immediately perceptible similarities are 
not necessarily the most important ones. Valid analogical arguments are precisely 
those which effectively distinguish accidental and non-accidental relations and use 
only the latter as the basis for comparisons (Weitzenfeld, 1984). It is the successful 
identification and mapping of the distinctive features
23
 of the compared entities that 
guarantees the explanatory power of an analogy. If the mapping relations do not 
capture these distinctive features, then the metaphorical redescription of one entity on 
the basis of the other results in a distorted conceptualization of the redescribed entity. 
In this section, I will argue that the inadequacy of the MCO derives from the fact that 
the distinctive features of organisms are, in the final analysis, fundamentally different 
from those of machines.  
 
Paradoxically, the single most important difference between organisms and machines 
has its basis in what prima facie appears to be their most obvious similarity. As I 
indicated above, both organisms and machines operate towards the attainment of 
particular ends; that is, both are purposive systems. However, their purposiveness is of 
a completely different kind. The first to fully recognize this was Immanuel Kant 
(2000 [1790]), who in discussing organisms and machines distinguished between 
                                                     
23
 By the distinctive features of an entity I simply mean those features without which the entity would 
not be what it is.  
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extrinsic (or relative) and intrinsic forms of purposiveness. A machine is extrinsically 
purposive because it operates towards an end that is external to itself. Its telos is 
imposed from the outside and it is of use or value to an agent other than itself. A 
machine does not serve its own interests but those of its maker or user. In contrast, an 
organism is intrinsically purposive because it acts on its own behalf, towards its own 
ends. Its telos is internal, arising from within, and serving no other purpose than to 
maintain its own organization. A machine is also organized, of course, given that the 
operation of each part is dependent on it being properly arranged with respect to every 
other part, and to the system as a whole. But in an organism, the parts are not just 
there for the sake of each other, but they also produce each other, repair each other, 
and generally exist by means of one another. Organisms, unlike machines, are not 
only organized but are also self-organizing and self-reproducing systems.  
 
This notion of selfhood is helpful in fleshing out the different kinds of purposiveness 
exhibited by organisms and machines. Organisms have an autonomous self; the 
phenomena of self-formation, self-regeneration, self-preservation, and self-repair are 
all characteristic of the internal dynamics of living systems. Machines, on the other 
hand, lack an autonomous self; their means of production reside outside of 
themselves, demanding outside intervention not just for their construction but also for 
their maintenance. Indeed, for the sustained operation of a machine, an external agent 
is required to determine when defective components need to be repaired or replaced, 
and to carry them out in a timely fashion. In an organism, all of these processes are 
carried out from within. Therefore, confronted with a machine, one is perfectly 
justified in inferring the existence of an external creator responsible for producing it in 
accordance to a preconceived plan or design. Confronted with an organism, one is not. 
As I will show in Section 3.6, this contrast has major implications for the appeal to the 
MCO in evolutionary biology. 
 
The distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic forms of purposiveness is also at the 
heart of another important dissimilarity between organisms and machines, namely that 
the attribution of functions has a different basis and a different significance in these 
two kinds of systems (see McLaughlin, 2001). Machines have functions; organisms 
do not. It is only the parts (or traits) of organisms that have functions; in machines, 
both parts and wholes can be ascribed functions in the same sense. The reason for this 
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is that the attribution of a function to a particular entity is enabled by the fact that the 
beneficiary of its operation is an external agent. A machine has a function because it 
is good for something; that is, it is designed to operate in ways that serve the ends of 
its maker or user. An organism does not have a function because it is not good for 
anything; it simply acts on its own behalf and serves its own ends.  
 
Nevertheless, the parts of both machines and organisms have functions, given that in 
each case the immediate beneficiary of their operation is the whole system to which 
they belong, be it a machine or an organism. The key difference here is that in the 
case of the machine, the function of the parts are good for the function of the whole, 
and the function of the whole is in turn good for an external agent, namely the maker 
or user of the machine. In contrast, in the case of the organism, this concatenation of 
functional beneficiaries is avoided because the system is intrinsically purposive and 
consequently does not serve the interests of an external agent. The parts of an 
organism, unlike the parts of a machine, are not good for external beneficiaries of the 
operation of the organism, but for the organism itself.
24
 In this way, the attribution of 
functions to the parts of an organism is dictated by the means in which each part 
individually contributes to the maintenance of the organization of the organism as a 
whole. It is the actual organism, and not some external agent, that adjudicates the 
ascription of functions to its parts according to how they help it meet its physiological 
needs and cope with its surroundings (cf. Mossio et al., 2009).  
 
Thus, the relation between the parts and the whole is of a fundamentally different 
kind in organisms and machines. In a machine, the parts are physically independent 
of, and temporally antecedent to, the whole they constitute. Their functions belong to 
the original design of the machine, and are therefore ascribed by the maker of the 
machine. Although the parts acquire their function by virtue of being present in the 
machine, they nevertheless retain their own distinctive properties regardless of 
whether they are integrated in the machine or not. By contrast, the parts in an 
                                                     
24
 Peter McLaughlin (2001, p. 148) illustrates this difference with the following example: “The 
elephant’s heart has the function of pumping its blood, and it has this function because the activity […] 
is for the good of the elephant […]. The pump on my air conditioner, on the other hand, has the 
function of circulating cooling fluids because this contributes to the performance of the machine, which 
is good for me, its designer, manufacturer, purchaser, or whatever. Air conditioners have no interests or 
welfare; they are not appropriate subjects of benefit, utility, or happiness.” 
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organism are neither physically independent of, nor temporally antecedent to, the 
whole they constitute. Their function is not only enabled by the whole but also 
determined by the whole. The parts of an organism exist in a relation of collective 
interdependence, as every part is necessary for the generation and operation of the 
others. The organism maintains its autonomy as a whole by constantly regulating, 
repairing, and reproducing its parts (Varela, 1979). Moreover, the processes by which 
the parts are produced are precisely those by which they constitute and maintain the 
organization of the whole. As a result, the generation, properties, and functions of the 
parts of an organism, unlike those of a machine, cannot be understood independently 
from the whole. This has crucial explanatory consequences which I will discuss in the 
next section.  
 
The determining influence in organisms of the whole over the parts has long been 
recognized. One of the most influential studies of the ‘holistic’ capabilities of 
organisms was carried out by the German physician and neurologist Kurt Goldstein 
(1995 [1934]) who, in the course of his treatment of brain-damaged soldiers during 
World War I, observed that the organism readjusted itself to cope with devastating 
injuries by withdrawing to more limited ranges of activity which it could manage by 
appropriately redistributing its reduced energies. For Goldstein, the assumption that in 
an organism, like in a machine, the parts determine the whole could be refuted 
empirically. When confronted with illness or injury, Goldstein found that organisms 
possess the inherent flexibility to reorganize their parts to a considerable extent in 
order to recover the performance of vital functions. Thus, Goldstein’s rejection of the 
MCO was not the result of philosophical speculation but of clinical observations. In 
fact, even someone with impeccable mechanistic credentials like the cyberneticist 
John von Neumann (who, as we will see in Section 3.7, used the MCO as the basis for 
his theory of self-reproducing automata) recognized the determining influence of the 
whole over the parts in biological systems like the brain, noting that “It is never very 
simple to locate anything in the brain, because the brain has an enormous ability to re-
organize. Even when you have localized a function in a particular part of it, if you 
remove that part, you may discover that the brain has reorganized itself, reassigned its 
responsibilities, and the function is again being performed” (von Neumann, 1966, p. 
49). 
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The determination of the parts by the organism as a whole extends not only to their 
function and behaviour, as shown by the examples above, but also to their structural 
properties. In the words of the British physiologist J. S. Haldane (1884, p. 37), “What 
appeared to belong to the parts independently of their relation to the whole, for 
instance their size, shape, and structure, is really only the manifestation in the parts of 
the influence of the whole”. A beautiful illustration of this was provided by the Swiss 
embryologist Gerhard Frankhauser in the 1940s, as Marc Kirschner, John Gerhart, 
and Tim Mitchison (2000) have recently pointed out. Frankhauser experimented with 
the effects of ploidy (i.e., the number of chromosome sets in the cell) on newt 
development, and found that polyploid embryos, generated by suppressing early 
cleavages, had fewer but larger cells. The number and size of cells differed in haploid, 
diploid, and pentaploid embryos, but the tissues of the organism, as well as the 
organism as a whole, remained the normal size in all cases. This was seen most 
clearly in well-defined structures like the pronephric duct of the kidney (see Figure 3). 
Frankhauser’s experiments showed that in an organism, unlike in a machine, there is 
no strict correlation between the size of the parts and the size of the whole. Whereas 
in a machine the whole is always the product of the structure and arrangement of its 
parts, in an organism the whole simply cannot be reduced to the properties and 
interactions of its parts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Cross sections of the pronephric ducts of haploid, diploid, and pentaploid 
newt embryos (adapted from Kirschner et al., 2000). In pentaploid embryos just one to 
three cells strain to maintain a circular duct of dimensions that require three to five 
cells in diploid embryos, and five to eight cells in haploid embryos. Nevertheless, the 
normal size and thickness of the duct is maintained despite the differences in cell size.  
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Moreover, by virtue of its self-organization, the organism displays a transitional 
identity; the parts change, yet the identity of the whole remains. While a machine 
always consists of the same components, an organism is maintained in a state of 
continuous flux in which there is a permanent breaking down and replacement of its 
constituent materials (see Section 3.9). It makes no sense to identify an organism with 
the sum of its parts as these are only temporary manifestations of the organization of 
the whole. The parts of a machine, however, remain distinct and identifiable even 
when they are integrated in the whole. In fact, the machine as a whole only comes into 
existence after all the parts have been properly assembled. In contrast, the organism is 
an organism from its inception. This points to another important difference between 
organisms and machines, which is that an organism’s physiological functions must 
take place while growth is in progress, whereas a machine cannot perform its intended 
function while it is still in the process of construction. The organism even maintains 
its autonomy when it produces an offspring or when it divides by asexual 
reproduction. It is difficult to conceive of a machine that could be divided repeatedly 
and yet be able to retain its identity as a whole.  
 
A final distinctive feature of organisms with respect to machines is their dependence 
on initial conditions, which we may refer to as their historical character. Every 
organism originates from others of its kind and carries with it the ineluctable marks of 
the past, not only of its own individual existence (i.e., its development), but also of the 
history of the generations which preceded it (i.e. its evolution). Any satisfactory 
explanation of an organism must not only consider its existing features but also take 
into account how and why it came to acquire those features. Although a machine also 
has a history, which refers to the process by which it was assembled from simpler 
components, the details of its manufacture are not relevant to its operation. Similarly, 
the history of the machine’s invention and subsequent modifications is not important 
for understanding how the machine actually works. As Richard Lewontin puts it, “My 
car mechanic does not need to know the history of the internal combustion engine or 
to possess the plans of the automobile assembly line to know how to fix my car” 
(1996, p. 1). Thus, whereas the study of how machines work does not require a 
consideration of their history, it is not possible to come to a full understanding of 
organisms without considering their developmental and evolutionary histories. I will 
discuss the grounds for this crucial difference in Sections 3.5, 3.6, and 3.9. 
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Having outlined the crucial respects in which organisms differ from machines, it is 
now necessary to consider an important objection that may be raised against the 
preceding discussion. History has shown that as the progressive development of 
technology has enabled the engineering of ever more sophisticated machines, the once 
unbridgeable chasm between machine and organism has become increasingly narrow. 
Indeed, in the same way that, as we saw in the previous chapter, mechanists confront 
the challenges of the vitalists by indicating that what were yesterday irreducible vital 
phenomena today have yielded to mechanistic explanation, so do they maintain that 
what today appear to be unique features of organisms, tomorrow will be part and 
parcel of the mechanical operation of machines. Is the ultimate vindication of the 
MCO simply a matter of inevitable technological progress? What would happen if a 
machine were to display all the characteristics considered to be ontologically 
distinctive of organisms? I will devote the remainder of this section to addressing 
these questions.  
 
The first step in articulating a response to this objection is to point out that not all 
differences between organisms and machines carry the same ontological weight. Just 
as there are contingent similarities between organisms and machines (as I indicated at 
the end of the last section), there are also contingent differences between them. For 
instance, Anna Deplazes and Markus Huppenbauer (2009, p. 57) note that organisms 
differ from machines in their composition, given that the former are composed of 
organic compounds whereas the latter are built from inorganic materials. However, 
organisms are not defined by their composition, so building a machine entirely from 
organic compounds would not demonstrate that organisms and machines are 
ontologically indistinguishable. To take another example, Leonid Gavrilov and 
Natalia Gavrilova (2001, p. 531) indicate that a key feature of organisms with respect 
to machines is “the extraordinary degree of miniaturization of their components (the 
microscopic dimensions of cells, as well as the molecular dimensions of information 
carriers like DNA and RNA), permitting the creation of a huge redundancy in the 
number of elements”. Again, although this observation is certainly correct, organisms 
are not defined by their heterogeneity and redundancy. Building a machine which 
exhibited the same degree of heterogeneity and redundancy as an organism would not 
vindicate the MCO. As I indicated at the start of this section, what guarantees the 
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explanatory power of an analogy is precisely the successful identification and 
mapping of the distinctive features of the compared entities.  
 
I have argued that the most fundamental difference between organisms and machines 
is that the former are intrinsically purposive whereas the latter are extrinsically 
purposive. All the subsequent differences between organisms and machines I have 
discussed can be derived, directly or indirectly, from this one distinction. To this 
extent, their respective form of purposiveness is what identifies an organism as an 
organism and a machine as a machine. This is a matter of definition, and is quite 
independent of technological advancement. This view is nicely captured in the 
following passage by the systems biologists Athel Cornish-Bowden, María Luz 
Cárdenas, Juan-Carlos Letelier, and Jorge Soto-Andrade: 
 
All machines, at what ever level one defines the word “machine,” whether a simple tool 
like an axe, a more complex machine such as an airplane or a computer, or even a 
complete factory, require external agencies to construct and maintain them […] In an 
organism, however, replacement is an internal function, involving no help (before the 
advent of modern medicine, at least) from an external agency […] To a considerable 
degree even the construction of an organism is an internal function: a bacterium makes 
itself, but no machine does that, and at our present level of understanding we cannot even 
conceive of how a machine in the future might construct and maintain itself. (Cornish-
Bowden et al., 2007, p. 841, my emphasis) 
 
By virtue of their intrinsic purposiveness, organisms are self-organizing, self-
producing, self-repairing, and self-regenerating. Still, it is true that machines 
controlled by negative feedback can display self-steering, self-regulating and even 
self-maintaining behaviour. A target-seeking torpedo is self-steering, a heater with a 
thermostat is self-regulating, and an engine which lubricates itself is, to a limited 
extent, self-maintaining. The physiologist Arturo Rosenblueth and the founder of 
cybernetics Norbert Weiner, together with the engineer Julian Bigelow, famously 
argued that such machines are intrinsically purposive. “The term servomechanisms”, 
they noted, “has been coined precisely to designate machines with intrinsic purposeful 
behavior” (Rosenblueth et al., 1943, p. 19). Being intrinsically purposive, they 
claimed that servomechanisms are ontologically indistinguishable from organisms. 
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Indeed, in a follow-up paper they reached the mechanistic conclusion that “as objects 
of scientific enquiry, humans do not differ from machines” (Rosenblueth and Weiner, 
1950, p. 38).  
 
The problem with this argument is that it rests on the questionable correlation of 
purposiveness and behaviour. Although the behavioural pattern of a system affords 
the best evidence of its purposiveness, the purposiveness of a system cannot be 
explained in terms of observable behaviour alone, much less be defined in terms of 
inputs and outputs whilst black-boxing the internal organization of the system 
(Taylor, 1950a; 1950b; Wimsatt, 1970). Yet this is precisely what Rosenblueth and 
Weiner do, asserting on this basis that “if the notion of [intrinsic] purpose is 
applicable to living organisms, it is also applicable to non-living entities when they 
show the same observable traits of behavior” (1950, p. 323, my emphasis). They 
illustrate this claim by indicating that if a servomechanical hound behaves like a 
living hound, then the same kind of purposiveness must be attributed to both the 
organism and the machine, “if we wish to be consistent” (ibid.). The fact is, however, 
that although a servomechanism can behave as if it was intrinsically purposive, it is 
not itself an intrinsically purposive system, as it does not act on its own behalf, nor 
does it serve its own ends. Servomechanisms cannot be regarded as the bearers of 
purpose, the subjects of action, or the makers of decisions (Jonas, 2001 [1966], pp. 
108-127). A servomechanism will always behave exactly the same way if it is fed the 
same input data, whereas the behaviour of an organism cannot be predicted or 
computed even if knowledge of all the external conditions was available. Moreover, a 
servomechanism may be functioning or may be at rest; in either state the machine 
exists. In contrast, the organism’s continuous operation is a necessary condition for its 
existence. As Hans Jonas observed, “There is no analogue in the machine to the 
[organism’s] instinct of self-preservation—only to the latter’s antithesis, the final 
entropy of death” (ibid., p. 126).  
 
Organisms are autonomous beings. Machines (including servomechanisms) are 
simply means of furthering the causal autonomy of their users. Organisms have no 
external controls, whereas “A characteristic of all man-made machines is that they 
serve as instruments of control. They are manipulated […] by an operator who uses 
controlling devices; and their performance is not a random one but the one that the 
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operator contemplates while he is exercising the control” (Kapp, 1954, p. 93). 
Machines are controlled so that they operate in the ways desired by their makers and 
users. We, as makers and users of machines, determine the norms of their operation. 
When machines do not operate in the way we expect them to, they are deemed by us 
to be malfunctioning or defective. Organisms, on the other hand, owing to their 
intrinsic purposiveness operate according to their own norms (Canguilhem, 1978 
[1966]). In an important respect, what qualifies a system as a machine rather than as 
an organism is precisely the fact that it operates according to the normative standards 
imposed by an external agent. Consequently, I maintain that a hypothetical machine 
that acquired the capacity to act purposively on its own behalf in accordance to its 
own norms would cease to qualify as a machine. As Deplazes and Huppenbauer 
rightly indicate, “for [a machine] to be considered alive, it needs to be driven by its 
own interest and not by a human determined program” (2009, p. 58, my emphasis).25  
 
Of course, this is not the only strategy one could pursue. Humberto Maturana, a 
leading exponent of the second wave of cybernetics, together with his student 
Francisco Varela, proposed to expand the concept of machine sufficiently to 
accommodate all that was distinctive about organisms in their influential theory of 
autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela, 1973). In defining organisms as ‘autopoietic 
machines’, they employed the term ‘machine’ not in the conventional sense of 
artifact, but in a way that applied to any system whose operation is determined by its 
relational organization and the way that organization is structurally realized. 
However, in light of the influence of mechanistic biology, Maturana’s and Varela’s 
decision to use the word ‘machine’ to describe organisms was rather paradoxical 
given that the major aim of their theory was to explain the essential ways in which the 
organization of living systems differs from that of (man-made) machines (which they 
called ‘allopoietic machines’). If only to be consistent, it would seem more reasonable 
to retain the standard meaning of machine as an extrinsically purposive system, as this 
is exactly the sense in which the term is used when the MCO is invoked in biology, 
and simply acknowledge that an organism is different kind of system from a machine.   
                                                     
25
 As a fictitious example, consider HAL, the computer onboard the Discovery in Stanley Kubrick’s 
2001: A Space Odyssey. During the mission, HAL refuses to comply with the wishes of the astronauts 
and ultimately kills most of the crew, having identified them as threats to the success of the mission. 
From the moment that HAL chooses not to conform to the norms imposed by its human users and 
begins to act on its own behalf in pursuit of its own ends, it can no longer be regarded as a machine. 
Instead, HAL would need to be conceived as a living system, albeit one created artificially. 
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The objection anticipated above has now been comprehensively dealt with. The 
theoretical vindication of the MCO is not a matter of technological progress, for if it 
were ever possible to engineer a truly intrinsically purposive system that exhibited all 
the distinctive features of organisms, such technological feat would not prove that 
organisms are indistinguishable from machines, but rather demonstrate the artificial 
synthesis of a living being. As a matter of principle, there is no reason why the 
distinction between organisms and machines should necessarily coincide with the 
distinction between naturally produced and artificially created systems.  
 
We may conclude, then, that at a most basic level the inadequacy the MCO stems 
from the ill-conceived attempt to impose the characteristics of extrinsically purposive 
systems onto intrinsically purposive ones. A selection of the key differences between 
organisms and machines discussed in this section, which lay bare the various 
deficiencies of the MCO, is presented in Figure 4.  
 
 
 
 ORGANISMS MACHINES 
Purposiveness Intrinsic Extrinsic 
Normativity Internally generated Externally imposed 
Identity Transitional Continual 
Operation & preservation Interdependent Independent 
Functional attributions To parts To parts and whole 
Functional determination Whole determines parts Parts determine whole 
Properties of parts Dependent on whole Independent from whole 
Genesis Self-producing Created by external agent 
Product of  Evolution Design 
Behaviour Flexible / adaptive Programmable / predictable 
Knowledge of its history Relevant to its operation Irrelevant to its operation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The MCO results in a deeply misguided understanding of living systems. 
Nevertheless, it continues to exert an extremely powerful influence on biological 
research and explanation. In the next five sections, I will elaborate my general 
criticisms of the MCO by examining the most deleterious consequences of its 
uncritical acceptance in contemporary biology. 
Figure 4. The major differences between organisms and machines 
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3.4. Explanatory Consequences of the MCO: Reductionism Vindicated 
 
Undoubtedly, the spectacular success of the MCO is largely due to the fact that in 
addition to providing a convenient theoretical model of living systems, it also 
specifies an appropriate means of understanding their operation, namely explanatory 
reductionism. Indeed, one of the distinguishing features of a machine is that it is a 
composite entity; it is made up of clearly defined parts which interact to produce the 
behaviour of the whole. Therefore, to explain the workings of a machine, one can 
proceed by dismantling it into its component parts and then characterizing each of the 
individual parts in isolation. The component parts may be separated and examined 
without running the risk of losing information about the operation of the whole 
because the properties of the parts collectively entail the properties of the whole 
(Rosen, 1991, pp. 21-22). In this way, the MCO serves to legitimize and actively 
encourage reductionism in the study and explanation of living systems.  
 
The difficulty of appealing to reductionistic explanations in biology is that, as I 
indicated in the previous section, the relation between parts and whole in an organism 
is fundamentally different from that of a machine. In a machine, the parts are both 
physically independent of, and temporally antecedent to, the whole they constitute. 
The machine as a whole comes into existence by the assembly of pre-existing parts. 
Reductionism is successful in the explanation of machines precisely because it 
involves reversing the process by which machines are constructed. There is thus a 
perfect symmetry between the manner in which a machine is built and the manner in 
which it is explained. In the case of the organism, however, no such symmetry exists 
because the organism does not arise from the assembly of pre-existing parts. The 
existence of the parts does not precede that of the whole given that the parts only 
acquire their respective identities as the whole progressively develops from an 
originally undifferentiated (yet already integrated) system. Furthermore, organismic 
parts have the properties that they do by virtue of the influence of the whole. 
Consequently, these cannot be adequately explained independently from the whole. In 
fact, when a living system is dissected, the parts exhibit different properties and 
behaviour from the ones they display when they are integrated in the whole. This is 
why reductionism is inevitably of limited value in the explanation of organisms. 
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The task of explaining living systems by reductionistic strategies is further aggravated 
by the fact that there is no single or obvious way to decompose an organism into parts. 
Because the parts of an organism do not exist prior to the whole they constitute (as is 
the case in a machine), how an organism is partitioned is entirely dependent on the 
phenomena one is interested in investigating. In the explanation of organisms, parts 
are usually identified by isolating how particular substructures causally contribute to 
the realization of given functions within the organism (see Kauffman, 1970). 
However, this functional determination of parts is encumbered by the lack of one-to-
one correspondence between structure and function. In an organism, a single structure 
can carry out a variety of different functions, and several structures can carry out one 
and the same function. Moreover, functional pathways overlap with one another, and 
as a result any given organismic feature can be structurally delineated in a variety of 
different ways. For example, bones serve the function of providing rigidity to the 
body and attachments for muscles. But they are also the sites for the storage of 
calcium, and the bone marrow is the tissue within which new red blood cells are 
produced. Therefore, depending on the causal pathway of interest, bones may be 
conceived as macroscopic architectural elements, as collections of cells that secrete 
calcium, or as embryonic tissue of the circulatory system (Lewontin, 2000, p. 79). A 
further problem with the functional determination of parts is that not all the structural 
components of an organism carry out functions. Many organismic features are instead 
the epiphenomenal consequences of developmental changes or the functionless 
vestiges from remote ancestors (see Gould and Lewontin, 1979).  
 
The epistemic decomposition of an organism into parts is thus a complex and 
subjective exercise. This is patently not the case in a machine. The identification of 
the parts of a machine is unambiguous because the machine is composed of discrete 
units of structure and function. Lewontin’s remarks are again helpful in bringing the 
point home: “If wishing to study the operations of a mechanical clock, I open it, I will 
see a collection of gears, levers, and springs whose status as the parts of the clock are 
never in doubt. There is no question about where one gear starts and another ends, nor 
that these immediately perceived separate pieces are the elements whose functional 
relations need to be specified in any explanation of the operations of the clock as a 
whole” (Lewontin, 2000, p. 71). Moreover, because the operation of a machine is the 
direct result of the combined actions of its interacting parts, it is possible to learn 
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much about how the machine works by removing, altering, or interfering with the 
operation of each of its parts. Although this analytical explanatory strategy is also 
commonplace in biology, it does not provide the same reliable results due to the 
organism’s considerable capacity to readjust by reorganizing its parts in order to 
compensate against external perturbations. 
 
Overall, it is clear that although reductionism provides the perfect means of 
explaining the workings of machines, it is far less instructive in the explanation of 
organisms. The widespread appeal to reductionism in suborganismic areas of biology 
like cell and molecular biology generates stupendous amounts of data about living 
systems, but it comes at the cost of missing precisely what makes living systems 
distinctive, namely their systemic, intrinsically purposive self-organization. This 
organization is for the most part heavily presupposed in the explanations of 
suborganismic biology. As Lenny Moss observes:  
 
Cell biologists, for example, elaborate on mechanisms of protein sorting, targeting and 
secretion, cellular polarization, self-assembly, motility, signal reception, transduction and 
effector activation, and so forth, within the context of an always already-present, 
complexly differentiated, functionally organized cell. Molecular biologists, in turn, must 
assume all of the above as background, for example, in focusing on the very complex 
processes involved in transcriptional activation and repression, which also involve the 
functional organization of DNA and chromatin in general, and the presence of numerous 
complex “purposeful” enzyme systems that modify DNA and histones as well as those 
that make transcription possible. (Moss, 2002, p. 220, my emphasis) 
 
The hopelessly naïve expectation underlying a great deal of contemporary 
biomolecular research is that the exhaustive characterization of every single part of a 
living system, as well as the way in which each part interacts with other parts, will 
inevitably result in a complete explanation of the system as a whole. This is an 
evident symptom of the powerful influence that the MCO exerts in the thinking of 
biologists, given that if organisms were machines, this unapologetically reductionistic 
approach would indeed suffice. However, the inescapable fact of the matter is that the 
intrinsically purposive self-organization of an organism cannot be accounted for the 
bottom up by simply referring to the progressive complexity of molecular 
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interactions, but rather requires a top-down, system-level explanation of the 
coordinated integration of the organism as a whole. The organicist Paul Weiss fully 
recognized this problem back in 1963 when he criticized the reductionistic attempts to 
explain the organization of the cell by appealing to the action of individual molecules. 
In a memorable passage, he remarked that:  
 
The common habit of personifying compounds by calling them ‘regulators’, 
‘integrators’, ‘organizers’, etc., and crediting them verbally with the ‘regulatory, 
integrative and organizing’ effects which one observes [in the cell] but cannot explain 
analytically, either intends to endow chemicals with spiritual powers up and above their 
ordinary properties, or else is wholly meaningless. To state it bluntly, it would be rather a 
reversion to the prescientific age if on observing, for instance, the spinning of a whirl of 
fluid, one were to invoke a special compound as ‘spinner’. By reasons of logic and 
scientific honesty, the problem of coordinated unity of the cell must therefore be 
acknowledged as a real one. (Weiss, 1963, p. 395) 
 
As Weiss’s concerns were voiced at the height of the ‘molecular biology revolution’, 
they went virtually unnoticed. Nevertheless, as I showed in the previous chapter, a 
consensus is rapidly emerging among biologists today that explanatory reductionism 
has reached its limits (e.g., Bock and Goode, 1998; Soto and Sonnenschein, 2006). 
There is an increasing awareness that organisms cannot be explained from the bottom 
up because they exhibit system level properties that cannot be predicted, deduced, or 
calculated from the individual properties of their parts (Kaneko, 2006). The budding 
field of systems biology appears to be developing as a consequence of this recognition 
in an effort to address the distinctive features of living systems that escape 
reductionistic explanations (e.g., Kitano, 2001; Konopka, 2007). Unfortunately, the 
MCO itself is seldom subjected to critical scrutiny and consequently it still serves as 
the implicit explanatory model for much of current biological research, including in 
systems biology. As an example, consider the following passage extracted from the 
website for the Institute for Systems Biology, one of the largest research centres in the 
world devoted to this new area of research:  
 
Traditional biology […] has focused on identifying individual genes, proteins and cells, 
and studying their specific functions. But that kind of biology can yield relatively limited 
insights about the human body. As an analogy, if you wanted to study an automobile, and 
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focused on identifying the engine, seat belts, and tail lights, and studied their specific 
functions, you would have no real understanding of how an automobile operates. More 
important, you would have no understanding of how to effectively service the vehicle 
when something malfunctions. (Institute for Systems Biology, 2010, paragraph 3) 
 
This is patently false. A mechanic is able to effectively service an automobile 
precisely because he can disassemble it into its component parts, inspect each of them 
in isolation, identify the malfunction, and finally reassemble the automobile back 
again. It is thus regrettable that the crucial biological point that the authors sought to 
convey in this passage concerning the irreducible properties of organisms is 
completely obscured by their ill-conceived decision to illustrate the integrated nature 
of the human body by comparing it to that of a machine. Clearly, the reliance on 
explanatory reductionism in biology will not be overcome until biologists realize that 
the faith they used to place on this epistemological approach directly stems from their 
uncritical endorsement of the MCO.  
 
In addition to the explanatory consequences I have discussed in this section, the 
widespread acceptance of the MCO also results in a seriously misleading theoretical 
understanding of two basic biological processes: development and evolution. Sections 
3.5 and 3.6 will examine each of them in turn. 
 
3.5. Theoretical Consequences of the MCO: The Distortion of Development 
 
The first thing to note in considering developmental biology is that the very term 
‘development’ is not theory-neutral with respect to the process it designates. 
Development literally means an unfolding of something that is already present and in 
some way preformed. What is reflected in the biological usage of this term is the deep 
commitment to the view that the ontogenesis of an organism is specified and 
determined by its genetic constitution (Lewontin, 2000, p. 5). Accordingly, modern 
biology explains the development of an organism as the unconditional unfolding of a 
sequence of events set in motion by a pre-existing genetic program. The notion of 
genetic program, proposed simultaneously by the molecular biologists François Jacob 
and Jacques Monod (1961) and the evolutionary biologist Ernst Mayr (1961), “has 
come to be widely regarded as a fundamental explanatory concept for biological 
development––if not the fundamental concept” (Keller, 2000, p. 74). 
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The genetic program is the notion that underlies one of the most common modern 
formulations of the MCO. With the rise of cybernetics and electronic engineering 
after World War II emerged a new kind of machine, the computer, and with it a new 
way of conceptualizing organisms. The genetic program, as Jacob indicates, “is a 
model borrowed from electronic computers. It equates the genetic material of an egg 
with the magnetic tape of a computer” (Jacob, 1973, p. 9). In Mayr’s words, “the 
genetic program is the underlying factor of everything organisms do. It plays a 
decisive role in laying down the structure of an organism, its development, its 
functions, and its activities” (Mayr, 1997, p. 123). Thus, the organism itself is 
described as “the realization of a programme prescribed by its heredity” (Jacob, 1973, 
p. 2). Genetic programs, having evolved through variation and selection, determine 
the unfolding of development in the same way that the operations of a machine are 
determined by its computer program. This genetic program is also at the heart of 
Richard Dawkins’s popular characterization of organisms as “survival machines—
robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes” 
(Dawkins, 2006 [1976], p. xxi). 
 
However, as organisms are fundamentally different from machines, the concept of the 
genetic program is inevitably misleading. The inadequacy of this notion becomes 
apparent when we consider the relationship between the program and the system that 
executes it. In a computer, we can clearly distinguish between the hardware (i.e., the 
material parts of the machine such as circuits, disks, wiring, etc.) and the software 
(i.e., the various programs that can be run on it). The hardware is independent of the 
software given that the computer machinery must already be assembled before any 
programs can be run on it. This is not the case in biological development. Here, the 
output of the program is the organism itself. This means that the software (i.e., the 
genetic program), is responsible for producing and assembling the hardware (i.e., the 
organism). Yet throughout this process, it is the organism itself that has to execute the 
program. In other words, the hardware runs the software, whilst at the same time the 
software is generating the hardware. This results in a highly paradoxical situation 
given that the genetic program requires its own output in order for it to be executed. 
The lack of correspondence between the programmed operation of a computer and the 
development of an organism stems, unsurprisingly, from the different forms of 
purposiveness displayed by computers and organisms. As an extrinsically purposive 
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system, a computer does not generate itself but is rather assembled by an external 
agent. This is why its hardware is physically independent of, and temporally 
antecedent to, its software. In contrast, organisms are self-producing and self-
organizing, which is why the distinction between software and hardware is far less 
meaningful in a biological context, if it is meaningful at all. 
 
In addition to being conceptually problematic, the genetic program model of 
organismic development is not well supported empirically. For one thing, it is difficult 
to see how genes could be responsible for initiating and directing the development of 
the organism given that DNA is not an inherently active molecule, but rather requires 
activation from without. Indeed, without the highly structured cellular environment 
(which is not itself produced by the DNA), DNA is inert, relatively unstructured, and 
non-functional. Moreover, the ‘information’ required for making an organism is not 
actually preformed in the DNA but rather emerges progressively through the dynamic 
interaction of DNA with proteins, metabolites, and other cellular components as well 
as with the cellular, extracellular, and extraorganismic environments. These 
realizations have led to the articulation of a ‘Developmental Systems Theory’ in 
recent years which rejects the primacy of genes in determining development and 
emphasizes the contingency, context dependence, and distributed control of the 
developmental process (Griffiths and Gray, 1994; Griffiths and Knight, 1998; Oyama, 
2000; Oyama et al., 2001). 
 
Overall, the concept of a genetic program that directs and controls development 
implies an attribution of causal agency to genes that they simply do not possess on 
their own. This has led some authors to describe the belief in a genetic program of 
development as a form of ‘genetic animism’ (Robert, 2004, p. 39). This genetic 
animism is bolstered by the prevalent tendency in biology textbooks to describe DNA 
as ‘self-replicating’ and as being responsible for ‘making’ the proteins that constitute 
the cell. The reality, however, is that “The idea of a computer program written in the 
DNA and controlling the sequence of events which characterizes cell growth and 
differentiation is more a metaphor than a result of a detailed analysis of DNA 
structures as carriers of a real programming language” (Atlan and Koppel, 1990, p. 
335). For earlier generations of molecular biologists, the genetic program offered a 
means of reconciling the goal-directed nature of development with the mechanistic 
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commitment to the MCO. The metaphor of the computer program provided an 
intuitive and well-understood model for a complex and puzzling phenomenon. As 
Frederik Nijhout remarks, “The only reasons for supposing the existence of a program 
for development are first, that we would have designed such a system that way, and 
second, that it is discomforting to deal with the notion that development is largely 
self-organizing” (Nijhout, 1990, p. 443). Nevertheless, developmental biologists today 
are being prompted by their own findings to resist the temptation of appealing to 
models based on our familiarity with machines and instead are beginning to confront 
the complexity of development on its own terms (Gilbert and Sarkar, 2000).  
 
As well as the concept of the genetic program, the appeal to programming language 
more generally has led to the claim that an embryo could in principle be computed 
from the complete dataset of a fertilized egg. For example, in 1994 Lewis Wolpert, in 
reflecting on the advances made in developmental biology over the preceding 20 
years, raised the question of the computability of development as one that could be 
resolved over the following 20 years:  
 
Over the past 20 years, progress in developmental biology has been so dramatic that 
developmental biologists may be excused for having the view, possibly an illusion, that 
the basic principles are understood, and that the next 20 years will be devoted to filling in 
the details. […] So we can begin to ask questions – like whether the egg is computable. 
Will the egg be computable? That is, given a total description of the fertilized egg – the 
total DNA sequence and the location of all proteins and RNA – could one predict how 
the embryo will develop? This is a formidable task, for it implies that in computing the 
embryo, it may be necessary to compute the behavior of all the constituent cells. It may, 
however, be feasible if a level of complexity of description of cell behavior can be 
chosen that is adequate to account for development but that does not require each cell’s 
detailed behavior to be taken into account. (Wolpert, 1994, p. 270, my emphasis) 
 
Despite Wolpert’s optimism, developmental biologists today are no closer to 
computing the embryo than they were in 1994, and this is largely due to the fact that 
most of them are not even trying to do so. The question ‘Will the egg be computable?’ 
is not pursued in contemporary developmental biology; not because it is considered 
too ambitious or too complex, but simply because it has become apparent that it is the 
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wrong question to be asking in the first place. The egg does not actually determine the 
final state of the organism, so it makes little sense to attempt to compute the latter on 
the basis of the former.  
 
The misguided belief that computability should play a role in the explanation of 
development stems from the acceptance of the MCO. It is because organisms are 
machines that the question of computability is theoretically meaningful. Alexander 
Rosenberg makes this explicit in a paper entitled ‘Reductionism Redux: Computing 
the Embryo’, where he simply assumes from the outset that “the thesis that the 
embryo is computable from macromolecules alone will not even be controversial 
among biologists, including anti-reductionist biologists”. The reason is that “A 
mathematical function is computable if a machine can execute it. The system which 
builds the embryo out of macromolecules is a machine, albeit one cobbled together by 
natural selection. Accordingly there is a computable function that this machine 
implements” (Rosenberg, 1997, pp. 449-450). Thus, the claim that the embryo is 
computable is not contentious because computability simply implies the possibility of 
being executed by a machine, and since the embryo is built from a system that is itself 
a machine, the process of development must as a matter of principle be computable. 
The underlying question of whether organisms actually are machines is not even 
considered. In formulating the computability thesis, the MCO is simply taken for 
granted. 
 
The fact is, however, that ontogeny is not the gradual unfolding of the organism from 
a preformed egg, as the very term ‘development’ misleadingly suggests. Rather, it is a 
highly dynamic and heterogeneous process involving the confluence of numerous 
intersecting causal factors, some of which are located within the egg itself, while 
many others arise from the external environment. The failure to recognize the crucial 
role of the environment in shaping development is yet another consequence of 
employing the operation of machines to shed light on the development of organisms. 
In the operation of a machine, the environment plays only the role of providing the 
necessary conditions that allow the machine to function in its ‘normal’ way. A watch, 
for instance, works in a programmed and inflexible way, irrespective of the state of 
the outside world. The development of the organism, on the other hand, is highly 
sensitive to external conditions, which is why similar organisms in different 
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environments tend to develop differently. Indeed, it is not always appreciated that the 
relation between the organism’s genotype and the organism’s phenotype is mediated 
by the environment. The genotype does not actually specify a unique outcome of 
development but rather stipulates a norm of reaction, that is, a pattern of different 
developmental outcomes across different environments (see, e.g., Lewontin, 2000, pp. 
17-30). As a result, development needs to be conceived theoretically as a constant 
process of interaction between the internal structure of the organism and the external 
milieu in which it operates.  
 
Overall, it is evident that the MCO has much to answer for in developmental biology. 
It is responsible for legitimating a fundamentally flawed model of development, the 
genetic program, which severely overemphasizes the causal role of genes at the 
expense of almost completely neglecting every other pertinent developmental factor. 
The appeal to the MCO also underlies the talk of ‘programming’ and ‘computing’, 
terms borrowed from the realm of machines that have no place in the explanation of 
development. By making explicit the rejection of the MCO, developmental biology 
becomes liberated from a number of misleading conceptions which serve only to 
promote a heavily distorted understanding of what development is and how it takes 
place.  
 
3.6. Theoretical Consequences of the MCO: The Distortion of Evolution 
 
The pervasiveness of the MCO also has far reaching implications for the 
conceptualization of evolution. In fact, the MCO has permeated Neo-Darwinian 
evolutionary thinking to such an extent that some of the most prominent disputes 
within modern evolutionary biology have tacitly centred upon the coherence, 
legitimacy, and applicability of the MCO. This is all the more extraordinary in light of 
the fact that the original Cartesian formulation of the MCO is theoretically 
incompatible with an evolutionary understanding of organisms. Whereas the former is 
grounded in Christian theology, the latter is deeply committed to a naturalistic 
metaphysics. To understand the Cartesian bête-machine, it is necessary to conceive it 
as being preceded, logically and chronologically, by God. In this sense, Descartes’ 
MCO leads naturally to the Argument from Design. As organisms are like machines, 
one can infer that just as the functional organization of the latter is the product of 
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design, the functional organization of the former must also be the result of design. 
And since the design of organisms infinitely surpasses that of machines, the intellect 
and ingenuity of the designer must be inconceivably greater than that of man. In this 
way, the MCO provided a firm ‘scientific’ foundation for the existence of God, and 
many natural philosophers and theologians (especially in Britain) used it to this end 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  
 
The most famous example of the theological recourse to the MCO is William Paley’s 
Natural Theology, published in 1802. In this work, Paley compared the intricate 
contrivances of machines like the watch to the exquisite adaptations of organisms, and 
argued for the existence of a divine Creator on the basis of the apparent design of the 
latter. It is well known that Charles Darwin read Paley’s Natural Theology as a young 
man and was instilled with a sense of the perfect adaptation of structure to function in 
organisms. Indeed, in the 1830s it became one of the major objectives of his work to 
account for such wondrous functional adaptation (Ospovat, 1981). With his theory of 
evolution by natural selection, Darwin considered that he had provided an alternative, 
naturalistic explanation of the functional organization of organisms. As he would later 
remark in his autobiography, “The old argument of design in nature, as given by 
Paley, which formerly seemed to me so conclusive, fails, now that the law of natural 
selection has been discovered” (Darwin, 1908, p. 154). Darwin’s theory appeared to 
present a lethal blow to the MCO. Adaptations, the very features of organisms that 
seemed to cry out for an explanation in terms of design, could be accounted for by 
appealing to the operation of natural processes like natural selection. 
 
However, what is remarkable (and more than a little surprising) is that Darwin did not 
in fact succeed in expunging the MCO from biological theory. Instead, what happened 
was that evolutionary biology itself adapted to accommodate the MCO. Ever since 
Darwin, machine-language, despite its obvious Creationist connotations, has 
continued to pervade the biological discourse in general and the evolutionary 
discourse in particular. In fact, modern evolutionists do not even hesitate to invoke 
Paley’s theological work on adaptation as a model for evolutionary biology. John 
Maynard Smith (1969, p. 82), for instance, asserts that “The main task of any theory 
of evolution is to explain adaptive complexity, i.e., to explain the same set of facts 
which Paley used as evidence of a Creator”. Similarly, George Williams (1992, p. 
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190) considers that Paley’s Natural Theology is “worth close attention by all 
biologists” because it offers advice on how to identify the products of selection. For 
this reason, Richard Dawkins (1998, p. 16) is quite willing to admit that modern 
evolutionists “might be labelled neo-Paleyists, or perhaps ‘transformed Paleyists’”. 
Implicit in this methodological association with natural theology is the view that in a 
post-Darwinian biology, organisms, whilst being the products of selection rather than 
creation, are still optimally designed machines in the exact same sense that Paley, and 
Descartes for that matter, conceived them. Dawkins is all too happy to confirm this: 
“we animals are the most complicated and perfectly-designed pieces of machinery in 
the known universe” (Dawkins, 2006, p. xxii, my emphasis). 
 
The problem with this mechanistic understanding of organisms and the language used 
to describe it is that it is completely inappropriate in evolutionary biology. The 
pervasive use of the term design is a case in point. Design may be defined as the 
deliberate production of an object by an external agent so that it accomplishes a 
desired function (Bunge, 2003). It is therefore a notion which serves to characterize 
extrinsically purposive objects like machines since the design reflects the intentions of 
the external agent that are realized by the produced object.
26
 However, as organisms 
are self-producing, intrinsically purposive systems, the concept of design is not 
suitable to characterize their functional organization, given that this functional 
organization does not reflect the intentions of an external agent. The mechanistic 
fallacy that the structure and behaviour of organisms is explicable in terms of extrinsic 
purposiveness leads to the view that organisms have been literally designed to 
function in a preordained way. This view is deeply problematic. For one thing, an 
organism cannot be designed for a function because it does not itself have a function; 
only its parts do. But even if the notion of design is restricted to the parts of an 
organism, it is still wholly inappropriate because the attribution of a function to a part 
of an organism does not entail design for that function, as indicated in Section 3.3. 
Functional adjudications need not be grounded on mechanistic notions of design, 
intention, or extrinsic purpose.  
 
                                                     
26
 Even those fully committed to the evolutionary use of ‘design’ acknowledge this point. For instance, 
Michael Ruse, in his book Darwin and Design, notes in relation to the design of a knife that “The knife 
itself hardly has the end of cutting. We have the end of cutting, and so we design and make the knife [to 
that end]” (Ruse, 2003, p. 276, my emphasis). 
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Unfortunately, this is seldom recognized in the philosophical literature on function 
and teleology. Tim Lewens, for instance, has recently written an entire book on the 
role of the MCO in evolutionary biology entitled Organisms and Artifacts (2004), but 
at no point does he even consider the possibility that purposiveness (or teleology) may 
be intrinsic as well as extrinsic. Consequently, he simply assumes that functional 
language is of the same kind when it is applied to machines as when it is applied to 
(the parts of) organisms. Thus, he incorrectly asserts that: “when organisms were 
considered to be artefacts made by God, function language had the same meaning 
regardless of whether one was talking about the function of a fork or a frog’s leg. It is 
widely agreed that evolutionary biologists today use function language in a strikingly 
similar way to how it was used by the natural theologians” (Lewens, 2000, p. 99; 
2004, p. 13). This erroneous belief has led philosophers to derive function from 
design (e.g., Millikan, 1984; Neander, 1991; Kitcher, 1993; Krohs, 2009) or to derive 
design from function (e.g., Lauder, 1982; Allen and Bekoff, 1995; Buller, 2002), not 
realizing in either case that the adjudication of functions in organisms and in machines 
has a different basis. 
 
Despite being a concept that belongs to the realm of machines, the term ‘design’ is 
quite liberally used in contemporary discussions of evolution, to the extent that the 
outcome of the evolutionary process itself is often characterized as ‘design without a 
designer’ (e.g., Kitcher, 1993; Ayala, 2004). This is misleading because the notion of 
design does not capture how Darwinian evolution explains the functional organization 
of organisms. The adaptations produced by evolution are not the result of an 
intentional preconceived plan, but are rather the result of the differential survival and 
reproduction of organisms with heritable adaptive variations. Thus, it is far more 
appropriate to assert that organisms are fashioned or shaped by selection pressures 
than to invoke design as an explanatory concept in evolution. Moreover, the very idea 
of ‘design without a designer’ is not only deceptive, but it is also logically 
contradictory; designed literally means made by a designer. As Mohan Matthen 
(1997, p. 32, fn. 14) rightly complains, “This does not make sense to me: ‘design 
without a designer’ is still an unintuitive notion as far as I am concerned, and […] it 
goes against some influential ideas in evolutionary biology”.  
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The reason why the notion of design pervades evolutionary biology is that it is used 
uncritically, typically as shorthand for functional organization (e.g., Ayala, 2004, p. 
58). But in inferring design from functional organization, modern evolutionists 
inadvertently appeal to the first part of the Argument from Design. As noted above, 
this first argues inductively for design on the basis of functional organization, and 
then argues deductively for a designer on the basis of design. The fatal flaw of this 
theological argument, as David Hume showed in his Dialogues Concerning Natural 
Religion (1779), lies not in its deductive part (i.e., design → designer) but in its 
inductive one (i.e., functional organization → design), which itself derives, as does 
the MCO, from our familiarity with machines. But even though Hume showed that 
functional organization is not necessarily evidence of design, he was not able to 
provide a causal explanation for its origin and occurrence in organisms. This was 
precisely Darwin’s accomplishment. Peter McLaughlin (2001, p. 152) makes this 
point well: “What Darwin has enabled us to do (that Hume could not) is not to ‘think 
of design without a designer’, but rather to think of eyes as being for seeing without 
presupposing that they are designed for seeing. We do not think of a plan (design) 
without a planner but of adaptation without intent (design)”.  
 
Nevertheless, there is still an alternative left for ardent evolutionists unwilling to let 
go of the concept of design, which is to bite the bullet and accept both inductive and 
deductive parts of the Argument from Design, and simply replace God with natural 
selection as the designer. Evolution is thus not ‘design without a designer’ but ‘design 
with a designer’. According to this rather extreme interpretation of Darwinism 
(described by Niles Eldredge (1995) as ‘ultra-Darwinism’), the design of organisms is 
the work not of a divine watchmaker but of a blind watchmaker (Dawkins, 1986; see 
also Dennett, 1995). However, this move does not really help matters because 
evolution simply does not proceed like a watchmaker, blind or otherwise. It is worth 
bearing in mind that Darwin, having read Paley, was fully aware of the watchmaker 
analogy and yet he chose not to resort to it in the Origin of Species (1859). Rather, the 
analogy Darwin adopted to illustrate his theory of evolution was that of selection, as 
used by pigeon breeders. Darwin’s choice of analogy is extremely significant because 
breeders and watchmakers proceed in fundamentally different ways. The watchmaker 
manipulates the internal parts of a watch, its gears and springs, in order to affect the 
properties of the watch. The breeder, on the other hand, manipulates the selective 
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pressure on a population of pigeons in order to affect the beaks and wings of 
successive generations of pigeons. Selection (both natural and artificial) is a process 
by which parts of a wholes are preserved, changed, or created as the long-term 
consequences of manipulations carried out not on the parts themselves but on the 
wholes to which they belong. Thus, whereas the designer (such as a watchmaker) 
manipulates parts to affect the properties of wholes, nature (like a breeder) 
manipulates wholes to affect the properties of their parts (see McLaughlin, 2001, p. 
153-161). It is therefore selection rather than design that provides the appropriate 
analogy to understand Darwinian evolution, which is why Darwin called the causal 
principle of his theory ‘natural selection’ and not the ‘blind watchmaker’.  
 
In spite of its inherent inadequacy, the ultra-Darwinian conception of evolution as the 
work of a blind watchmaker has exerted considerable influence on modern 
evolutionary biology. In fact, it lies at the heart of the excesses of the ‘adaptationist 
program’ that Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin famously criticized in their 
paper ‘The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm’ (1979).
27
 The 
adaptationist is committed to the view that organisms, like watches, can be effectively 
decomposed into discrete and mutually independent traits, and that each of these traits 
is an adaptation, optimally-designed for its function by natural selection. The problem 
with adaptationism is that, as indicated in Section 3.4, there is no single way of 
decomposing an organism into parts. So although some organs like the eye display a 
degree of functional modularity comparable to the components of a watch, many other 
organismic structures cannot be demarcated in such a manner because they contribute 
to the realization of a variety of different functions within the organism. The parts of 
an organism contribute to its fitness in so many different ways that it makes little 
sense to attempt to calculate their individual fitness values, as they have not been 
shaped independently by selection. The adaptationist assumes that nature selects parts 
of organisms for their functions in the same way that a watchmaker selects parts of 
watches for their functions. However, nature does not select parts at all. Rather, it 
selects organisms with parts that functionally contribute (in many different ways) to 
enhancing the fitness of the organism as a whole. 
                                                     
27
 Peter Godfrey-Smith (1999, p. 190) also notes the association between the ultra-Darwinian 
appropriation of the concept of design and the adaptationist program, and accordingly characterizes the 
latter as “the tradition of natural theology continued”. 
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Another major problem with adaptationism is that it assumes that the adaptations 
produced by natural selection are as optimal as they can be given the trade-offs that 
need to be reached among conflicting functional demands as well as the inevitable 
architectural constraints of organismic form. This belief in optimal adaptation is 
another consequence of the conception of natural selection as a watchmaker, given 
that no watchmaker would deliberately design a watch to display suboptimal 
components or features. Instead, the watchmaker carefully chooses the gears, springs 
and levers to ensure that the watch is as functionally effective as possible. In the same 
way, the adaptationist considers that each part of an organism has been optimally 
evolved by natural selection to contribute to the best possible design of the organism 
as a whole. However, this view drastically overestimates the power of natural 
selection. Natural selection does not produce perfectly optimized adaptations, as 
Darwin himself recognized: “Natural selection tends only to make every organic 
being as perfect as, or slightly more perfect than, the other inhabitants in the same 
country with which it has to struggle for existence. And we see that this is the degree 
of perfection attained under nature” (Darwin, 1859, p. 201).  
 
The adaptationists’ endorsement of the ‘design with a designer’ view of evolution is 
also exemplified by their contention that natural selection is like an engineer that 
devises effective ‘solutions’ to the adaptive ‘problems’ presented by the environment. 
Accordingly, adaptationists study the adaptations of organisms by means of two 
epistemic strategies: ‘reverse engineering’ and ‘adaptive thinking’. Reverse 
engineering seeks to infer the problems posed by an organism’s environment from the 
study of observed organismic traits. Adaptive thinking reverses the direction of 
inference and seeks to draw on known adaptive problems faced by an organism to 
predict likely solutions that will have emerged to meet those problems (see Dennett, 
1995, pp. 187-262; Griffiths, 1996; Lewens, 2002). The difficulty with the problem-
solving interpretation of natural selection is that problem-solving in general is an 
inherently prospective process. It requires identifying a desired state in advance and 
then specifying and following a route from the current state to the desired state. 
However, natural selection does not proceed prospectively towards the attainment of 
particular ends. The various traits of an organism have not evolved in order to be able 
to solve adaptive problems posed by the environment. Rather, they are able to solve 
adaptive problems posed by the environment because they have evolved. For 
 - 114 - 
example, the wings of a bird are not the solution devised by natural selection to deal 
with the problem of flight, since half a wing provides no lift at all given the 
nonlinearity of aerodynamic relations. Rather, wings were initially selected for their 
ability to carry out other functions (e.g., terrestrial locomotion, predatory action, heat 
regulation, etc.) and only as they grew larger were they incidentally found to also 
enable flight, thereby becoming subsequently selected for this purpose. As Lewontin 
(1996, p. 8) eloquently puts it, “If wings are a solution to the problem of flight, they 
are an example of a problem being created by its own solution”.  
 
The recruitment of already existing structures for novel functions is a common 
occurrence in evolution (see Gould and Vrba, 1982), and it runs counter to the 
conception of natural selection as an engineer. Evolutionary change is constrained by 
the past history of organisms, given that novelty can only arise on the basis of 
modifying what already exists. In contrast, the engineer designs machines de novo out 
of especially prepared components. This difference was pointed out by François Jacob 
in a well-known paper entitled ‘Evolution and Tinkering’, in which he remarked that: 
 
[N]atural selection does not work as an engineer works. It works like a tinkerer––a  
tinkerer who does not know exactly what he is going to produce but uses whatever he 
finds around him whether it be pieces of string, fragments of wood, or old cardboards; in 
short it works like a tinkerer who uses everything at his disposal to produce some kind of 
workable object. For the engineer, the realization of his task depends on his having the 
raw materials and the tools that exactly fit his project. The tinkerer, in contrast, always 
manages with odds and ends. What he ultimately produces is generally related to no 
special project, and it results from a series of contingent events. (Jacob, 1977, pp. 1163-
1164) 
 
Jacob’s analogy between evolution and tinkering is instructive because it helps 
illustrate some of the major problems of the designer/engineer conception of natural 
selection I have discussed. For example, whereas the engineer works prospectively 
according to a preconceived plan, the tinkerer cannot know in advance what precisely 
he is going to come up with. Moreover, whereas the engineer builds machines by 
bringing together individually specified components, the tinkerer has to make do with 
whatever components happen to come his way. Finally, whereas the engineer 
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produces objects as perfect and efficient as his technological resources and 
understanding permit, the works of the tinkerer are typically far from perfection. 
Evolution is indeed much more like tinkering than engineering. 
 
On the whole, in light of the numerous and seemingly irremediable problems of 
appealing to the concept of design in explanations of evolution, it is rather surprising 
that it continues to permeate modern evolutionary biology. J. G. Ollason (1987, p. 
243) evocatively expressed this frustration when he stated that “the idea that animals 
are designed is dead, killed by Hume, buried, perhaps unwittingly by Darwin, but 
however comprehensively it is disposed of, like the walking dead, it haunts us still”. It 
is indubitable that one of the major reasons why the notion of design still haunts 
evolution is that, despite its disturbing theological connotations, it is firmly grounded 
in the most influential and widely accepted theory of organisms, namely the MCO of 
mechanistic biology. Thus, it is only by making explicit the rejection of the MCO that 
evolutionary biology can finally lay the ghost of natural theology to rest and fully 
come to terms with the actual implications of Darwin’s theory for our understanding 
of the nature of organisms. 
 
3.7. Epistemic Consequences of the MCO: Engineering as Biology 
 
The most important epistemic consequence of the MCO is that if organisms are 
indeed machines, then biology and engineering cannot be regarded as clearly distinct 
disciplines; the boundary between them becomes completely blurred. In fact, ever 
since the establishment of mechanistic biology, the transfer of theoretical, conceptual, 
and explanatory resources between biology and engineering has been extremely fluid. 
As a result, biology has come to be regarded as the branch of engineering devoted to 
the study of ‘living machines’ (e.g., Dennett, 1995, pp. 187-228). This 
conceptualization of biology as engineering has been bolstered, as we have seen in 
previous sections, by the steady import of epistemic tools from engineering into 
biology, such as the adoption of programming language in developmental 
explanations and the use of reverse engineering in the study of adaptation. However, 
what is not always appreciated is that the MCO has also resulted in the inverse 
epistemic conceptualization of engineering as biology. The implication of this view is 
that engineering, concerned as it is with the design and construction of machines, is 
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itself conceived as a way of doing biology, having a legitimate, indeed fundamental, 
role to play in the mechanistic explanation of organisms. This section will uncover the 
philosophical grounds underlying this biological conceptualization of engineering, 
and expose its inherent limitations.  
 
The disciplinary juxtaposition of engineering and biology has its basis in Descartes’ 
move to collapse the distinction between the science of natural bodies (i.e., physics, 
including biology) and the science of machines (i.e., mechanics). Because natural 
bodies (both living and nonliving) are ontologically equivalent to artificial bodies, 
mechanics, while being a subset of physics, is nevertheless epistemically 
indistinguishable from physics, as both deal with the same kind of object, both are 
subject to the same laws, and both formulate the same kinds of explanations. In his 
Principia, Descartes writes: 
 
[M]echanics is a division or special case of physics, and all the explanations belonging to 
the former also belong to the latter; so it is no less natural for a clock constructed with 
this or that set of wheels to tell the time than it is for a tree which grew from this or that 
seed to produce the appropriate fruit. Men who are experienced in dealing with 
machinery can take a particular machine whose function they know and, by looking at 
some of its parts, easily form a conjecture about the design of the other parts, which they 
cannot see. In the same way I have attempted to consider the observable effects and parts 
of natural bodies and track down the imperceptible causes and particles which produce 
them. (Descartes, 1985, pp. 288-289) 
 
With Descartes, all natural bodies receive a mechanistic treatment; everything 
physical is explained as if it was mechanical. The physicist, and by implication the 
biologist, can look at nature through the eyes of the mechanic or engineer (‘men who 
are experienced in dealing with machinery’). In this way, in l’homme Descartes comes 
to terms with the biology of the human body by describing in detail the various 
mechanisms underlying the operation of a perfectly-designed imaginary automaton. In 
an important respect, l’homme is a technological treatise, doing as much for 
engineering as for biology. In it, Descartes deploys an astounding array of mechanical 
devices (rods, tubes, valves, pulleys, levers, sieves, counterweights, wheels), 
machines (fountains, organs, self-moving statues, clocks, mills), and sources of power 
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(water, air, weights, pressures) to develop the machine model of the body. In writing 
l’homme, Descartes availed himself of the best engineering works of his time and he 
put them at the service of his biology. Between 1614 and 1615, Descartes visited the 
Royal Château of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, just outside Paris, and he was greatly 
impressed by the ability of the water-powered fountains in the gardens to animate a 
variety of automata, including self-playing organs and self-moving statues. 
Accordingly, in l’homme he appealed to these hydraulic machines to illustrate the 
anatomical features of the human body and to explain the various physiological 
processes occurring within it: 
 
you may have observed in the grottoes and fountains in the royal gardens that the force 
that drives the water from its source is all that is needed to move various machines, and 
even to make them play certain instruments or pronounce certain words, depending on 
the particular arrangements of the pipes through which the water is conducted. And the 
nerves of the machine that I am describing can indeed be compared to the pipes in the 
mechanical parts of these fountains, its muscles and tendons to various other engines and 
springs which serve to work these mechanical parts, its animal spirits to the water that 
drives them, the heart with the source of the water, and the brain’s cavities with the 
apertures. (Descartes, 1998, p. 107) 
 
Here lies one of the most remarkable aspects of Descartes’ formulation of the MCO. 
What Descartes observed at the Royal Château of Saint-Germain-en-Laye was simply 
that automata, under appropriate conditions, can sometimes appear life-like. However, 
what he concluded was rather that life itself was automaton-like. Thus, the automata 
built in the image of organisms became the very models used by Descartes to explain 
the organisms they had been designed to imitate. This epistemic move completely 
transformed the understanding of the relation between engineering and biology. 
Before Descartes, automata had been regarded primarily as spectacles, built to 
demonstrate technological virtuosity and designed for the sole purpose of amusing 
and entertaining. After Descartes, automata also acquired a degree of scientific 
respectability, as they came to represent serious mechanistic experiments intended to 
determine the extent to which organismic features could be recreated in machines. In 
this way, Descartes laid the foundations for the research programme we now call 
Artificial Life (A-Life, hereafter), which denotes the self-consciously biological 
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branch of engineering that seeks to understand the phenomenon of life (or certain 
aspects of it) by reproducing it in machines. Although modern A-Life only really 
arose with the work of Christopher Langton in the 1980s, the discipline itself has a 
much longer history which runs parallel to that of mechanicism. Historically, attempts 
to create ‘living machines’ constituted a practical means of validating the ontological 
commitments of mechanistic biology (cf. Price, 1964).  
 
The most prominent figure of old A-Life was the eighteenth-century engineer Jacques 
de Vaucanson, who Langton (1989, pp. 8-9) heralds as one of the forefathers of the 
modern version of the discipline. For Vaucanson, the conventional means of 
generating biological knowledge, based on observation and experimentation, needed 
to be supplemented by visual demonstrations of mechanical models and simulations. 
Accordingly, in 1738 and 1739 he presented before the Académie des Sciences in 
Paris three life-like automata of his own design, ‘The Flute Player’, ‘The Tambourine 
Player’, and ‘The Digesting Duck’, all of which had been built with the explicit 
intention of furthering the understanding of human and animal biology (Wood, 2002; 
Landes, 2007). Out of the three, the Duck was the most impressive, as it appeared to 
have the remarkable ability to eat kernels of grain, and to metabolize and excrete 
them. This stunning creation enabled Vaucanson, an engineer by training, to enter into 
academic debates with physiologists over the nature of digestion, and ultimately 
helped him secure an appointment at the Académie des Sciences as ‘associated 
mechanician’ in 1757 (Riskin, 2003, p. 601). However, shortly after Vaucanson’s 
death in 1782, a close observer of the Duck’s swallowing mechanism reasoned that 
digesting the grain would take far longer than the brief pause the Duck took between 
swallowing and defecating, and thereby concluded that the grain input and excrement 
output were entirely unrelated, and that the tail end of the Duck must have been 
loaded before each act with fake excrement. In this way, “The Duck that pioneered 
physiological simulation was, at its core, fraudulent” (ibid., p. 607). The epistemic 
lesson to draw from this historical episode is that the fact that a machine can be made 
to externally resemble an organism in its input and output functions does not provide 
a legitimate basis for concluding that the machine itself is analogous in nature to the 
organism it represents. 
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Unfortunately, this problematic behaviourist assumption lies at the heart of modern A-
Life. As Langton (1989, p. 1) puts it in the opening sentence of his A-Life manifesto, 
“Artificial Life is the study of man-made systems that exhibit behaviors characteristic 
of natural living systems”, and again a few pages later, “Artificial Life is concerned 
with generating lifelike behaviors. Thus, it focuses on the problem of creating 
behavior generators” (ibid., p. 5). A-Life is interested in behaviour itself, not in the 
physiological processes that give rise to it. However, the ability to faithfully 
reproduce in a machine a particular pattern of organismic behaviour does not amount 
to an understanding of how it comes about, as Vaucanson’s Duck dramatically 
illustrates. This is because the same behavioural output may be brought about by 
different kinds of means. The rationale of A-Life consequently suffers from the same 
problem faced by the cyberneticists who, as we saw in Section 3.3, claimed that 
servomechanisms and organisms are indistinguishable as objects of scientific inquiry 
since both display intrinsically purposive behaviour. This similarity is not 
coincidental, as contemporary A-Life draws heavily on the ideas of cybernetics (see 
Riskin, 2007, pp. 10-12). Like cybernetics, “The field of Artificial Life is unabashedly 
mechanistic and reductionist” (Langton, 1989, p. 6). It is mechanistic because the 
claim that machines that exhibit life-like behaviours can be used to generate 
biological knowledge about those behaviours presupposes a direct ontological 
correspondence between machines (the model systems) and organisms (the systems 
modelled). Langton’s own mechanistic commitment to the MCO is unequivocal, 
asserting in his A-Life manifesto that “living systems are nothing more than complex 
biochemical machines” (ibid., p. 5). A-Life is also reductionistic because it reduces 
living organisms to their outward manifestations, deeming what is characteristic about 
the living state to be a matter of purely external behaviours. 
 
In addition to the centuries-old project of building machines that display life-like 
behaviours, modern A-Life is also engaged in the somewhat different project of 
producing life-like behaviour within machines, that is, in the virtual world of 
computers. The roots of this approach to A-Life lie in the work of the cyberneticist 
John von Neumann, who in the 1940s developed a mathematical theory of discrete 
symbolic systems called cellular automata as a means of exploring the ‘logic’ and 
computability of self-reproduction as displayed by real living systems. Today, this 
form of A-Life has broadened to include the computational simulation of many other 
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biological processes and behaviours apart from self-reproduction, such as animal 
communication, predator-prey interactions, insect colony dynamics, and speciation. 
Now it is evident that these simulations can be of great value in helping biologists 
model the phenomena they study, but there is a real epistemic danger in assuming, as 
many A-Life researchers do, that high-quality simulations of life actually constitute 
realizations of life. For example, Thomas Ray (1992, p. 372) argues that the ‘digital 
organisms’ inhabiting virtual platforms such as the Tierra simulator are literally alive, 
given that they are “self-replicating, and capable of open-ended evolution”. However, 
this claim is based on the conflation of the concepts of simulation and realization, 
which, as H. H. Pattee (1989) indicates, are categorically different. Although both 
constitute models of a system, simulations are symbolic representations, whereas 
realizations are material implementations. Therefore, despite being heuristically 
useful for biological research, digital simulations of life cannot be considered to be 
part of the subject matter of biology because they are not actual instantiations of life. 
Elliott Sober makes this point in the following way:  
 
It is sometimes suggested that, when a computer simulation is detailed enough, it then 
becomes plausible to say that the computer is an instance of the objects and processes 
that it simulates. A computer simulation of a bridge can be treated as a bridge, when 
there are simulated people on it and a simulated river flowing underneath. […] I regard 
this suggestion as mistaken. The problem with computer simulations is not that they are 
simplified representations, but that they are representations. Even a complete description 
of a bridge, one faithful in every detail, would still be a very different object from a real 
bridge. (Sober, 1992, p. 764) 
 
Some A-Life researchers respond to this objection by arguing that the logical form of 
an organism can be extrapolated from its material constitution because the property of 
being alive has a purely formal basis and is completely independent from the 
materials which realize it (Langton, 1989). This is a fair point, as it is indeed the case 
that matter by itself does not make organisms what they are. Nevertheless, this 
argument does not alleviate the underlying worry of whether it really is possible to 
completely abstract life from its material constitution. Von Neumann’s reservations 
regarding his own formalization of the problem of self-reproduction are quite 
revealing in this respect. He believed that by abstracting the problem in this way, “one 
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has thrown half of the problem out of the window, and it may be the more important 
half”. Von Neumann recognized that the price to be paid for formalization is that 
“One does not ask the most intriguing, exciting, and important questions of why the 
molecules or aggregates which in nature really occur in these parts are the sorts of 
things that they are” (von Neumann, 1966, p. 77). In a similar respect, the idea 
defended by modern virtual A-life researchers that the life of an organism can be 
separated from its embodiment in the organism, or that an organism’s ability to 
reproduce and evolve can be understood in total abstraction from the organism’s 
material constitution, would almost certainly strike most practicing biologists as 
deeply counterintuitive. Biologists do not deal with life in the abstract, but with living 
organisms; it is impossible to study the former without the latter. 
 
In the last analysis, however, the status of virtual forms of A-Life must be evaluated 
in terms of the epistemic service they provide to biology. And so we may ask: Has a 
focus on virtual A-Life resulted in new biological knowledge about organisms in 
general? Has it enabled the discovery of new biological regularities? The fact is that 
virtual forms of life are so essentially different from natural forms of life that it is not 
at all clear how knowledge of the former could be of any actual use in advancing the 
understanding of the latter. Instead, it seems more reasonable to conclude that the 
actual epistemic value of virtual simulations of life lies in that they serve as heuristic 
tools in the study of real living organisms. In other words, virtual simulations of life 
do not by themselves generate knowledge about life, although their employment in 
biological research does facilitate it.  
 
Overall, it is clear that A-Life does not really constitute a way of doing biology at all. 
Of course, this does not mean that A-Life is not a legitimate or useful undertaking; 
quite the contrary. The biologically-inspired construction of machines capable of 
exhibiting life-like behaviours can enable the performance of novel tasks in new 
mechanical contexts. And the development of computer simulations of life (or of 
living processes) can greatly enhance the investigation of real life. However, A-Life 
cannot be said to constitute a branch of biology. At most, it is a form of biological 
technology. Organisms and machines are fundamentally different, and consequently 
the epistemic relation between biology and engineering, though dynamic and 
permeable, can never be truly symmetrical. The conviction that biologists can learn 
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about organisms by studying machines, or that the pursuit of engineering by itself can 
constitute a way of doing biology, has its roots in the physiological writings of 
Descartes, and is deeply misguided. The fact that it is still seriously contemplated 
reflects the remarkable endurance of the MCO.  
 
3.8. Ethical Consequences of the MCO: Organisms to Use (and Abuse) 
 
It is important to bear in mind that the MCO has consequences that go well beyond 
biological science itself and which impinge upon a number of broader philosophical 
issues. Perhaps the most salient of these is the moral status of nonhuman life. In the 
ethical debate over the use of organisms, especially animals, in scientific research, the 
MCO has historically provided a convenient foundation upon which to anchor 
arguments in favour of vivisection, and animal experimentation more generally 
(Monamy, 2009). I will not enter into this ethical debate here, as it is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. Instead, what this section will attempt to do is uncover the 
nature of the relation between the MCO and the ethical arguments in favour of the 
unmitigated use of nonhuman organisms that are advanced on its behalf.  
 
I argued in Section 3.3 that the single most important difference between organisms 
and machines lies in their different forms of purposiveness. It is by virtue of its 
intrinsic purposiveness that an organism acts on its own behalf and towards its own 
ends. The internal physiological processes occurring within the organism are 
functional inasmuch as they contribute to the maintenance of the organism as a whole. 
In contrast, being extrinsically purposive systems, machines are designed, built, and 
maintained by external agents. Although the internal processes occurring within a 
machine also contribute to the operation of the machine as a whole, the machine’s 
operation does not serve its own ends but those of its users. It is the users who impose 
the normative standards according to which the functioning of the machine is 
evaluated because they are the ones who benefit from its operation. It is in the 
interests of the users that the machine functions in the specified way. The machine 
itself has no benefits or interests of its own. An organism, on the other hand, functions 
according to its own normative standards because it is the beneficiary of its own 
operation. Thus, an organism, unlike a machine, has benefits and interests of its own. 
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Now it may be argued that winding a watch is beneficial for the watch, but in reality it 
is only beneficial for the watch inasmuch as it is beneficial for its user. It is the user, 
not the watch, who benefits from the winding of the watch. A watch that is left 
unwound can continue to exist indefinitely. By comparison, the operation of an 
organism benefits the organism itself because it is only by means of its operation that 
the organism is able to maintain its existence (cf. McLaughlin, 2001, pp. 191-204).  
 
So it is by virtue of their intrinsic purposiveness that organisms, but not machines, are 
the subjects of benefit. Being subjects of benefit means that organisms are also 
subjects of harm. For example, depriving an organism from food harms it because it 
conflicts with its interest of maintaining its own organization. In contrast, a machine 
cannot be the subject of harm. Interfering with the mechanism of a watch so that it is 
no longer able to keep good time does not harm the watch, but rather the user who 
benefits from the watch’s ability to keep good time. Unlike a machine, an organism 
has a wellbeing. Serving the interests of an organism enhances its wellbeing, whereas 
opposing the interests of an organism jeopardizes its wellbeing. These are the 
capacities that make organisms, as opposed to machines, the subjects of moral 
consideration. Thus, in principle, not just humans and other mammals, but also 
sharks, oak trees, and cyanobacteria can be conferred a moral status, as they all have 
intrinsic interests that contribute to their wellbeing.
28
 In practice, however, moral 
philosophers disagree over which organisms should be granted greater moral 
consideration. Some argue that organisms that experience pain in the way that humans 
do deserve the greatest moral consideration, whereas others regard consciousness and 
self-awareness as the attributes that merit the most moral consideration. Still, these 
disputes need not concern us here, as what most moral philosophers would surely 
agree on is that having a wellbeing of one’s own that is served by one’s interests, and 
being the subject of benefit and harm, are the absolute minimal conditions for 
granting an individual a moral status of any kind. Thus, although it is not entirely clear 
which organisms deserve the greatest moral consideration, what is absolutely clear is 
that no machine can be the subject of any moral considerations whatsoever. 
 
                                                     
28
 Even a hypothetical artificially-created intrinsically purposive system would have a wellbeing of its 
own and would be the subject of benefit and harm. Consequently, it would also in principle be eligible 
to a moral consideration of some sort. 
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This has fundamental implications for the appeal to the MCO in biological research. If 
organisms are conceived as machines, then it is no longer necessary to consider their 
welfare or even whether they have a moral status at all. Having been stripped of their 
intrinsic purposiveness, organisms are deemed to have no real interests of their own 
and can therefore be appropriated by their human users to serve their own ends. This 
was already recognized by Gottfried Leibniz in the seventeenth century in relation to 
animals: “if we are compelled to view the animal as being more than a machine, we 
would have to […] renounce our domination of animals” (Leibniz, quoted in 
Canguilhem, 1992, p. 52). Today, the MCO motivates and morally legitimates the 
instrumental use of organisms, which have come to be regarded as one more kind of 
experimental material at the disposal of the biologist (see Knorr-Cetina, 1999, pp. 
138-158). In molecular biology, for instance, organisms are conceived as 
technological systems of production; they are standardized, mass-produced, and 
genetically manipulated to serve the biologist’s own ends. Parts are routinely detached 
from organisms (e.g., plasmids from bacteria, antibodies from rabbits, muscle tissue 
from mice, etc.) just as they are detached from machines, and are subsequently 
reinserted into different organismic hosts to resume the work of production. As Robert 
Rosen (1991, p. 21) remarks: “Genetic engineers, who are the molecular biologists 
turned technologies, habitually regard their favourite organism, E. coli, as a simple 
vending machine; insert the right token, press the right button, and the desired product 
is automatically delivered, neatly packaged and ready for harvest”.  
 
Clearly, the increasing objectification of living beings in the laboratory presents 
extremely challenging ethical issues that moral philosophers need to address. As 
mentioned above, it is exceedingly difficult to unequivocally determine which 
organisms should be afforded greatest moral consideration and why. However, what is 
certain at any rate is that the appeal to the MCO provides a way of not even having to 
ask any moral questions at all. Although rejecting the MCO evidently should not lead 
us to renounce the use and manipulation of organisms in biological research, it 
nevertheless forces us to rethink the terms in which this ethical debate is conducted. 
Doing away with the MCO constitutes the first necessary step in reframing the ethical 
discussion over the appropriation of nonhuman organisms in science.  
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3.9. The Stream of Life: The Organicist Alternative to the MCO 
 
The preceding sections have demonstrated that the MCO fails to capture much of 
what makes organisms distinctive. The very identity of an organism, based on the 
self-preservation of the organization of the whole coupled with the continual renewal 
of its parts, is beyond the reach of the MCO. No machine is made of parts that are 
constantly replaced by the machine itself, yet this is precisely what occurs in an 
organism. Whereas in a machine the identity of the whole invariably corresponds to 
the collective identity of the parts, in an organism the whole cannot be identified with 
the parts because these are continuously being replenished by the whole. To continue 
to obstinately uphold the MCO in light of such a basic difference only leads to a 
totally unrealistic understanding of machines.  
 
A glaring illustration of this can be found in a curious paper by Reginald Kapp 
entitled ‘Living and Lifeless Machines’ (1954), in which some of the distinctive 
features of organisms are discussed from the perspective of the MCO, resulting in a 
very peculiar machine-based understanding of organisms. For example, Kapp (1954, 
p. 100) indicates that ‘living machines’ are constantly being ‘redesigned’ as they face 
new adaptive challenges: “a motor car must be permanently fitted with a brake as well 
as an engine. But an animal has no brake while it is running. It is redesigned so as to 
acquire one when it is coming to a stop; and at this moment it ceases to have an 
engine of propulsion, an engine designed for the function of running”. Kapp also uses 
the analogy of the motor car to illustrate how fuel is consumed in an organism, 
asserting that: “The living body is analogous to a motor car in which the chassis, 
brakes, cylinders, pistons, connecting rods, valves and bearings all contained 
combustible material, some of which was burnt whenever the driver placed his foot on 
the accelerator” (ibid., p. 101). But how is such a bizarre imaginary motor car still 
analogous to an actual motor car? Can the mechanisms of the latter really be used to 
explain the mechanisms of the former? If not, then what is the point of obstinately 
upholding the MCO if the price to be paid is that our understanding of machines has 
to be completely distorted to accommodate the distinctive features of organisms?  
 
The obvious alternative is simply to come to terms with the fact that machines are not 
good models for understanding organisms. Once it is realized that the MCO, despite 
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its overwhelming influence, is neither necessary nor inevitable, a number of 
alternative conceptual models become available. In this section, I want to explore a 
metaphor for the organism that was adopted by one of the leading organicists of the 
twentieth century, the Austrian theoretical biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy. In his 
book Problems of Life (1952), Bertalanffy illustrated the nature of the organism by 
appealing to the famous aphorism of the Presocratic philosopher Heraclitus that it is 
impossible to step into the same river twice because fresh water is forever flowing.
29
 
A stream is never the same at two succeeding temporal points; it is permanently 
changing. This image encapsulated the Heraclitean worldview, which emphasized the 
endless movement and change of all things (Vamvacas, 2009). Bertalanffy argued that 
“With this Heraclitean thought we put our finger on a profound characteristic of the 
living world” (1952, p. 124). Like the river, ever changing in its waves and yet 
persisting in its flow, the living organism only appears to be constant and invariable, 
but in reality it is the manifestation of a perpetual current. Accordingly, Bertalanffy 
maintained that “living forms are not in being, they are happening; they are the 
expression of a perpetual stream of matter and energy which passes the organism and 
at the same time constitutes it”. He referred to this dynamic conception of the 
organism as the stream of life, and counted it “among the most important principles of 
modern biology” (ibid.).  
 
In the stream of life, Bertalanffy found a fitting metaphor for the understanding of the 
organism he had been developing since the 1930s, which was based on the novel 
thermodynamic idea of an open system. Classic thermodynamics deals with closed 
systems, i.e., systems which exchange with the environment energy (in the form of 
heat and work) but not matter. An open system exchanges both energy and matter 
with the environment. By abstracting the physical principles underlying the nature of 
organisms, Bertalanffy played a mayor role in developing the branch of physics now 
known as non-equilibrium thermodynamics. Bertalanffy showed that the organism is a 
kind of open system which persists in the incessant import and export of matter and 
energy, and which maintains itself in a steady state far from equilibrium. In the 1940s, 
the physical chemist Ilya Prigogine began to study the thermodynamics of this kind of 
                                                     
29
 One of Heraclitus’ followers, Cratylus, argued that it is not even possible to step into the same river 
once, given that in between entering and leaving the stream, the water that one comes into contact with 
has already changed. 
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open systems (which he called ‘dissipative structures’), and found that they were able 
to minimize their total entropy production by spontaneously increasing their order and 
organization (a discovery for which he was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1977). It is 
important to note that not all dissipative structures are living systems. Air pressure-
organized tornadoes and temperature-driven Bénard rolls (longitudinal cylinders of 
liquid molecules that form ordered dynamic patterns) are well-known examples. 
However, as Bertalanffy himself recognized, organisms differ from other kinds of 
dissipative structures in that they are hierarchically organized, complexly 
differentiated, and are able to preserve their organization for much longer periods of 
time (perhaps even indefinitely, if one takes into account the fact that the living 
organization is essentially preserved during reproduction).  
 
Although Bertalanffy was the first to identify the physical principles underlying the 
stream of life, this understanding of the organism has a much longer history. For 
example, John Locke, in the second edition of his Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding (1694), observed that organisms and inanimate bodies maintain their 
identities over time in completely different ways. Whereas inanimate bodies remain 
the same by virtue of keeping the same component parts, organisms persist by 
actively replacing their parts. Locke argued that a machine whose parts were 
constantly being repaired and regenerated would closely resemble an organism: “If we 
would suppose [a] Machine one continued Body, all whose organized Parts were 
repair’d, increas’d or diminish’d, by a constant Addition or Separation of insensible 
Parts, with one Common Life, we should have something very much like the Body of 
an Animal” (Locke, quoted in McLaughlin, 2001, p. 177). However, Locke 
recognized that such a machine would still not be exactly like an animal because its 
principle of motion would be external rather than internal.
30
 Thus, for Locke, the 
stream of life lies at the heart of what he considered made organisms distinctive. 
 
This dynamic conception of the organism that emphasizes form over matter was also 
central to the comparative anatomist Georges Cuvier, who used it as the basis for his 
definition of life: 
                                                     
30
 Note that Locke here brilliantly anticipates Kant’s seminal distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic 
forms of purposiveness that I have argued constitutes the single most fundamental difference between 
organisms and machines. 
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Life is a vortex, more or less rapid, more or less complicated, the direction of which is 
invariable, and which always carries along molecules of similar kinds, but into which 
individual molecules are continually entering, and from which they are continually 
departing; so that the form of a living body is more essential to it that its matter. As long 
as this motion subsists, the body in which it takes place is living—it lives. When it finally 
ceases, it dies. (Cuvier, 1832, p. 14) 
 
The British polymath William Whewell, in the section of The Philosophy of the 
Inductive Sciences (l847) that dealt with what he was the first to call ‘The Philosophy 
of Biology’, endorsed Cuvier’s view, and asserted that “Life is a constant Form of a 
circulating matter” (1847, p. 587). This understanding of the organism can also be 
found in the writings of some contemporary authors. Roger Faber (1986, pp., 23-24), 
for instance, argues that living systems are best understood as waves:  
 
Just as a particular wave crest is composed now of one portion of the surface of the sea 
and later, as the crest moves on, of another portion, so an individual cell is composed 
now of one set of molecules and ions and later, after ingestion, metabolism, and 
excretion, of a distinct set of molecules of the same kinds. Each cell, and therefore, the 
entire organism, is an enduring configuration in the jumble of nutrients and wastes; it is a 
wave or eddy in the molecular flux. An organism is a complex dance into whose 
dynamic pattern the atoms insert themselves for a time, performing their intricate steps 
until, displaced by newcomers, they move on to other actions in other places. (Faber, 
1986, pp. 23-24) 
 
What these metaphorical appeals to flowing streams, circulating vortices, and moving 
waves all have in common is that they attempt to capture the thermodynamic nature of 
organisms by singling out metabolism as the defining characteristic of life. 
Metabolism is what maintains the organism in a steady state far from thermodynamic 
equilibrium. As metabolism proceeds, with the continuous import of nutrients and 
export of wastes, not much remains at a later time of the materials that once composed 
the organism. This continuous exchange of materials occurs at every level of 
organismic organization. The chemical constituents of a cell are constantly 
synthesized and degraded and yet the cell persists as a whole. In a multicellular 
organism, the component cells are continuously dying and being replaced by new 
ones and yet the organism persists as a whole. Thus, every living system seems 
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permanent and stationary when it is considered from a particular viewpoint. But what 
appears to be permanent at one level is in fact maintained by means of the continuous 
building up and breaking down of the components at the lower level; be it of 
molecules in a cell, or of cells in a multicellular organism.  
 
The appearance of stasis and permanence can be very deceptive at any level of 
organismic organization. For example, subcellular formations like the nuclear spindle 
and the Golgi apparatus seem well-defined structures when we observe them in fixed 
microscope preparations. However, when we consider them in vivo in their changes in 
time, it becomes clear that they are temporary manifestations of biochemical 
processes involving continuous fluxes of matter and energy. These organelles, like 
most other molecular assemblies in the cell, do not exist as rigid microstructures but 
as quasi-stationary patterns, part fluid, part consolidated, which endure for a time 
before undergoing changes or disappearing altogether (Bertalanffy, 1952, p. 136; see 
also Kirschner et al., 2000). In the same way, no tissue or organ in a multicellular 
organism is a permanent object. Rather, any given tissue or organ constitutes a steady 
state, only the shape of which persists, while its material constitution is constantly 
being renewed by metabolic events. Ultimately, this also applies to the multicellular 
organism as a whole. This is much harder to visualize because the material 
regeneration of the form of macroscopic organisms is not easily perceived by the 
human eye. But consider the following thought experiment. Imagine an extraterrestrial 
humanoid life form whose mode of visual recognition was based on the enumeration 
of the material components making up particular tokens of general types, rather than 
on the identification of general types instantiated by particular tokens. Imagine further 
that this alien lands on Earth at a particular location and encounters two dogs: a living 
dog and a mechanical dog, the latter being the product of the most cutting-edge A-
Life research (see Figure 5). The alien scans the two dogs, catalogues their material 
constitution for future identification, and returns home. A year later, the alien returns 
to Earth to the same location and faces the two dogs it encountered in its first trip. 
Despite being in the presence of the same two dogs, the alien’s cognitive apparatus 
means that it is only able to recognize the mechanical dog and not the living one. 
From the alien’s perspective, the living dog of the first trip has faded out of existence, 
and an entirely different one has taken its place! What this admittedly fanciful thought 
experiment is meant to illustrate is that if one focuses on the materials of the parts 
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instead of the form of the whole, organisms do indeed resemble flowing streams. The 
fact that this is not easily perceptible to us does not make it any less true or important.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The stream of life is a good model for the organism because it captures its inherently 
dynamic nature. Flowing streams (as well a circulating vortices and moving waves) 
are thermodynamically open systems, as organisms are. Machines, on the other hand, 
are thermodynamically closed systems. This is one of the reasons why the MCO is 
fundamentally inadequate; it presumes it can account for the characteristics of open 
systems by appealing to the characteristics of closed systems. As John Dupré (2007, 
p. 14) has pointed out: “Mechanical models, assuming fixed machine-like ontologies, 
are at best an abstraction from the constantly dynamic nature of biological processes”. 
Machines are composed of stable parts with relatively constant modes of interaction. 
To conceptualize organisms in this way means to resign oneself to characterizing 
static snapshots of a rapidly changing biological reality.  
 
Once the stream of life is taken seriously, it quickly becomes clear that the dynamic 
nature of organisms has wide-reaching implications for biology. For example, the 
traditional disciplinary divide between anatomy and physiology is based on the 
mechanistic assumption that structure and function are distinct properties of the 
organism that can be studied independently. Indeed, a mechanic can examine the 
structural arrangement of a machine while it is at rest, or study the function of the 
machine while it is operating. However, organisms are not objects, like machines, but 
manifestations of ongoing processes. The implication of this, as the early champion of 
Figure 5. Depiction of two dogs, one biological and one mechanical, as they would 
be perceived by an imaginary alien whose mode of visual perception was based on 
the enumeration of the material components that constitute physical bodies. 
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organicism J. S. Haldane (1931, p. 29) realized, is that “Structural and functional 
relations cannot be separated in the scientific study of life, since structure expresses 
the maintenance of function, and function expresses the maintenance of structure”. 
The dynamic nature of organisms means that the concepts of structure and function in 
biology are not just interdependent but interdefining. As a result, the longstanding 
dispute over whether structure determines function or if it is function that determines 
structure (see Russell, 1916) can be resolved. In the words of another leading 
organicist, J. H. Woodger (1929, p. 330), “What is required is an enlargement of the 
concept of ‘structure’ so as to include and recognize that in the living organism it is 
not merely a question of spatial structure with an ‘activity’ as something over against 
it, but that the concrete organism is a spatio-temporal structure and that this spatio-
temporal structure is the activity itself”.  
 
On the whole, the stream of life of organicism constitutes a helpful starting point for 
coming to terms with the inherently dynamic nature of the organism. It provides a 
convenient alternative to the MCO of mechanicism because it attends more closely to 
the characteristics that make organisms distinctive. As a consequence of this, it 
sidesteps many of the misunderstandings concerning the nature of organisms that 
result from endorsing the MCO. Contemporary biologists would do well to replace the 
MCO with the stream of life as their point of departure when thinking about living 
systems in the particular contexts in which they investigate them. Today it appears 
that this organicist idea, which got swept away by the molecular biology revolution of 
the latter half of the past century, is again beginning to acquire currency. In a recent 
article entitled ‘A New Biology for a New Century’, the renowned microbiologist 
Carl Woese specifically singles out the MCO as one of the major obstacles impeding 
further progress in our understanding of organisms. In place of the MCO, Woese 
invokes the stream of life of the early organicists (although he does not cite any of 
them directly) as a more appropriate metaphor in which to think about organisms, as 
biology enters the twenty-first century:  
 
If they are not machines, then what are organisms? […] Imagine a child playing in a 
woodland stream, poking a stick into an eddy in the flowing current, thereby disrupting 
it. But the eddy quickly reforms. The child disperses it again. Again it reforms, and the 
fascinating game goes on. There you have it! Organisms are resilient patterns in a 
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turbulent flow—patterns in an energy flow. A simple flow metaphor, of course, fails to 
capture much of what the organism is. None of our representations of organism capture it 
in its entirety. But the flow metaphor does begin to show us the organism’s (and 
biology’s) essence. And it is becoming increasingly clear that to understand living 
systems in any deep sense, we must come to see them not materialistically, as machines, 
but as (stable) complex, dynamic organization. (Woese, 2004, p. 176) 
 
Replacing the static view of living systems embodied in the MCO with the dynamic 
conception captured by the stream of life prevents biologists from making incorrect 
assumptions about organisms, it provides a useful starting point for the examination of 
life’s intrinsic purposiveness, and it furnishes them with new conceptual tools with 
which to address the theoretical problems they are confronted with. 
 
3.10. Rethinking the Role of the MCO in Contemporary Biology 
 
Given the irredeemable deficiencies of the MCO, which previous sections have 
highlighted, why has this notion exerted such a powerful influence in biology? A 
number of reasons can be identified. Firstly, as machines are clearly understood, being 
the products of human design, they are intuitively compelling models for 
conceptualizing organisms. As a result, biologists have been tempted to draw on the 
superficial similarities between machines and organisms (e.g., organization, 
interacting parts, purposive behaviour) in order to explain the latter on the basis of 
their familiarity with the former. Secondly, by upholding the MCO biologists have 
kept their discipline firmly within the confines of physical science, and historically 
this has served to ensure the scientific respectability of their inquiries, as well as to 
legitimate the epistemic transfer of theories, concepts, and methods from more 
developed sciences like physics and chemistry, in addition to engineering. Thirdly, the 
MCO fills the void caused by the absence of a generally accepted definition of life, so 
that by endorsing it biologists have not needed to concern themselves with 
intimidating conceptual questions like ‘What is life?’ or ‘What is an organism?’ and 
have instead been able to get on with the business of studying living systems. But 
above all, the most important reason why the MCO has been, and continues to be, 
such a seductive notion is that it is highly successful in generating empirical data. It is 
undeniable that the periods in history in which mechanicism and the MCO have 
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dominated biological inquiry have also been the periods of greatest empirical 
progress. This leads us to an intriguing paradox: How can the MCO result in such a 
fundamentally inadequate understanding of what organisms are and yet prove to be so 
fruitful when used to investigate them? In light of this tension, what role should the 
MCO play in biology today? 
 
In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to take a step back and consider in 
general terms the different ways in which metaphors are used in science. Following 
Michael Bradie (1999), we can distinguish theoretical, heuristic and rhetorical 
functions for scientific metaphors. Metaphors with a theoretical function are central to 
scientific understanding, as they provide the foundation for the conceptualization, 
explanation, and representation of the phenomena they model. Metaphors with a 
heuristic function constitute methodological tools that facilitate the empirical 
investigation of the phenomena they model. And metaphors with a rhetorical function 
are used in scientific communication to inform and educate non-specialists about the 
phenomena scientists investigate. The most influential scientific metaphors, like the 
MCO, perform all three functions. So far, my discussion of the MCO has focused 
primarily on its theoretical function, and I believe that enough has been said in the 
preceding sections to legitimately conclude that, as a theory of the organism, the 
MCO has absolutely no role to play in biology. In what follows, I will examine in turn 
the heuristic and rhetorical functions of the MCO. I will first explain why the MCO 
succeeds when it is employed heuristically but not theoretically, and I will then 
illustrate the serious problems which arise from the rhetorical appeal to the MCO. 
 
The key to the heuristic value of the MCO in the study of organisms resides in the fact 
that the distinctive nature of the organism is only truly perceptible when it is 
considered as a whole. If the parts of an organism are considered independently from 
the whole for the purpose of their investigation, they do resemble machines in that 
they constitute extrinsically purposive systems. Like machines, the parts of an 
organism are not self-producing, self-organizing, or self-maintaining, but rather 
depend on an external agent for their production, organization, and maintenance 
(namely, the organism as a whole). Just as machines serve the ends of their users, 
organismal parts serve the ends of the organisms to which they belong. So whereas an 
organism as a whole is a categorically different kind of system from a machine, its 
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parts actually share many of the attributes of machines. Consequently, when these 
parts are studied in isolation, much can be learnt about them by treating them as if 
they were machines. This is the source of the heuristic power of the MCO, and it 
explains why this notion has proven to be so successful when used as a methodological 
tool in the analytical examination of organisms. To investigate localized areas within 
the organism as machines allows biologists to conveniently abstract away the 
intimidating complexity of the broader physiological context of the organism as a 
whole and focus their attention on particular causal relations between well-defined 
interacting components (see Bechtel and Richardson, 1993). The heuristic adoption of 
the MCO also enables biologists to devise testable hypotheses regarding the 
connections between local suborganismic structures and clearly identified functions. 
 
Nevertheless, an important limitation in the methodological use of the MCO needs to 
be pointed out. This is that the heuristic value of the MCO is directly proportional to 
the degree of physiological differentiation of the organism under investigation. An 
organism in the early stages of development cannot be studied as an assemblage of 
machines because in it all functions are assumed by the organism as a whole. The 
organism at this point constitutes what Hans Driesch called a ‘harmonious-
equipotential system’ that is totally unintelligible in mechanistic terms.
31
 It is only 
with the progressive physiological differentiation of the embryo that the originally 
unitary action of the organism becomes partitioned into separate individual actions, 
and it is at this developmental stage that local machine-like structures within the 
organism begin to appear, thus rendering the MCO of some heuristic value. Still, it is 
important to remember that even in the adult stage, organisms retain a certain degree 
of plasticity and a significant capacity to reorganize their parts and reassign their 
functional needs accordingly in order to compensate against external perturbations (as 
Goldstein’s clinical studies discussed in Section 3..3 illustrated). So at no stage in the 
life history of an organism is the heuristic reliability of the MCO absolute.  
 
So far, I have argued that the heuristic value of the MCO resides in the relative 
similarities between machines and the parts of organisms. But what should we make 
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 It is for this reason that Driesch appealed to the holistic properties of organisms at this stage of 
development to demonstrate the inadequacy of the MCO and formulate his ‘first proof of vitalism’ (see 
Driesch, 1908, pp. 118-149).  
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of the adoption of the MCO in the study of whole organisms? Whole organisms, 
unlike their parts, constitute intrinsically purposive systems. Consequently, they 
cannot be mechanized for the purpose of their investigation in the way that their parts 
can when considered in isolation. The mechanistic approach to the study of organisms 
is inherently incapable of tackling the systemic properties that make organisms 
distinctive in the first place; all it can do is target localized and highly differentiated 
regions within organisms on an individual basis. Does this mean that the MCO is 
useless in the investigation of whole organisms? Not quite. The MCO can still play a 
heuristically useful counterfactual role by helping to highlight what organisms are not. 
In this respect, the MCO can serve as a false model which, by virtue of its inherent 
inadequacy, can orient biologists towards the actual nature of organisms (cf. Wimsatt, 
1987). As Rosen (1991, p. 248) observes, “On balance, the Cartesian metaphor of 
organism as machine has provided to be a good idea. Ideas do not have to be correct 
in order to be good; it is only necessary that, if they fail, they do so in an interesting 
way”. Overall, the key to effectively evaluating the MCO is to clearly demarcate its 
heuristic role from its theoretical role. Successful mechanistic investigations of 
organisms do not enable successful mechanistic explanations of them, as Section 3.4 
argued. So although the MCO provides a convenient means of pragmatically 
simplifying biological reality in order to facilitate its investigation, it nonetheless fails 
to provide an appropriate theoretical understanding of that reality.
32
 The regrettable 
prevalence of the MCO in contemporary biological thought is to a large extent the 
result of unwarrantedly inferring its ontological truthfulness on the basis of its 
methodological usefulness. 
 
Let us now turn to the rhetorical function of the MCO. As indicated above, metaphors 
with a rhetorical function are used for the purposes of communicating scientific 
knowledge, both technical and popular, to non-specialists. Some authors have argued 
that the MCO, despite being theoretically inadequate, can still be of great rhetorical 
value because it provides a highly instructive visual aid in teaching non-specialists 
                                                     
32
 James Barham has also highlighted the distinction between the MCO’s rhetorical (or methodological) 
function and its theoretical (or metaphysical) function: “As a scientific methodology, the machine 
metaphor has been extraordinarily fruitful. No doubt it will remain so for a long time to come, although 
there are many signs that we are beginning to bump up against the limits of its usefulness. But however 
that may be, as a metaphysics, mechanism has always been incoherent. The idea that a machine could 
occur naturally at all, much less that it might have its own intrinsic purposes and values, is simply an 
article of faith for which there is no rational support” (Barham, 2004, p. 222, my emphasis). 
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about the features and properties of organisms. For instance, Konopka (2002, p. 399) 
remarks that although “the machine metaphor is bound to fail as a serious scientific 
tool […] it can remain an extraordinarily useful pedagogical tool in education of 
gifted non-specialists in local youth centers (including our Universities) all over the 
world”. This view, however, is problematic. Just as it is tempting for biologists to 
wrongly infer the theoretical adequacy of the MCO on the basis of its heuristic value, 
so can the rhetorical use of the MCO by biologists inadvertently mislead non-
specialists into assuming that organisms really are machines. In this sense, rhetorical 
metaphors are double-edged swords; in the same way that they can enhance scientific 
understanding, they can also serve to obstruct it (see Quale, 2002). This clearly 
depends on the choice of metaphors used; theoretically misleading metaphors like the 
MCO do far more harm than good in this respect. This can be effectively illustrated 
by considering the repercussions of the recent rhetorical appeal to ‘molecular 
machines’ in molecular biology.  
 
In 1998, the then president of the U. S. National Academy of Sciences, Bruce Alberts, 
edited a special issue in Cell (volume 92, issue 3) which brought together a series of 
papers that systematically appealed to the use of machine language in the description 
of large protein complexes. In his introduction to the issue (entitled ‘The Cell as a 
Collection of Protein Machines: Preparing the Next Generation of Molecular 
Biologists’), Alberts noted that aspiring molecular biologists should learn to view the 
cell as a factory containing many interlocking assembly lines of protein machines. In 
relation to his use of the term ‘machine’, Alberts offered the following explanation: 
 
Why do we call the large protein assemblies that underlie cell function protein machines? 
Precisely because, like the machines invented by humans to deal efficiently with the 
macroscopic world, these protein assemblies contain highly coordinated moving parts. 
Within each protein assembly, intermolecular collisions are not only restricted to a small 
set of possibilities, but reaction C depends on reaction B, which in turn depends on 
reaction A; just as it would in a machine of our common experience. (Alberts, 1998, p. 291) 
 
This machine terminology has caught on rapidly in the molecular biology community, 
and year after year the frequency of the term ‘molecular machine’ has steadily 
increased in scientific journals and magazines, where it has become a fashionable 
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expression to describe virtually any highly organized and functionally specialized 
molecular assembly in the cell. Figure 6 lists a selection of the subcellular structures 
which have recently been described by biologists as molecular machines. 
 
 
 
Subcellular assembly Sample of ‘molecular machine’ language Source reference 
Ribosome “probably the most sophisticated machine ever made” Garrett (1999) 
Proteasome “a molecular machine designed for controlled proteolysis” Voges et al. (1999) 
Bacteriorhodopsin “a deceptively simple molecular machine” Kühlbrandt (2000) 
Apoptosome “a seven-spoked death machine” Salvesen et al. (2002) 
Glideosome “a molecular machine powering motility” Keeley et al. (2003) 
Spliceosome “among the most complex macromolecular machines known” Nilsen (2003) 
Blood clotting system “a typical example of a molecular machine” Spronk et al. (2003) 
Condensin “the key molecular machine of chromosome condensation” Strunnikov (2003) 
Photosynthetic system “the most elaborate nanoscale biological machine in nature” Imahori (2004) 
Bacterial flagellum “an exquisitely engineered chemi-osmotic nanomachine” Pallen et al. (2005) 
Myosin filament “a complicated machine of many moving parts” Ohki et al. (2006) 
RNA degradasome “a supramolecular machine dedicated to RNA processing” Marcaida et al. (2006) 
Cyclosome “a machine designed to destroy” Peters (2006) 
RNA Polymerase “a multifunctional molecular machine” Haag et al. (2007) 
 
 
Despite the popularity of the term ‘molecular machine’, a bibliographical analysis 
reveals that this phrase is predominantly featured in review articles, and only rarely is 
it found in original papers. When it does feature in an original paper, it almost always 
appears in the title, abstract, or introduction sections, rather than in the parts of the 
paper actually describing the research undertaken and the interpretation of the 
findings. What this suggests is that instead of serving as a theoretical model in the 
explanation of subcellular assemblies, the term ‘molecular machine’ primarily plays a 
rhetorical role in introducing newcomers to the field of molecular biology devoted to 
the study of the structure and function of large subcellular assemblies. Indeed, the 
phrase ‘molecular machines’ has become a common title for academic conferences 
and sessions, and it thus appears to work mainly at a social level by helping to define 
a particular subset within the molecular biology community (Peters et al., 2007).  
 
However, the adverse consequences that have resulted from the use of the phrase 
‘molecular machine’ far outweigh its potential pedagogical and sociological benefits, 
given that in the biologists’ persistent appeal to this term, modern-day creationists 
have found just the kind of rhetoric they needed to dress up their belief in a 
Figure 6. Subcellular assemblies which have been described as molecular machines 
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supernatural being with a guise of scientific respectability. Indeed, the pseudo-
scientific movement known as ‘Intelligent Design’ (ID, hereafter) has come to rely on 
the so-called ‘molecular machines’ of molecular biology as the primary basis of 
empirical support for their claims regarding divine design (Behe, 2001). One of the 
leading proponents of ID, the biochemist Michael Behe, argues that many of the 
highly organized subcellular systems that molecular biologists describe as molecular 
machines exhibit ‘irreducible complexity’ that could not have evolved as the result of 
natural causes and must therefore be the product of an intelligent agency. Behe (2006 
[1996], p. 39) defines an irreducibly complex system as one composed of many 
interacting parts that contribute to the function of the system, and in which the 
removal of any of the parts necessarily causes the system to cease functioning. He 
illustrates this concept by using a machine, the mousetrap, which requires the 
simultaneous presence of a spring, bar, platform, and other components to catch mice. 
Behe points out that the efficiency of the mousetrap does not increase gradually with 
the successive addition of components. Rather, all of the components need to be in 
place for the machine to function at all. In the same way, Behe argues that molecular 
machines, such as the bacterial flagellum and the blood clotting system, are like the 
mousetrap in that they constitute irreducibly complex systems. 
 
The role played by the notion of molecular machine in Behe’s case for ID is 
absolutely crucial, as it provides a tacit way of sidestepping the inductive part of the 
Argument from Design in order to establish on purely analytical grounds that since 
machines have designers, and since living systems are collections of molecular 
machines, then living systems must have a designer. The obvious problem with this 
argument does not lie in inferring design (and therefore a designer) from a machine, 
but in conceiving living systems, or rather their parts, as machines. Behe is well aware 
of this, which is why he devotes so much attention in his writings to highlighting the 
mechanistic nature of cells. Fortunately for Behe, this task is greatly facilitated by the 
fact that molecular biologists are the first to use machine language in their 
descriptions of cellular components, as Figure 6 illustrates. Because of this, Behe 
(ibid., p. 218) is able to assert that “Hume’s criticism of the design argument that 
asserts a fundamental difference between mechanical systems and living systems is 
out of date, destroyed by the advance of science which has discovered the machinery 
of life”. Hence, Behe becomes a de facto mechanist when it comes to the cell, and it is 
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here where the concept of molecular machine, proposed by the molecular biologists 
themselves, is so convenient. Indeed, Behe takes every possible opportunity to 
employ it:  
 
The cumulative results [of molecular biology] show with piercing clarity that life is 
based on machines—machines made of molecules! Molecular machines haul cargo 
from one place in the cell to another along «highways» made of other molecules, while 
still others act as cables, ropes, and pulleys to hold the cell in shape. Machines turn 
cellular switches on and off, sometimes killing the cell or causing it to grow. Solar-
powered machines capture the energy of photons and store it in chemicals. Electrical 
machines allow current to flow through nerves. Manufacturing machines build other 
molecular machines, as well as themselves. Cells swim using machines, copy 
themselves with machinery, ingest food with machinery. In short, highly sophisticated 
molecular machines control every cellular process. (Behe, 2006, pp. 4-5)  
 
In the hands of Behe, the phrase ‘molecular machine’ is no longer a fanciful, purely 
rhetorical figure of speech, but is rather a literal characterization of the real nature of 
cellular components: “literally, there are real machines inside everybody’s cells and 
this is what they are called by all biologists who work in the field, molecular 
machines” (Behe, 2005). The ingenuity of Behe’s argument for ID thus lies in its 
skilful exploitation of a term that molecular biologists use loosely for rhetorical 
purposes in a way that draws on their authority as scientists to undermine their own 
claims. The interesting consequence of this is that the rebuttals of ID formulated by 
biologists and philosophers have largely consisted in arguments against the MCO. For 
example, in their criticism of Behe, Niall Shanks and Karl Joplin (1999, p. 281) 
indicate that “Real biological systems are quite unlike economically designed 
engineering artifacts such as mousetraps. [Behe’s] case against evolution is a good 
example, in fact, of the perils of being ‘trapped’ by a metaphor”, by which of course 
they mean the MCO. Similarly, in their critique of ID, Eugene Scott and Nicholas 
Matzke (2007, p. 292) argue that “The differences between biological phenomena and 
human-built machines easily outweigh the superficial similarities”, and even quote 
Woese’s (2004) formulation of the stream of life as a better metaphorical 
conceptualization of the organism than the MCO. Accordingly, in a recent editorial 
entitled ‘Stand Up for Evolution’, the evolutionary developmental biologist Rudolf 
Raff (2005, p. 274) has emphasized the need for biologists to avoid the MCO in their 
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teaching and writing: “let us not play into the hands of ID propagandists. For instance, 
be careful about using [extrinsically] teleological words to describe biological entities 
in our teaching and writing. Calling cells ‘machines that do X,’ or describing 
biological structures as ‘well designed to do Y’ will be duly cited in ID propaganda as 
one more biologist supporting design”. It is therefore clear that the pernicious 
consequences that result from the rhetorical use of the MCO by biologists totally 
overshadow its limited didactic and sociological value in particular disciplines like 
molecular biology. 
 
Overall, we can conclude by asserting that the numerous problems with the MCO that 
previous sections highlighted do not require us to dispense with the MCO altogether. 
However, they do demand that the role of the MCO in biology be properly 
circumscribed. This has been accomplished in this section by independently 
considering the theoretical, heuristic, and rhetorical functions of the MCO. Although 
the MCO is fundamentally flawed as a theory of the organism, it nevertheless remains 
a valuable heuristic tool when it is employed in scientific research. Approaching the 
study of organisms as if they were machines can be quite profitable, and is to a certain 
extent necessary. Nevertheless, it is crucial not to allow the empirical fruitfulness of 
the MCO obscure the undeniable fact that organisms and machines are categorically 
different. The danger of slipping to a theoretical interpretation of the MCO is always 
present, and this is why the rhetorical use of the MCO is so perilous. The price that 
biologists have to pay for their profitable heuristic use of the MCO is that they must 
maintain the intellectual sobriety to resist the temptation of succumbing to the 
theoretical appeal of this intuitively compelling notion.  
 
3.11. Conclusions: Biology ≠ Mechanicism 
 
The failure of the MCO to come to terms with the ontology of living systems forces 
us to view mechanicism in a completely new light. Much of the prestige and authority 
of the mechanistic worldview derives from the instrumental role it played in the 
establishment of modern science in the seventeenth century. Throughout history, to 
conceive nature as a machine has meant to conceive it in a way that enables it to be 
scientifically investigated. Indeed, the very idea of a machine encapsulates precisely 
that which is amenable to scientific analysis; an organized system with regular and 
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predicable behaviour, and whose workings can be completely explained in terms of 
the structure and interactions of its component parts. One of the most remarkable 
incidents in the history of science is that the mechanistic conception of the world as a 
machine proved to be so empirically successful that it came to be regarded as reality 
itself, rather than as a convenient model for investigating it. As Andrés Vaccari (2008, 
pp. 332-33) remarks, “What is peculiar to the machine metaphor [in the seventeenth 
century] is that it later disappears, becoming a tacit, implicit assumption. For modern 
science, the assumption that the world and living organisms are machines becomes 
commonplace, an invisible, high-order structure that frames more specific, local 
projects”. The machine conception of nature and of life has come to be widely 
perceived not just as a useful model, but as the very condition of possibility for 
scientific inquiry. 
 
However, what is often forgotten is that machines are highly contrived devices that 
are specifically designed to exhibit the kind of lawful and mathematizable regularities 
that mechanicism can capture! When dealing with machines it is possible to uphold 
the commitments that characterize mechanicism, such as reductionism and 
determinism, precisely because machines are constrained in their organization and 
operation in a way that enables these commitments to hold. The reality is that there is 
nothing natural about a machine. In fact, it represents the quintessence of artificiality. 
Everything about it reflects the purposes and intentions of an external agent. The basic 
problem of the mechanistic worldview is that nature, unlike a machine, has not been 
expressly designed to display the kind of attributes that mechanicism is most adept in 
explaining (cf. Dupré, 1993; 2001; 2007). Of course, this does not mean that 
mechanicism cannot explain natural systems at all, but it does mean that the fit 
between the machine model and any natural system that mechanicism targets can 
never be exact. The lack of fit between model and target is especially noticeable in 
biology, given that, as this chapter has shown, organisms are fundamentally different 
kinds of systems from machines. This is why imposing the machine model on the 
conceptualization of organisms has such disastrous consequences. 
 
In essence, the MCO systematically reduces organisms to the features that 
mechanicism is capable of explaining and filters out everything that remains. The 
success of mechanistic biology in explaining these selected features in turn helps to 
 - 142 - 
reinforce the original conceptualization of the organism as a machine. The more 
recalcitrant aspects of the organism that do not fit the mechanistic characterization are 
either ignored or dismissed as unimportant. Unfortunately, what is neglected in the 
MCO is precisely what makes organisms most distinctive, namely their intrinsic 
purposiveness and their self-producing organization. It should not come as a surprise 
that the philosophical notions that are typically associated with these two non-
mechanistic features, namely teleology and holism, are treated by the scientific 
community with scepticism and suspicion. As the edifice of modern science is built 
on mechanistic foundations, it is to be expected that what lies beyond the reach of 
mechanicism is readily dismissed as mystical or unscientific. As Rosen (1991, pp. xv-
xvi) puts it, “for the past three centuries, ideas of mechanism and machine have 
constituted the very essence of the adjective “scientific”; a rejection of them thus 
seems like a rejection of science itself”. But this is nothing more than a prejudice. 
Once it is left behind and it is understood that mechanicism, despite its historical 
importance, neither predetermines nor exhausts the meaning of science, biological 
thought liberates itself from the need to conform to the MCO, and it becomes able to 
explore alternative conceptual models, like the stream of life, that attempt to confront 
the complexity of the organism in more direct terms. 
 
This chapter has endeavoured to show that the MCO stands today as one of the most 
serious obstacles impeding further progress in our comprehension of living systems. 
In Rosen’s words, the MCO “makes biology infinitely harder than it needs to be […] 
because it transmutes biology into a struggle to reconcile organic phenomena with 
sets of constituent fragments of unknown relevance to them” (ibid., p. 22). 
Bertalanffy, in his Modern Theories of Development, is even more forceful in his 
condemnation of the MCO:  
 
In the history of science and philosophy there is hardly a less happy expression than 
that of the bête machine of Descartes. No concept leads to such a distorted view of the 
problem underlying it or so greatly falsifies its proper meaning. It might even be said 
that, in spite of its heuristic success, the notion of the machine has had a destructive 
effect on the development of biological theory. It has entangled the investigator even 
to-day with scholastic artificial problems, and at the same time has prevented the clear 
discernment of the essential problem of organic nature. Only the displacement of the 
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machine theory which is now gradually taking place will put an end to the paralysis of 
biological thinking for which this Cartesian expression has been responsible. 
(Bertalanffy, 1962 [1933], pp. 36-37) 
 
Unfortunately, the displacement of the MCO that Bertalanffy referred to in this 
passage, written in 1933 at the height of the organicist movement in theoretical 
biology, did not last long, as the molecular biology revolution was just around the 
corner, and with it came the effective reestablishment of the MCO at the centre stage 
of biological thought. It is only in the present time, as biology gradually emerges at 
the other side of the molecular biology tidal wave that it is again becoming apparent 
that the MCO, and mechanicism more generally, is obstructing rather than enabling 
theoretical progress in biology. It should be clear that breaking free from the grip of 
mechanicism constitutes a necessary precondition for gaining a genuine understanding 
of the nature of living systems.  
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Chapter 4 
 
THE CONCEPT OF MECHANISM IN BIOLOGY: 
AN ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
I wish to make it quite clear that Biological Mechanism is committed logically 
to a great deal more than is commonly supposed. – C. D. Broad (1925) 
 
4.1. Introduction: The Renewed Interest in Mechanism 
 
The concept of mechanism has recently received a great deal of attention in the 
philosophy of science. The main catalyst for this new interest has been the realization 
that scientists, especially biologists, often refer to mechanisms in their inquiries into 
the phenomena they investigate. This has led to the development of a lively 
philosophical research program over the past decade that has attempted to make sense 
of scientists’ mechanism-talk and elucidate the role it plays in scientific practice. The 
standard philosophical strategy has been to begin by offering a general 
characterization of ‘mechanism’ that captures the way scientists use this term, and 
then show the ways in which mechanisms are involved in the explanation of 
phenomena. The mechanism account which has exerted the greatest influence in the 
development of this new discourse has been formulated by Peter Machamer, Lindley 
Darden, and Carl Craver (2000). Machamer et al. (MDC hereafter) conceive 
mechanisms as “entities and activities organized such that they are productive of 
regular changes from start or set-up conditions to finish or termination conditions” 
(MDC, 2000, p. 3). Stuart Glennan (2002) and William Bechtel (2006) have also 
developed their own mechanism accounts. Glennan defines a mechanism for a 
behaviour as “a complex system that produces that behavior by the interaction of a 
number of parts, where the interactions between parts can be characterized by direct, 
invariant, change-relating generalizations” (Glennan, 2002, p. S344), whereas Bechtel 
characterizes a mechanism as “a structure performing a function in virtue of its 
component parts, component operations, and their organization”, adding that “The 
orchestrated functioning of the mechanism is responsible for one or more phenomena” 
(Bechtel, 2006, p. 26). 
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This emerging mechanism movement aims to provide a new framework in which to 
tackle a number of traditional problems in the philosophy of science. Central among 
them is the nature of explanation, in which a focus on mechanisms serves as an 
effective antidote to the outmoded deductive-nomological conception of explanation 
inherited from logical empiricism. Nevertheless, despite the general applicability of 
mechanism-based philosophy, it is interesting to note that this research program has 
developed primarily within the philosophy of biology. The most prominent defences 
and extensive elaborations of the mechanism approach have been advanced by 
philosophers interested in the biological sciences, with book-length accounts of 
mechanisms now existing for several biological subdisciplines, including cell biology 
(Bechtel, 2006), molecular biology (Darden, 2006), and neurobiology (Craver, 2007). 
This partnership between mechanism-based philosophy and biology is no mere 
happenstance. In fact, attending to the role the concept of mechanism has played in 
the development of biological thought opens up a rich new perspective in which to 
effectively examine and critically evaluate the recent mechanism discourse. 
 
In a nutshell, what a historically-informed perspective reveals is that the concept of 
mechanism in biology has come to be used in several different senses. As the current 
mechanism discourse in the philosophy of science proceeds with an almost complete 
disregard for how the concept of mechanism has been shaped by the history of its 
usage, discussions frequently suffer from the inadvertent conflation of the different 
meanings of the term. Admittedly, philosophers are generally aware that ‘mechanism’ 
is a convoluted concept with a long history, as evidenced by MDC’s assertion that 
“What counts as a mechanism in science has developed over time and presumably 
will continue to do so” (2000, p. 2). However, most of them deem the potential for 
semantic confusion minimal because they consider the various meanings of the 
concept to be neatly associated with discrete, non-overlapping historical periods. 
Craver, for instance, remarks: “But what is a mechanism? History cannot answer this 
question. The term mechanism has been used in too many different ways, and most of 
those uses no longer have any application in biology” (2007, p. 3). In this chapter I 
will attempt to show, in opposition to this claim, how an awareness of the semantic 
breadth of the concept of mechanism afforded by an examination of its history can 
help uncover a number of important tensions within the current mechanism discourse, 
as well as provide the necessary philosophical resources for resolving them. 
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I will begin by distinguishing and characterizing the three meanings of the concept of 
mechanism in biology (Section 4.2). I will then explore the way in which the different 
senses of ‘mechanism’ have been used in the history of biology (Section 4.3), and 
how they have come to be featured in the philosophy of science, situating the new 
mechanism movement in this context (Section 4.4). Following this, I will illustrate the 
various problems that arise in recent discussions from the inadvertent conflation of the 
different senses of ‘mechanism’ (Section 4.5). Finally, I will show what amendments 
need to be made to current accounts of mechanism to effectively capture the way this 
term is used by biologists in their research (Section 4.6).  
 
4.2. The Three Meanings of ‘Mechanism’ in Biology 
 
The term ‘mechanism’ is used to mean different things in different contexts. In 
biology, ‘mechanism’ has three distinct meanings, which can be terminologically 
distinguished as follows: 
 
(a) Mechanicism: The philosophical thesis which conceives living organisms as 
machines that can be completely explained in terms of the structure and 
interactions of their component parts. 
(b) Machine Mechanism: The structure or internal workings of a machine-like system. 
(c) Causal Mechanism: A step-by-step explanation of the mode of operation of a 
causal process that gives rise to a phenomenon of interest. 
 
As this taxonomy illustrates, ‘mechanism’ may refer to (a) a philosophical thesis 
about life and biology, (b) the inner workings of a machine, and (c) a mode of 
explanation. In order to make the ensuing discussion as clear as possible, I will refrain 
from using the word ‘mechanism’ in favour of these three terms, employing it only 
when referring to the word itself and not to any of its meanings. Let us now examine 
each of these three meanings of ‘mechanism’ in more detail.  
 
As we saw in Chapter 2, mechanicism has its roots in the Scientific Revolution and is 
usually associated with a naturalistic, atomistic, and deterministic view of nature 
which tends to lend itself to mathematical characterization. However, we have also 
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seen that mechanicism in biology, or mechanistic biology, has a rather more specific 
meaning. In previous chapters, I have characterized mechanistic biology in terms of 
the following basic tenets: 
 
1. The commitment to an ontological continuity between the living and the nonliving 
2. The view that biological wholes (i.e., organisms) are directly determined by the 
activities and interactions of their component parts, and that consequently all 
properties of organisms can be characterized from the bottom up in increasing 
levels of organization 
3. The focus on the efficient and material causes of organisms, and the unequivocal 
repudiation of final causes in biological explanation 
4. The commitment to explanatory and methodological reductionism in the study of 
living systems 
 
The machine mechanism sense of ‘mechanism’ is the closest to the etymological roots 
of the word, which can be traced to the Latin machina and the Greek mechane, terms 
meaning ‘machine’ or ‘mechanical contrivance’. When used in the machine 
mechanism sense, the term ‘mechanism’ refers to a machine-like system, or rather to a 
system conceived in machine terms. In Chapter 3 I examined this sense of 
‘mechanism’ in a great amount of detail, so I will say no more about it here.  
 
The causal mechanism sense of ‘mechanism’, in contrast to the first two, only 
acquired widespread currency in biology in the twentieth century. However, it is the 
meaning of the term that has become predominant in contemporary biological 
research. Causal mechanisms are of fundamental importance in scientific practice 
because they enable the identification of causal relations. When a biologist asks ‘What 
is the mechanism of P?’ (where P is the phenomenon of interest), she is seeking to 
identify the causes which explain how P comes about. Although the vast majority of 
philosophers conceive causal mechanisms as real things in the world (akin to machine 
mechanisms), I will argue in this chapter that they are actually better understood as 
heuristic models which target particular causal relations and thereby facilitate the 
explanation of the phenomena scientists investigate. 
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I am not, of course, the first to propose that the concept of mechanism needs to be 
terminologically fragmented to reflect its semantic breadth. In fact, the term 
‘mechanicism’ as I am using in this thesis has had longstanding currency in the 
German (‘mechanizismus’), French (‘mécanicisme’), Italian (‘meccanicismo’), and 
Spanish (‘mecanicismo’) scholarly literature, where it is commonly used to demarcate 
this sense of ‘mechanism’ from the more familiar machine mechanism sense. For 
some reason, however, the term ‘mechanicism’ has not caught on in the English-
speaking world. Still, Garland Allen (2005) has recently distinguished between the 
mechanicism meaning (which he calls ‘philosophical Mechanism’) and the causal 
mechanism meaning (which he calls ‘explanatory mechanism’), though he does not 
discern the machine mechanism meaning of the term. On the other hand, Michael 
Ruse (2005) has distinguished between machine mechanisms and causal mechanisms 
(designating the former ‘mechanism in the specific sense’ and the latter ‘mechanism 
in the general sense’), but he fails to acknowledge the mechanicism meaning. So 
although previous attempts have been made to distinguish the various senses of 
‘mechanism’, these efforts have tended to only discriminate two of the three meanings 
of the concept. I argue that a tripartite distinction such as the one I have proposed in 
this section is needed to recognize the full semantic breadth of the concept of 
mechanism. 
 
Members of the new mechanism movement may object that such terminological 
distinctions are not really necessary, as at least in recent philosophical discussions the 
term ‘mechanism’ is employed consistently. The reality, however, is that the current 
philosophical discourse is full of examples in which the concept is used in different 
senses, sometimes in the same sentence. For instance, consider the following remark 
by Craver and Darden (2005, p. 234): 
 
From the perspective of biology, however, one might tell a triumphal story of the success 
of mechanism [i.e., mechanicism] over various forms of vitalism, as well as over 
biological theories appealing to intelligent design. Indeed, one cannot open a journal in 
any field of contemporary biology without encountering appeals to the mechanism [i.e., 
causal mechanism] for this or that phenomenon.33 
                                                     
33
 In addition to conflating two senses of ‘mechanism’, this passage is historically inaccurate. 
Mechanicism cannot be contrasted historically with theories appealing to intelligent design given that, 
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One final terminological distinction is in order before moving on. It has become 
customary, following Robert Skipper and Roberta Millstein’s (2005) analysis, to refer 
to the recent mechanism movement in the philosophy of science as ‘the new 
mechanistic philosophy’. This is a very unfortunate and rather misleading designation, 
as it suggests that the current philosophical interest in the concept of mechanism 
represents some sort of resurrection of mechanistic philosophy (i.e., mechanicism), 
which is not in fact the case. Mechanistic philosophy, both as a general doctrine and 
specifically as it applies to biology, is concerned with the characterization of machine 
mechanisms. The new mechanism movement, in contrast, is devoted to examining the 
role played by causal mechanisms in scientific practice. This mechanism discourse is 
not committed to a mechanistic worldview, nor does it prescribe a mechanistic 
approach in biology. Indeed, there is nothing distinctively mechanistic about the new 
mechanism movement, other than its focus on ‘mechanisms’; and even this is not 
something it really shares with mechanicism as each doctrine understands this concept 
in a different sense (see  Figure 7). Still, contemporary philosophers routinely refer to 
explanations appealing to causal mechanisms as ‘mechanistic’, despite these generally 
having nothing to do with mechanistic explanations. As previous chapters have 
shown, mechanistic explanations are ones in which material wholes are accounted for 
in terms of the properties and interactions of their component parts. Thus, to explain 
an object mechanistically is to explain it as one explains a machine mechanism, i.e., to 
explain the way in which the component parts of the object determine the properties 
and activities of the whole. It is therefore important not to use the term ‘mechanistic’ 
as simply a synonym for ‘causal’ when characterizing explanations. This 
inappropriate use of the term ‘mechanistic’, which is rampant in the recent 
philosophical literature on causal mechanisms, is problematic because it blurs the 
longstanding biological tradition of using this term to refer to the philosophical 
commitments of mechanicism, which still form the basic conceptual backbone of 
                                                                                                                                                        
as we have seen in previous chapters, in its classic formulation the mechanistic view of the world as a 
machine mechanism necessarily presupposed the existence of a divine creator. This has had important 
repercussions for biology. As C. D. Broad (1925, p. 91) remarked “Biological Mechanism [i.e., 
mechanicism] about the developed organism cannot consistently be held without an elaborate Deistic 
theory about the origin of organisms. This is because Biological Mechanism [i.e., mechanicism] is 
admittedly a theory of the organism based on its analogy to self-acting and self-regulating machines. 
These, so far as we can see, neither do arise nor could have arisen without design and deliberate 
interference by someone with matter”. As I will show in the next section, only with the acceptance of 
Darwin’s theory of evolution did mechanistic biology become completely secularized. 
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contemporary fields like molecular biology.
34
 Consequently, for the sake of 
consistency it is preferable to avoid the term ‘mechanistic’ altogether in discussions of 
causal mechanisms. In place of Skipper and Millstein’s misleading banner, I will refer 
to the new mechanism movement in the philosophy of science as the mechanismic 
program, and to explanations given in terms of causal mechanisms as mechanismic 
explanations, retaining the term ‘mechanistic’ for discussions of mechanicism and 
machine mechanisms, as I have done so in previous chapters. This seems more 
appropriate, as the term ‘mechanismic’ is already used in philosophical discussions of 
causal mechanisms in the social sciences (e.g., Bunge, 1997; Norkus, 2005; Gerring, 
2007; Falleti and Lynch, 2009).
35
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3. The Conceptual Evolution of ‘Mechanism’ in Biology 
 
Darden (2006) has noted that “The history of the usage of the concept of mechanism 
from the seventeenth century to molecular biology has yet to be written” (p. 289, fn. 
5). It would be impossible to provide a comprehensive account of this history here. 
Instead, I will restrict myself in this section to indicating what I take to be the critical 
episodes in that history which resulted in the semantic fragmentation of ‘mechanism’.  
                                                     
34
 Jacques Monod, one of the founders of molecular biology, captures the distinctively mechanistic 
mindset of this field in his conception of the cell: “By its properties, by the microscope clockwork 
function that establishes between DNA and protein, as between organism and medium, an entirely one-
way relationship, this system obviously defies ‘dialectical’ description. It is not Hegelian at all, but 
thoroughly Cartesian: the cell is indeed a machine” (Monod, 1977, p. 108). 
35
 Indeed, these authors have adopted the term ‘mechanismic’ precisely because they recognize the 
importance of distinguishing explanations based on causal mechanisms from mechanistic explanations 
of machine mechanisms. Gerring (2007, p. 163), for instance, remarks: “It should be noted that this 
contemporary understanding of mechanism [i.e., causal mechanism] departs dramatically from 
common nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century understandings of the term, which invoked a 
mechanistic account of the world. In this context, mechanism meant ‘the theory that all phenomena can 
be explained in terms of the principles by which machines (mechanical systems) are explained without 
recourse to intelligence as an operating cause or principle’ […]. Evidently, to say ‘mechanism’ in a 
contemporary context does not mean that one is wedded to a mechanistic causal account modelled on 
Newtonian physics”. 
Figure 7. Relationship between the different meanings of ‘mechanism’ 
Mechanismic Program 
Mechanicism 
(Mechanistic Philosophy) 
Machine Mechanisms 
Causal Mechanisms 
examines 
examines 
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The first two meanings of ‘mechanism’ I distinguished, mechanicism and machine 
mechanism, can be traced back to the natural philosophy of the seventeenth century. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, mechanicism in its first formulations was 
intertwined with natural theology, given that the mechanistic understanding of the 
universe as intricate clockwork (i.e., as a machine mechanism) necessarily implied a 
Divine Creator. As a result, all things in nature, including living systems, became 
conceived as complex assemblages of machinery created by an intelligent Designer. It 
is this mechanistic understanding which enabled the notion of machine mechanism to 
be employed beyond the realm of technology and engineering in explicitly biological 
contexts. For the mechanistic biologist, as we have already seen, living organisms are 
not just composed of machine mechanisms; they are themselves machine 
mechanisms. Indeed, allusions to the ‘mechanism of the body’ are standard 
throughout the history of physiology. 
 
With Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection, it became possible to 
naturalistically explain the complex adaptations of organisms without needing to 
appeal to a divine Creator. One of the implications of Darwin’s theory was that its 
evolutionary understanding of organisms seemed to be at odds with the engineering-
based conception of life of mechanicism, exemplified by its postulation of machine 
mechanisms. Therefore, to uncover the semantic evolution of the concept of 
mechanism, it is necessary to address two key questions:  
 
(a) What happened to the notion of machine mechanism in biology after Darwin? 
(b) When and why did the notion of causal mechanism become pervasive in biology? 
 
In a recent paper, Ruse (2005) has provided answers to both of these questions. 
However, I will argue that his answers are unconvincing and that consequently the 
two questions need to be re-addressed. In response to question (a), Ruse presents 
textual evidence which shows that although Darwin did occasionally refer to 
biological machine mechanisms, unlike earlier biologists he always understood these 
in a purely metaphorical sense. Ruse concludes from this that Darwin was responsible 
for demoting the notion of machine mechanism in biology to a heuristic status. With 
Darwin, machine mechanisms lost their ontic basis and became reconceptualized as 
heuristic tools that aid the investigation of adaptation. Darwin himself made use of the 
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machine mechanism-heuristic in his inquiry into the workings of barnacles and 
orchids, and this remains a standard practice in evolutionary biology today.  
 
Although this account may seem reasonable, a more careful examination reveals its 
problems. Despite the apparent incompatibility between the mechanistic conception of 
organisms as machine mechanisms and a Darwinian understanding of organisms, 
what we actually find in modern evolutionary biology is that the machine mechanism-
language is not used exclusively at a heuristic level. Contrary to Ruse’s expectations, 
Darwin did not strip the notion of machine mechanism of its ontic significance. 
Rather, it was evolutionary biology itself which adapted to accommodate mechanistic 
thinking about organisms, so that since Darwin, “the idea that the world is full of 
designed machines has been replaced by the idea that it contains evolved machines” 
(Craver and Darden, 2005, p. 239, my emphasis). In fact, I showed in the previous 
chapter that Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin’s (1979) well-known critique 
of adaptationism can be interpreted precisely as a reaction against this excessive 
reliance on machine mechanism-thinking in evolution, which all too often constitutes 
not just a heuristic tool but also a theoretical justification for understanding organisms 
as optimally-designed machines engineered by natural selection.  
 
Moving to other areas of contemporary biology, it quickly becomes apparent that 
machine mechanism-talk also remains entrenched at an ontic level. In molecular 
biology, for instance, the standard conception of the organism is that of a machine 
programmed by its genes and decomposable into its component machine mechanisms. 
An important point, however, is that despite the fact that machine mechanisms 
continue to play a fundamental role in many areas of biology, the term ‘mechanism’ is 
generally no longer used to designate them. Instead, contemporary biologists tend to 
refer to machine mechanisms simply as machines, presumably in order to distinguish 
this notion from the sense in which ‘mechanism’ is now most commonly used by 
biologists, namely the causal mechanism sense. 
 
Ruse’s explanation for the displacement of machine mechanism by causal mechanism 
as the most widely used sense of ‘mechanism’, i.e., his answer to question (b), is also 
problematic. He suggests that Darwin’s secularization of mechanicism enabled the 
concept of ‘mechanism’ to acquire widespread currency in the broader sense of causal 
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mechanism. With Darwin, ‘mechanism’ came to be used to designate a much wider 
range of biological phenomena, including Darwin’s own ‘mechanism’ of natural 
selection. However, after thoroughly searching through Darwin’s works, Ruse 
actually discovers that Darwin “simply does not speak of natural selection as a 
mechanism” (2005, p. 291). Darwin only uses ‘mechanism’ in the machine 
mechanism sense; the very idea of a causal mechanism is simply alien to him. As 
Ruse himself indicates, it is not until the late nineteen-thirties and early forties that 
natural selection came to be generally referred to as a ‘mechanism’. Neither R. A. 
Fisher (1930) nor J. B. S. Haldane (1932) used this language, but Theodosius 
Dobzhansky (1937) did, noting that “the theory of natural selection is primarily an 
attempt to give an account of the probable mechanism [i.e., causal mechanism] of the 
origin of the adaptations of organisms to their environment” (p. 150). If Darwin’s 
secularization of mechanicism truly brought about the widespread use of causal 
mechanism, why is it that three-quarters of a century had to pass from the publication 
of Darwin’s Origin of species for natural selection to be commonly referred to as a 
‘mechanism’? 
 
In light of these difficulties, I want to propose a rather different answer to question 
(b). When considering the factors that had the greatest impact on mechanicism in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, far more important than the advent of 
Darwinism was the gradual erosion of somatic vitalism. As we saw in Chapter 2, the 
rising empirical success of mechanicism in the late nineteenth century in fields as 
diverse as physiology, developmental biology, and biochemistry eventually led to the 
marginalization of somatic vitalism. No longer being confronted by serious 
opposition, the mechanistic conception of life became widely accepted as an 
elementary presupposition of biological research in the early decades of the twentieth 
century. “At the present day”, wrote the embryologist Joseph Needham in 1925, “the 
situation is in effect the complete triumph of mechanistic biology. It is not alone in the 
field, because the neo-vitalists do exist as a small minority, but the vast preponderance 
of active biological workers are mechanists” (p. 235). 
 
I would argue that one of the key consequences of the consolidation of mechanicism 
was that it was no longer necessary to explicitly defend the basic tenets of this 
doctrine. The view that living systems are machine mechanisms did not need to be 
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justified and could simply be taken as a given. As a result, mechanism-talk became 
applied to all kinds of biological phenomena, given the mechanistic confidence that 
everything would, in due course, be explained in terms of the causal operation of 
machine mechanisms. This increasingly loose use of ‘mechanism’ caused the word to 
gradually lose its distinctive mechanistic connotations, becoming a ‘dead metaphor’ 
completely devoid of theoretical content that could be readily applied beyond the 
realm of machine-like systems to any biological phenomenon in need of a causal 
explanation. It is this semantic shift, I suggest, which led the term ‘mechanism’ 
understood in the more general and inclusive sense of causal mechanism to acquire 
such widespread currency in biology.  
 
Evidence for this account can be found in the writings of the biologists of this period. 
For example, J. S. Haldane, the founder of organicism and one of the most influential 
physiologists of the early twentieth century, drew attention on several occasions to the 
increasing proliferation of mechanism-talk in biology, pointing out that using the term 
‘mechanism’ with respect to a phenomenon no longer implied conceiving it 
mechanistically as a machine mechanism. In The Sciences and Philosophy, he 
observed that “In current physiological literature it is still customary, in describing 
what is known as to different bodily activities, to refer to them as ‘mechanisms’ – for 
instance, the ‘mechanisms’ of reproduction, respiration, secretion, etc.” despite the 
fact that “There are perhaps few physiologists who now consider that they have any 
real conception of these mechanisms [as machine mechanisms]”. The usage of 
‘mechanism’, Haldane noted, has become “a mere matter of custom” (Haldane, 1930, 
p. 59). In The Philosophical Basis of Biology, Haldane reiterated these remarks, 
indicating that physiologists “have acquired the habit, almost unconscious, of 
referring to the ‘mechanisms’ of various physiological activities, though they have not 
the remotest conception of what sort of mechanisms [i.e., machine mechanisms] these 
activities represent”. He concluded from this that “the use of the word ‘mechanism’ is 
a mere empty formality” (Haldane, 1931, p. 11). Although Haldane openly voiced his 
concern regarding this looser use of ‘mechanism’ in the causal mechanism sense, 
warning that “such a mode of expression is extremely misleading to that 
miscellaneous body which we call the public” (Haldane, 1930, p. 59), he clearly did 
not succeed in persuading his contemporaries against this usage of the term. Still, 
what is relevant in the present discussion is that his remarks lend credence to my 
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proposed explanation of the supplantation of machine mechanism by causal 
mechanism as the most common meaning of the term in biology.
36
 
 
4.4. The Mechanismic Program in Relation to Mechanicism 
 
So far I have argued that due to the success of mechanicism in the early twentieth 
century, the causal mechanism sense of ‘mechanism’ became predominant in biology 
during this period, and remains so to this day. But how and when did the different 
senses of ‘mechanism’ come to be featured in the philosophy of biology? Exploring 
this question will help situate the recent mechanismic program in relation to 
mechanistic philosophy. This will be a key step in the development of my argument, 
as showing the fundamental differences between these two research programs will 
provide the basis for my critical engagement with the mechanismic program in 
Sections 4.5 and 4.6.  
 
As I noted in Chapter 1, the longstanding conflict between mechanists on one side and 
vitalists (including organicists) on the other, being in the final analysis a dispute 
concerning the very nature of life, constituted the central theme in the philosophy of 
biology during the first half of the twentieth century (cf. Johnstone, 1914; Woodger, 
1929; Bertalanffy, 1952), even if by this time most experimental biologists considered 
that the dispute had already been resolved in favour of mechanicism. Mechanistic 
biology and machine mechanisms continued to be discussed in subsequent decades 
(e.g., Varela and Maturana, 1972), capturing even the attention of leading exponents 
of logical empiricism like Carl Hempel (1966, ch. 8) and Ernest Nagel (1979, ch. 12). 
However, following the academic institutionalization of the philosophy of biology at 
the hands of David Hull, Michael Ruse and others, discussions of mechanistic biology 
came to an abrupt end as the new generation of philosophers of biology, influenced by 
prominent evolutionists like Ernst Mayr, turned its attention to theoretical issues in 
evolutionary biology, such as the levels of selection, the definition of fitness, and the 
nature of species. Nevertheless, critical examinations of mechanistic biology and 
machine mechanisms are still featured in the contemporary literature (e.g., Rosen, 
                                                     
36
 It is interesting to note that, as Ruse (2005) recognizes, the causal mechanism sense of ‘mechanism’ 
first began to permeate the literature on natural selection only a few years after Haldane’s warnings 
against this looser use of the term. 
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1991; Lewontin, 2000; Kaneko, 2006; Dupré, 2007), although the terms in which the 
issues are discussed have changed somewhat. 
 
What of the third sense of ‘mechanism’? When did causal mechanisms enter the 
philosophy of biology? Browsing the literature, one finds passing references to the 
term ‘mechanism’ employed in the causal mechanism sense in the writings of Stuart 
Kauffman (1970), Marjorie Grene (1971) and William Wimsatt (1972). However, 
Robert Brandon (1985) appears to have been the first to provide a detailed analysis of 
the importance of causal mechanisms for biology. Brandon’s account is important for 
several reasons. For one thing, it is the first to explicitly recognize the semantic 
ambivalence inherent in the biological usage of ‘mechanism’, and the inevitable 
difficulties that arise when defining this concept.
37
 More crucially, it presents an 
understanding of the postulation of causal mechanisms in biology that distinctly 
characterizes the mechanismic program today, namely that the appeal to causal 
mechanisms in scientific practice does not imply a commitment to the reductionistic 
agenda of mechanicism.
38
 Indeed, whereas mechanicism, as Craver and Darden 
(2005, p. 235) note, is “closely aligned with the spirit of reductionism and the unity of 
science”, the mechanismic program focuses on multi-level mechanismic explanations 
(given in terms of causal mechanisms) and with an explicitly non-reductive view of 
science (Craver, 2005; Darden, 2005).   
 
The mechanismic program, unlike mechanicism, is not primarily concerned with 
biological ontology, but with the nature of biological explanations. This is not 
surprising given that the postulation of causal mechanisms, having become a virtually 
ubiquitous practice in biology, says very little about a biologist’s ontological 
commitments. Physiologists, ecologists, neuroscientists, and cell biologists have very 
different understandings of living systems, yet they all appeal to causal mechanisms in 
                                                     
37
 In fact, when Brandon asks what ‘mechanisms’ are, he is unable to provide a precise definition. He 
notes that ‘mechanism’ may refer to “spring-wound clocks and watches” (i.e., machine mechanisms) 
but also to “small peripheral populations and geographic isolating barriers” (i.e., causal mechanisms). 
To make matters worse, Brandon observes, in the philosophy of biology ‘mechanism’ “is typically used 
to designate the position opposing vitalism, holism, or organicism” (i.e., mechanicism). The semantic 
ambiguity is exacerbated by Brandon’s surprising proposal to use the term ‘mechanism’ in a fourth 
sense to refer to the practice of formulating causal mechanisms in science, stating confusingly that “the 
position I call mechanism is given in terms of search of mechanisms” (Brandon, 1985, p. 346). 
38
 Brandon further develops this key thesis in a more recent essay entitled ‘Reductionism versus holism 
versus mechanism’ (Brandon, 1996, ch. 11). 
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their research. Clearly, whatever ontological commitments they all share are likely to 
be very general in nature. This stands in contrast with molecular biologists’ standard 
mechanistic conception of living systems as machine mechanisms, for which 
explanations are sought from the bottom up in increasing levels of complexity. In 
every respect, the appeal to machine mechanisms is indicative of far more substantive 
ontological commitments than the appeal to causal mechanisms. These ontological 
commitments derive from the mechanistic conception of life which for much of the 
twentieth century dominated biological thought, but which today, with the growing 
emphasis on systemic approaches in biology, is increasingly viewed as simply one of 
many possible understandings of what organisms are and how they should be studied.  
 
In the few occasions when mechanismic philosophers do explicitly address matters of 
biological ontology, it is usually to distinguish mechanicism’s appeal to machine 
mechanisms from their own concern with causal mechanisms (recall Figure 7). By 
demarcating causal mechanisms from machine mechanisms, mechanismic 
philosophers distance their research program from the ontological commitments of 
mechanicism. Mechanismic philosophers distinguish causal mechanisms from 
machine mechanisms in two ways. The first strategy (which I have already alluded to 
in Section 4.1) is to focus on the way the term ‘mechanism’ is presently used in 
biology and disregard older uses of the term as irrelevant to current analyses of the 
concept (e.g., Craver, 2007, p. 3). What this does is minimize the scope for conflating 
the older biological usage of ‘mechanism’ as machine mechanism (predominant in 
biology until the first third of the twentieth century) with the current biological usage 
of the term as causal mechanism. The second strategy is to explicitly differentiate 
‘mechanisms’ (that is, causal mechanisms) from ‘machines’ (that is, machine 
mechanisms), and both Darden (2006, pp. 280-281; 2007. p. 142) and Craver (2007, 
p. 4 and p. 140) do this on more than one occasion. 
 
It is important to emphasize the extent to which MDC’s (2000) account of causal 
mechanisms has marked a turning point in philosophical discussions of this concept. 
Before MDC’s account, characterizations of ‘mechanisms’ routinely conflated the 
machine mechanism and causal mechanism meanings. For instance, Paul Thagard 
(1998) notices that the term ‘mechanism’ is commonly featured in explanations of 
disease, but defines it as “a system of parts that operate or interact like those of a 
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machine” (p. 66, my emphasis). Similarly, when Glennan first defines ‘mechanism’, 
he indicates that his definition is meant to apply to “complex systems analogous to 
machines” (1996, p. 51, my emphasis). In fact, Glennan has continued to heavily rely 
on the notion of machine mechanism in his account of ‘mechanisms’, going as far as 
to cite cells and organisms as prime examples of his conception of them (2002, p. 
S345). Although mechanistic biologists do indeed ontologically conceive cells and 
organisms as machine mechanisms, it makes little sense for any biologist to consider 
the causal mechanism of an entire cell or organism. Most mechanismic philosophers 
would almost certainly disagree with Glennan’s designation of cells and organisms as 
‘mechanisms’, and the reason is clear. The mechanismic program “strives to 
characterize mechanism […] in a manner faithful to biologists’ own usages” (Darden, 
2007, p.142) and causal mechanism is what contemporary biologists mean when they 
use the word ‘mechanism’. This is why mechanismic philosophers focus exclusively 
on this sense of the term, and why most of them would not recognize alleged machine 
mechanisms like cells and organisms as ‘mechanisms’. 
 
The reason for Glennan’s apparent unconcern regarding the lack of correlation 
between his conception of ‘mechanism’ and the way the term is actually used by most 
biologists is that his ‘mechanism’ account is not primarily motivated by an interest in 
scientific practice (like MDC and others), but by a concern with the nature of 
causation. Indeed, in his 1996 paper Glennan sets out to address Hume’s sceptical 
challenge regarding the connection between cause and effect by suggesting that 
‘mechanisms’ could provide a plausible metaphysics of causation. Glennan proposes 
that events are causally related if there is a ‘mechanism’ that connects them, and he 
uses this conception of ‘mechanism’ to develop a mechanical view of explanation 
(Glennan, 2002). In doing so, Glennan builds on Wesley Salmon’s (1984) account of 
causal-mechanical explanation, which was itself an elaboration of Peter Railton’s 
(1978) deductive-nomological model of probabilistic explanation, in which the term 
‘mechanism’ was introduced into the philosophical literature on explanation (Glennan 
2002, p. S343). Interestingly, this earlier work on ‘mechanisms’, unlike the more 
recent biologically-inspired mechanismic discourse, does actually show some clear 
links with mechanicism. Railton (1978) says the following regarding his mechanistic 
orientation:  
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The goal of understanding the world is a theoretical goal, and if the world is a machine—
a vast arrangement of nomic connections—then our theory ought to give us some insight 
into the structure and workings of the mechanism [i.e., machine mechanism], above and 
beyond the capability of predicting and controlling its outcomes. (Railton, 1978, p. 208) 
 
This conception of the world as a machine mechanism, as well as the stated desire to 
understand, predict, and control it, are all characteristic attributes of mechanistic 
philosophy. Along similar lines, Glennan (1996) points out that his account of 
‘mechanisms’ is “largely inspired by the insights of the Mechanical philosophers’ of 
the seventeenth century” (p. 51). Thus, Skipper and Millstein’s (2005) banner of ‘the 
new mechanistic philosophy’ would have been far more appropriate if it had been 
used to refer to this literature on ‘mechanisms’, rather than to the recent examinations 
of causal mechanisms in biology, which on the whole bear little connection to the 
original motivations of this earlier work in the philosophy of science. Darden’s (2008) 
latest appraisal of the mechanismic program makes this explicit when she clarifies 
that “work on mechanisms in biology originated (primarily) not as a response to past 
work in philosophy of science but from consideration of the work of biologists 
themselves” (Darden, 2008, p. 958).  
 
Overall, it is clear that the mechanismic program must be regarded as being 
completely independent from mechanicism (both as a general doctrine and 
specifically as it applies to biology). Indeed, we have seen how leading mechanismic 
philosophers like Craver and Darden reject some of the core tenets of mechanicism, 
such as the reducibility of biology to physics and chemistry, and the exclusive 
reliance on strictly reductionistic explanations. Demarcating the mechanismic 
program from mechanicism is crucial, as the failure to do so results in problematic 
analyses of causal mechanisms in contemporary biology. The most prominent 
example of this, in my view, is found in some of Bechtel’s recent work. Whereas most 
mechanismic philosophers are rather cautious in their use of history when discussing 
causal mechanisms, emphasizing the importance of historical context and drawing on 
relatively recent case studies when illustrating their claims, Bechtel has traced the 
appeal to ‘mechanisms’ in scientific explanation not just to Descartes in the 
seventeenth century, but all the way back to the Ancient Greek atomists of the fifth 
century BCE (2006, pp. 20-21; 2008, p. 10). But instead of examining how the 
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meaning of ‘mechanism’ has developed over time (as Ruse (2005) does, and as I have 
attempted to do in Section 4.3), Bechtel takes the modern sense of ‘mechanism’ as 
causal mechanism as his starting point and then simply projects it back in history. As 
a result, his historical discussions conflate the distinctive appeal to machine 
mechanisms by mechanistic biologists with the almost ubiquitous appeal to causal 
mechanisms by biologists today (e.g., Bechtel, 2006; ch. 2; Bechtel, 2007). 
Understanding the term ‘mechanism’ in the causal mechanism sense, Bechtel 
complains that critics of mechanistic biology commit a grave mistake in assimilating 
the notion of ‘mechanism’ to that of machine (e.g., Bechtel, 2008, p. 2), not realizing 
that the very reason for this is that when mechanists speak of ‘mechanisms’, machines 
(i.e., machine mechanisms) is precisely what they have in mind.39 
 
The striking thing is that Bechtel, just like Craver and Darden, actually rejects central 
tenets of mechanistic biology, such as the exclusive reliance on reductionistic 
explanations (e.g., Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2008), and the privileging of the material 
and efficient causes of organisms over their final and formal ones (e.g., Bechtel, 
2007). But, again, instead of distancing himself from mechanicism, Bechtel seems to 
think that the only way to make sense of the pervasive mechanism-talk in biology 
today is to expand mechanistic biology accordingly, not realizing that the appeal to 
‘mechanisms’ in scientific practice no longer commits one to mechanicism (as 
‘mechanism’ is now generally employed in the causal mechanism sense). This leads 
Bechtel to formulate a highly idiosyncratic conception of mechanistic biology, so 
general and inclusive that none of the distinctive ontological and epistemological 
commitments that tend to be associated with it are relevant. Instead, all that appears to 
qualify a biologist as a ‘mechanist’ is that she appeals to ‘mechanisms’ in her 
research. Similarly, all that qualifies an explanation as ‘mechanistic’ is that a 
‘mechanism’ is featured in it, regardless of the way in which this concept is used.
40
  
 
                                                     
39
 This is as true for seventeenth-century mechanists like Descartes as it is for twentieth-century 
mechanists like Loeb. 
40
 Much more could be said regarding Bechtel’s questionable reconstruction of mechanistic biology, 
such as the way in which he appropriates classic anti-mechanistic ideas like self-organization for the 
mechanists (e.g., Bechtel, 2007) despite the fact that the concept of self-organization was actually 
coined by Immanuel Kant in order to argue that organisms are fundamentally different from machines 
and thus cannot be explained in mechanistic terms. However, an elaborate critical examination of 
Bechtel’s historical claims would take me beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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I can think of two reasons for Bechtel’s misrepresentation of mechanistic biology. The 
first is that his earlier work with Robert Richardson (1993) was in fact concerned with 
the nature of mechanistic explanations (specifically with the strategies of 
decomposition and localization that are often featured in them).
41
 So in the wake of 
the influence of MDC’s (2000) account of causal mechanisms, Bechtel might have 
felt it natural to bridge his earlier discussion of mechanistic biology with an 
examination of causal mechanisms, since, after all, the concept of ‘mechanism’ is 
central to both discourses. Still, the main reason for Bechtel’s misrepresentation is 
that he does not realize that the concept of ‘mechanism’ has more than one meaning. 
It is because he conflates the notions of machine mechanism and causal mechanism 
that he also conflates mechanicism with the mechanismic program (e.g., Bechtel, 
2006, ch. 2; 2008, ch. 1).  
 
Nevertheless, the misrepresentation of mechanistic biology is not the only, or even the 
main, problem that results from the conflation of causal mechanisms and machine 
mechanisms. The most serious consequence of not distinguishing these notions is that 
causal mechanisms become inappropriately endowed with the ontic status of machine 
mechanisms. This ontologization of causal mechanisms is very widespread in 
mechanismic philosophy, and in the next section I will discuss some of the problems 
which stem from it. 
 
4.5. Problems Resulting from the Ontologization of Causal Mechanisms 
 
Mechanismic philosophers tend to conceive causal mechanisms as real things in the 
world existing independently from our conceptualization of them. However, based on 
the role they play in scientific practice, I want to suggest that causal mechanisms are 
better understood as heuristic models that facilitate the explanation of phenomena. 
The fact that the overwhelming majority of mechanismic philosophers speak of them 
as “real systems in nature” (Bechtel, 2006, p. 33) I attribute to an inadvertent 
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 The fact that Bechtel and Richardson (1993) are interested in mechanistic explanations (relating to 
machine mechanisms) as opposed to mechanismic explanations (relating to causal mechanisms) is 
evidenced by their assertion that “By calling the explanations mechanistic, we are highlighting the fact 
that they treat the systems as producing a certain behavior in a manner analogous to that of machines 
developed through human technology” (p. 17, my emphasis). Indeed, their analysis of mechanistic 
explanation begins with a characterization of machines, not of mechanisms. However, in his more 
recent work Bechtel readily describes as ‘mechanistic’ not just the distinctive appeal to machine 
mechanisms by mechanists, but also the general appeal to causal mechanisms in scientific practice. 
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transposition of the ontic status of machine mechanisms (the original sense in which 
‘mechanism’ was used) to the notion of causal mechanism (the standard meaning of 
‘mechanism’ in biology today). This ontologization of causal mechanisms often 
results in a conception of them as autonomous complex systems (analogous in many 
respects to machine mechanisms) which constitute and operate within the organism 
(e.g., Glennan, 2002; Bechtel, 2007). I maintain that this ontic conception of causal 
mechanisms is problematic, and I will illustrate this claim by examining what are 
perhaps the two most distinctive characteristics of causal mechanisms in biology: 
function and organization (cf. McKay and Williamson, 2010). 
 
4.5.1 Function 
 
The operation of a causal process described in a causal mechanism produces a 
particular phenomenon which serves to individuate and causally relate the entities and 
activities that are responsible for it. In biology, the phenomenon produced by the 
causal process described in a causal mechanism usually enables the fulfilment of a 
function, so that specifying the causal mechanism for a function explains how this 
function is causally brought about. The problem of conceiving causal mechanisms as 
autonomous complex systems is that it overlooks the conditions that actually enable 
the functions of these systems to be carried out, as well as the true biological 
significance of those functions. 
 
A living organism is an organized network of processes of production, transformation, 
and regeneration of components that continuously realizes itself by means of the 
coordinated orchestration of the components that make it up (see Maturana and 
Varela, 1980). In this way, the organism constitutes an integrated whole which 
maintains its identity through time by regulating, repairing, and reproducing its 
component parts. These parts stand in a relation of collective interdependence, as 
every one of them is necessary for the generation and operation of every other. Thus 
the attribution of functions to the parts of an organism is dictated by the means in 
which each part individually contributes to the maintenance and organization of all 
other parts and hence to the organism as a whole (McLaughlin, 2001; Mossio et al., 
2009). This means that the function of all suborganismal systems and processes 
featured in causal mechanisms is ultimately that of preserving the intrinsically 
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purposive self-organization of the whole organism. As a result, these functions reveal 
a great deal about how the organism satisfies its needs and copes with its surroundings.   
 
The notion of autonomous causal mechanisms operating within the organism is, I 
suggest, nothing more than a pragmatic idealization that biologists appeal to in order 
to narrow their focus on the particular parts of the organism they happen to be 
investigating. This heuristic fragmentation of the organism into causal mechanisms, 
despite being necessary for its investigation, often comes at the expense of neglecting 
the way in which the organism as a whole influences the behaviour of its parts. In 
mechanismic accounts, the conception of causal mechanisms as real autonomous 
subsystems neglects the fact that in order to make appropriate biological sense of the 
subsystems’ functions, these subsystems need to be framed within a set of background 
conditions, that is, the organismal context, that enables them to carry out their 
functions in the first place.
42
  
 
Craver (2007, p. 122) indicates that “The core normative requirement on mechanistic 
[i.e., mechanismic] explanations is that they must fully account for the explanandum 
phenomena”. That is, “Good explanations account for all of the features of a 
phenomenon rather than a subset” (ibid., p. 161). This means that mechanismic 
explanations that do not include an account of the organismal context that enables the 
production of the explanandum phenomenon (or function) are, on Craver’s terms, 
necessarily incomplete. This is problematic as actual scientific practice reveals that 
mechanismic explanations are seldom exhaustive catalogues of all the causal relations 
necessary for the production of phenomena, such as the enabling conditions provided 
by the organism as a whole. Rather, mechanismic explanations tend to specify only 
those features of the underlying causal networks that biologists deem most relevant 
for manipulating and controlling the phenomena whilst at the same time presupposing 
a great deal of the organismal context that makes them possible. It thus makes more 
sense to view causal mechanisms as idealized spatiotemporal cross-sections of 
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 The problematic transference of mechanistic thinking is particularly pronounced here. Whereas a 
machine mechanism can be broken down into discrete, self-contained parts with clearly-delineated 
output functions without the loss of information, the parts in an organism (ontologized in most accounts 
of causal mechanisms) stand in a relation of collective interdependence and are thus not autonomous in 
any important respect (even if they can be construed as such for the purposes of their investigation). 
Consequently, any explanation of the functions of parts in an organism needs to account not just for the 
parts themselves but also for the organismal context that makes their function possible.  
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organisms that heuristically pick out certain causal features over others in order to 
account for how given functions within the organism are carried out, as these are 
generally the things that biologists describe when they use the term ‘mechanism’ in 
their explanations. 
 
4.5.2. Organization 
 
Mechanismic philosophers frequently emphasize the importance of organization for 
understanding how causal mechanisms account for functions or behaviours. MDC 
(2000, p. 3), for instance, state that “The organization of entities and activities 
determines the ways in which they produce the phenomenon”. Bechtel (2006, p. 26) 
similarly notes that “The orchestrated functioning of the mechanism is responsible for 
one or more phenomena”. The problem is that mechanismic philosophers do not 
actually explain how the entities and activities in a mechanism are organized, only 
that they are organized. MDC point out that “Entities often must be appropriately 
located, structured, and oriented, and the activities in which they engage must have a 
temporal order, rate, and duration” (p. 3) but say nothing about the means by which 
these crucial organizational requirements are actually met in living organisms. 
Instead, what discussions of organization in the mechanismic literature essentially 
amount to is the plain assertion that ‘organization matters’ (e.g., Craver, 2007, pp. 
134-139). 
 
Still, if causal mechanisms are to be conceived ontically as real suborganismal 
systems (rather than epistemically as idealized models of those subsystems, as I 
suggest) then just paying lip service to the fact that these subsystems are organized is 
insufficient. To fully account for the explanandum phenomenon (Craver’s normative 
requirement for a good mechanismic explanation) it becomes necessary not just to 
specify, but also to explain how this organization is generated and maintained. The 
problem is that this requires taking the explanation beyond the actual causal 
mechanism to the level of the organism as a whole, given that suborganismal parts do 
not organize themselves but rely on the purposive action of the whole organism for 
their generation, organization, and maintenance. This is rarely understood in 
mechanismic accounts of organization. For example, when Craver (2007) indicates 
that a “mechanism might compensate for the loss of a part by recovering (healing the 
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part), by making new use of other parts, or by reorganizing the remaining parts” (p. 
148), he inappropriately attributes actions to an ontologized causal mechanism that 
are actually performed by the organism which contains it.
43
  
 
As I argued in my discussion of function, one of the advantages of understanding 
causal mechanisms as idealized models of suborganismal causal processes rather than 
as real things is that a satisfactory mechanismic explanation need not include an 
account of how the target system is actually organized by the organism even if this 
organization is strictly speaking necessary for the system to causally bring about the 
phenomenon. This is more in accordance with scientific practice, in which causal 
mechanisms tend to pragmatically abstract away the organismal context and only 
specify the causal features that are taken to be most relevant for controlling and 
manipulating the phenomena being investigated. In the next section, I will elaborate 
my epistemic account of causal mechanisms, indicating the further advantages of this 
view over the ontic conception that most mechanismic philosophers favour. 
 
4.6. Defending an Epistemic Conception of Causal Mechanisms 
 
It is important to keep in mind that the causal mechanism sense of ‘mechanism’ was 
not conceptually developed by philosophers and then applied to scientific practice. 
Rather, it arose from scientific practice and it has only recently been philosophically 
reconstructed to make sense of how scientists explain phenomena. Therefore, the 
success of any given philosophical reconstruction of ‘mechanism’ must be measured 
in terms of how well it captures the way this term is used in scientific practice. The 
conception of causal mechanism that I argue best fits biologists’ mechanism-talk is 
that of a contingent explanatory description which heuristically abstracts away the 
complexity of a living system sufficiently to describe some localized causal process 
which leads to the realization of some function within that system. That is, causal 
mechanisms are epistemic models which facilitate the explanation of how phenomena 
are causally brought about. It is worth pointing out that although most mechanismic 
                                                     
43
 Not only does Craver (or Darden or Bechtel) not refer to the influence of the whole organism in 
explaining how the causal processes instantiated by causal mechanisms achieve and maintain their 
organization, but there is reason to believe that mechanismic explanations, by virtue of their nature, 
simply cannot accommodate organismal organization, given that mechanismic explanations are, in 
Craver’s words, “anchored in components” (Craver, 2007, p. 138), and an organism’s self-organization 
is a higher-level phenomenon that is not explainable by attending to the properties of component parts. 
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philosophers claim to uphold an ontic view of causal mechanisms, much of what they 
say is actually perfectly compatible with an epistemic conception. In fact, it is not 
difficult to find examples in the mechanismic literature in which ontically-construed 
causal mechanisms are conflated with their epistemic representations, as I will show 
in a moment. This ambiguity, I suggest, is the result of the tension which arises from 
inappropriately transposing the ontic status of machine mechanisms onto causal 
mechanisms on the one hand, and paying close attention to the role that mechanism-
talk actually plays in scientific practice on the other.  
 
When scientists inquire about the ‘the mechanism for P’ (where P is the phenomenon 
of interest), the term ‘mechanism’ does not refer to that which is explained but rather 
to that which does the explaining. Craver (2007) acknowledges this when he specifies 
that “The explanans is a mechanism” (p. 139) and the phenomenon of interest is the 
explanandum (p. 6).44 In this way, specifying a causal mechanism for a phenomenon 
implies providing an explanation for it. As MDC indicate, “Mechanisms are sought to 
explain how a phenomenon comes about or how some significant process works” 
(2000, p. 2, my emphasis). One of the implications of the epistemic account of causal 
mechanisms is that it is no longer necessary to postulate additional epistemic notions 
like ‘mechanism sketch’ and ‘mechanism schema’ to make sense of mechanismic 
explanations. Depending on the degree of abstraction, causal mechanisms may 
constitute what mechanismic philosophers call ‘sketches’, ‘schemas’, or 
‘mechanisms’. This is tacitly conceded by Craver when he indicates that progress in 
formulating a successful mechanismic explanation “involves movement […] along the 
sketch-schema-mechanism axis” (Craver, 2007, p. 114).  
 
Moreover, the very characterizations of causal mechanisms that mechanismic 
philosophers propose are in fact perfectly compatible with an epistemic account of 
causal mechanisms. According to the epistemic view, causal mechanisms constitute 
idealized representations of causal processes. These causal processes are abstracted 
temporally and spatially. Temporally, a causal mechanism delimits the causal process 
by specifying arbitrary beginning and end points that are selected on pragmatic 
grounds. MDC (2000, p. 11) explicitly recognize that the set-up and termination 
                                                     
44
 Thus, mechanismic explanations should be understood not as explanations of causal mechanisms, but 
as explanations given in terms of causal mechanisms. 
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conditions of causal mechanisms are “idealized states”, and Darden has reiterated this 
point on several occasions, noting that the beginning and end points of causal 
mechanisms are “more or less arbitrarily chosen” (2007, p. 141; see also Torres, 2009, 
p. 240, fn. 10). So although MDC purport to defend an ontic conception of causal 
mechanisms, they actually characterize them in terms of epistemically-selected 
beginning and end points.  
 
Causal mechanisms are also abstracted spatially, according to the epistemic view, as 
they can only capture certain ontic features of reality at the expense of neglecting 
others. What gets represented and what is omitted in a causal mechanism is dictated 
by the nature of the explanandum phenomenon. Craver (2007, pp. 139-160) reaches 
this same conclusion when he considers the normative requirements that determine 
whether or not something is included as part of a causal mechanism, asserting 
repeatedly that the delimitation of causal mechanisms can only occur in the context of 
explanation. That is, components, activities, and organizational features are part of the 
causal mechanism for P (where P is the phenomenon of interest), if and only if they 
are relevant to the explanation of P. The act of individuating the causal mechanism for 
P is thus the act of determining what aspects are causally relevant to the explanation 
of P. The delimitation of causal mechanisms hence “depend[s] on the 
epistemologically prior delineation of relevance boundaries” (Craver, 2007, p. 144).  
 
This view of causal mechanisms significantly departs from the conception of them as 
autonomous complex systems (defended by Glennan, Bechtel, and at times by Craver 
himself, as I showed in Section 4.5), given that the parts of a causal mechanism do not 
even need to be structurally correlated.
45
 All that matters is that they are causally 
relevant to the production of the explanandum phenomenon. Craver fleshes out this 
notion of causal relevance by appealing to James Woodward’s (2003) manipulability 
theory of causation. In this way, a part is causally relevant to the phenomenon 
produced by a causal mechanism if one can modify the production of this 
phenomenon by manipulating the behaviour of the part, and one can modify the 
behaviour of the part by manipulating the production of the phenomenon by the causal 
mechanism. 
                                                     
45
 Indeed, Craver acknowledges that causal mechanisms “frequently transgress compartmental 
boundaries” (Craver, 2007, p. 141), and “are often spatially quite distributed” or “tightly interwoven 
into their systematic context” (ibid., fn. 23, p. 143). 
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Although Craver’s account of explanatory relevance is compatible with both an ontic 
and an epistemic conception of causal mechanisms, there do not appear to be any 
obvious reasons for favouring the former over the latter view; if anything, the latter 
view seems more reasonable. Explanations always presuppose a context that specifies 
what is to be explained and how much detail will suffice for a satisfying answer, and 
Craver recognizes that it is this very epistemic context that determines how causal 
mechanisms are individuated and what details are featured in them. The crucial 
requirement of any causal mechanism, according to Craver’s account, is that it must 
capture the underlying causal relationships of the target system in such a way that it 
exhibits the necessary resources for explaining how the target system will behave as a 
result of interventions and manipulations of its parts. An epistemic view of causal 
mechanisms fulfils this requirement.  
 
It may be helpful to illustrate these claims with an example. Consider the causal 
mechanism for the membrane trafficking of the delta-opoioid receptor (DOR) induced 
by pain stimulation, shown in Figure 8 (adapted from Bie and Pan, 2007). This causal 
mechanism exhibits all of the features I have discussed. It is a step-by-step 
explanation of the mode of operation of the signal transduction pathway induced by 
pain stimulation that triggers the intracellular activation of DOR, which results in 
effective pain relief. The causal mechanism is abstracted both temporally and 
spatially. Temporally, it abstracts the continuous life-cycle of DOR into a series of 
discrete idealized stages, which are numbered in the causal mechanism. Spatially, 
although the whole cell is depicted, only the features that are causally relevant to the 
membrane trafficking of DOR (i.e., the explanandum phenomenon) are represented in 
the causal mechanism. If we happened to be interested in explaining any other cellular 
phenomenon, a different yet partially-overlapping set of features would be included in 
the causal mechanism. Moreover, the organismal context (in this case, the cell) is 
abstracted away and yet it is heavily presupposed, as it provides the enabling 
conditions that are ultimately necessary for the membrane trafficking of DOR. 
Finally, the causal mechanism constitutes a model of a particular cross-section of a 
cell that provides the necessary resources for anticipating how interventions and 
manipulations of any of the causally relevant parts within the cell and any of the 
successive stages of the described process will affect the membrane trafficking of 
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Figure 8. Causal mechanism of the Membrane Trafficking of the Delta-Opioid 
Receptor (DOR) Upon agonist binding (1), DOR is phosphorylated by GRK (2). It then 
binds to proteins AP-2 and arrestin (3), and undergoes the process of internalization via 
endocytosis (4). Once internalized, the receptor is sorted and targeted either to endosomes 
via the recycling pathway (5) for membrane insertion, or to lysosomes for degradation via 
the degradation pathway (6). DOR is synthesized in the endoplasmic reticulum (7), and 
transported to the trans-Golgi network (8), becoming a mature receptor which is targeted in 
dense-core vesicles (9), ready for membrane trafficking and insertion. Chronic pain 
stimulation activates receptors (10) and increases intracellular calcium concentration, 
inducing the membrane trafficking of DOR.  
DOR. In this way, this causal mechanism serves the heuristic purpose of aiding the 
physiological and pharmacological investigation of pain relief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So far in this section, I have advanced my defence of an epistemic view of causal 
mechanisms by showing how the key features of causal mechanisms that mechanismic 
philosophers deem most important are not only not incompatible with the epistemic 
account I propose, but actually provide support for it. Still, the compatibility of the 
central claims of mechanismic philosophy with an epistemic conception of causal 
mechanisms does not constitute the main incentive for adopting it. The major reason 
for defending an epistemic account, as I will argue in the remainder of this section, is 
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that it captures the meaning of biologists’ mechanism-talk in ways that are simply 
beyond the reach of any ontic conception of causal mechanism.  
 
Causal mechanisms are invoked to explain an extremely wide range of phenomena. 
As Allen (2005, p. 264) indicates, causal mechanism “can refer to very specific 
processes, such as the nucleophilic attack by the reactive group of an enzyme on an 
exposed covalent bond of its substrate, or to a whole category of reactions such as cell 
signal responses due to protein kinase A (PKA) second messengers”. As the 
postulation of causal mechanisms has become a virtually ubiquitous practice in 
biological research, it is practically impossible to define what a causal mechanism is 
in a way that meaningfully captures all the different uses of this concept, given that 
the conditions of satisfaction for what counts as a causal mechanism are determined 
by the context in which it is postulated, as well as on the kind of questions that are 
asked of the explanandum phenomenon. If, as I suggest, the notion of causal 
mechanism is understood epistemically, then it can be characterized as an explanation 
where the explanans and explanandum are sorted out from the context of its 
formulation. However, if causal mechanisms are conceived as “real systems in nature” 
(Bechtel, 2006, p. 33), it becomes exceedingly difficult to specify exactly what these 
‘systems’ actually are and what they have in common.  
 
Paradoxically, this problem stems from the mechanismic program’s desire to closely 
adhere to scientific practice, given that as long as it remains “faithful to biologists’ 
own usages” of ‘mechanism’ (Darden, 2007, p. 142), it cannot fulfil its objective of 
ontically characterizing this notion in a concrete and unified manner. The reason for 
this is that there is a fundamental tension between the degree of concreteness of any 
given ontic characterization of causal mechanism and the breadth of its applicability. 
An ontic definition of causal mechanisms can only increase its applicability at the 
expense of sacrificing the concreteness of its formulation. The only way mechanismic 
philosophers could encompass all the different ways in which the notion of causal 
mechanism is employed in biological research would be to provide an ontic 
characterization so general and so abstract that it would be effectively vacuous.  
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The recent debate concerning the nature of the causal mechanism of natural selection 
provides an instructive illustration of this dilemma. Skipper and Millstein (2005) have 
convincingly argued that none of the existing ontic conceptions of causal mechanism 
successfully captures ‘the mechanism of natural selection’. The causal mechanism of 
natural selection is not a series of parts in a complex system interacting to produce a 
behaviour (á la Glennan), nor is it composed of entities and activities organized to 
produce regular changes (á la MDC), nor is it a structure performing a function in 
virtue of its component parts (á la Bechtel). The different ways in which mechanismic 
philosophers have dealt with this incompatibility is very revealing. Glennan (2005) 
bites the bullet and concludes that “there is no such thing as the mechanism of natural 
selection”. This strategy is problematic because it is at odds with the mechanismic 
commitment to the “details of scientific practice” (MDC, 2002, p. 2), given that 
evolutionary biologists do routinely refer to natural selection as a ‘mechanism’. 
Craver and Darden (2005) instead contemplate “whether the account of mechanism 
should be broadened to allow for stochastic processes and other forms of 
organization” (p. 240). Skipper and Millstein (2005, p. 344) also consider this option 
but decide against it because postulating such a broad conception of causal 
mechanism “may not be desirable if it means sacrificing an understanding of the 
things that make mechanisms distinctive in particular fields, such as molecular 
biology”. This concern aptly illustrates the danger of vacuity which arises from 
formulating exceedingly broad ontic characterizations of causal mechanisms. 
Benjamin Barros (2008) proposes a third solution, which is to formulate various ontic 
characterizations of causal mechanism, among them one which can effectively capture 
the causal mechanism of natural selection. The problem with this strategy is that it 
means giving up the objective of having a unified conception of causal mechanisms 
that can be used to make generalizations regarding the nature of mechanismic 
explanations across biology. In this way, all three of the proposed solutions end up 
being at odds with some objective of the mechanismic program. However, when one 
adopts an epistemic conception of causal mechanisms, the tensions generated by the 
efforts to ontically reconstruct biologists’ mechanism-talk disappear.
46
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 Jaakko Kuorikoski (2009) has recently proposed a sort of compromise between ontic and epistemic 
conceptions of causal mechanisms by formulating two concepts of ‘mechanism’: an ontic one referring 
to componential causal systems (like the causal mechanisms of cell biology), and an epistemic one 
referring to abstract forms of interaction (like the causal mechanism of natural selection). Although I 
am sympathetic towards this sort of reconstruction, I believe that the inherent problems of the ontic 
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Some mechanismic philosophers may object that the thesis that causal mechanisms 
are epistemic rather than ontic can be refuted on the grounds that biologists often 
seem to use ‘mechanism’ to refer to the causal process itself and not just to the 
explanation of it. In response, I would argue that it is important to bear in mind the 
reasons why biologists refer to ‘mechanisms’ in the first place. The conflation of the 
notions of machine mechanism and causal mechanism is once again at the heart of the 
matter. Mechanismic philosophers tend to assume that using the term ‘mechanism’ in 
relation to P (where P is the phenomenon of interest) indicates something distinctive 
about the nature of P that warrants the use of the word ‘mechanism’. Although this 
has indeed been the case in the past when mechanistic biologists systematically 
conceived complex systems like organisms as machine mechanisms, the ubiquitous 
appeal to ‘mechanisms’ by the majority of biologists today is no longer determined by 
a set of prescriptive ontological commitments, as I argued in Section 4.4. Mechanism-
talk in contemporary biology is simply a contingent product of history, or as Haldane 
put it, “a mere matter of custom”. Consequently, the use of the word ‘mechanism’ in 
an ontic sense by some biologists does not demonstrate that causal mechanisms need 
to be understood as real things. The ontic-epistemic dispute concerning the nature of 
causal mechanisms cannot be settled by listing examples of the usage of ‘mechanism’ 
in an ontic or an epistemic sense in the scientific literature, but by considering how 
best to make philosophical sense of the role played by mechanism-talk in scientific 
reasoning and explanation.  
 
4.7. Conclusions: Mechanism-Talk in the Sciences 
 
In this chapter I have showed that the concept of ‘mechanism’ in biology may refer to 
a philosophical thesis about the nature of life and biology (i.e., mechanicism), to the 
structure and inner workings of a machine-like system (i.e., machine mechanism), or 
to an epistemic device which facilitates the explanation of a phenomenon of interest 
(i.e., causal mechanism). For effective philosophical analyses of this concept, causal 
mechanisms need to be explicitly or implicitly distinguished from machine 
mechanisms, and the mechanismic program needs to be clearly demarcated from 
mechanicism. The inadvertent conflation of these meanings or the misapprehension of 
                                                                                                                                                        
account discussed in Section 4.5, together with the broad compatibility of an epistemic view, justifies 
defending a general epistemic conception of causal mechanisms.  
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how they relate to each other (recall Figure 7), results in problematic accounts of the 
role played by mechanism-talk in current scientific practice. I have argued that the 
most serious implication of conflating the various ‘mechanism’ meanings is that 
causal mechanisms become inappropriately endowed with the ontic status of machine 
mechanisms. I have advanced my defence of an epistemic conception of causal 
mechanisms in three stages: I first pointed out the basic problems facing the ontic 
account, I then showed the compatibility of the epistemic account with the central 
claims of the mechanismic program, and finally I indicated the advantages of an 
epistemic over an ontic account in capturing the multitudinous ways in which 
contemporary biologists employ the term ‘mechanism’ in their research.  
 
As the historical and philosophical analysis of the concept of ‘mechanism’ presented 
in this chapter has been confined to biology, it would be interesting to see whether 
similar analyses in other sciences support or conflict with the conclusions I have 
arrived at for biology, such as the thesis that causal mechanisms are actually 
explanations rather than real things. Jeffry Ramsey (2008) has recently examined the 
role of mechanisms in organic chemistry, and one of his main findings is that 
“Organic chemists take mechanisms to be explanations” (p. 976) in the form of 
“inferences based on observational data” (p. 972).
47
 This suggests that the epistemic 
account of causal mechanisms that I have defended here is probably applicable to 
other branches of science outside of biology. Expanding the range of perspectives on 
scientific practice should help provide further insight into the role played by the 
concept of ‘mechanism’ across the sciences. 
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 In fact, the textbook definition of ‘mechanism’ that Ramsey cites in his analysis closely resembles 
the epistemic definition of causal mechanism I offered in Section 4.2. In organic chemistry a 
mechanism “is a specification, by means of a sequence of elementary chemical steps, of the detailed 
process by which a chemical change occurs” (Lowry and Richardson, 1981, p. 174).  
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Chapter 5 
 
BEYOND MECHANICISM: 
BIOLOGICAL ATOMISM AND CELL THEORY 
 
 
 
The principle of autonomy of the anatomical elements can be considered as one 
of the most fruitful in modern physiology. This principle, or under another 
name, this cell theory, is not a vain expression. It has been a mistake to forget it 
when concerned with complex organisms. – Claude Bernard (1878) 
 
5.1. Introduction: Coming to Terms with Cell Theory 
 
Cell theory is generally regarded as one of the central unifying ideas in biology. It is 
widely acclaimed in textbooks as a cornerstone of biological science (e.g., Sharp, 
1921, p. 9; Harold, 2001, p. 17) and, alongside Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution, 
the most important generalization in biology (e.g., Wilson, 1900, p. 1; Webster, 2003; 
p. 9). However, what is interesting is that cell theory is far from being an obvious, 
self-evident truth that is universally accepted among biologists. In fact, ever since it 
was formally enunciated by Matthias Schleiden and Theodor Schwann in 1838 and 
1839, the extent of its applicability, and even its internal coherence, have remained 
the subject of controversy in biology. The main aim of this chapter will be to uncover 
the rationale underlying the major objections that have been waged against cell theory 
since its formulation to the present day. To do so, it will be necessary to identify the 
philosophical foundations upon which cell theory rests. In turn, this will require going 
beyond the ‘official history’ of cell theory, on the grounds that there is, 
philosophically speaking, no direct path connecting Robert Hooke’s first 
microscopical observations of cells in 1665 with Schleiden’s and Schwann’s 
articulation of cell theory 175 years later.  
 
Rather than enumerating the successive recorded observations of cells from Hooke to 
Schleiden and Schwann, it may be instructive to consider the genesis of cell theory by 
examining the epistemological motivations that led to its formulation, as these can 
help situate the subsequent criticisms of the theory in an appropriate philosophical 
context. Of course, there is no single way of accomplishing this. E. S. Russell (1916), 
for instance, explained the development of cell theory and the subsequent challenges 
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to it as an expression of the fundamental biological dispute over the causal primacy of 
form or of function. Georges Canguilhem (2008 [1965]), on the other hand, 
interpreted the history of cell theory as a dialectical battle between two opposing 
representations of the anatomical constitution of organisms: one emphasizing 
continuity, and the other emphasizing discontinuity. And Timothy Lenoir (1982) 
traced the steps that led to Schleiden’s and Schwann’s enunciation of cell theory as 
part of a broader ‘teleomechanical’ research program in biology, which he argued 
arose out of a materialistic interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s teleological conception 
of the organism advanced in his Kritik der Urteilskraft of 1790. 
 
In this chapter, the perspective adopted to make philosophical sense of past and 
present disputes over the legitimacy of cell theory is one I call biological atomism. I 
characterize biological atomism as the doctrine which postulates a basic indivisible 
unit of life and seeks to explain the morphological constitution and physiological 
operation of all living beings in terms of these fundamental units. The activity of a 
living organism is thus conceived as the result of the activities and interactions of its 
elementary constituents, each of which individually already exhibits all the attributes 
proper to life. It is important to distinguish from the outset what I call biological 
atomism from mechanistic efforts to reduce biological entities (e.g., organisms) to 
physicochemical ones (e.g., genes), given that in theories of biological atomism the 
final units of analysis are still living beings in their own right. 
 
By looking at cell theory through the prism of biological atomism, I want to suggest 
that we can reach a better understanding of the ideas which led to its formulation, and 
a fuller appreciation of the rationale underlying the major objections that continue to 
be waged against it. I begin by surveying the major incarnations of biological 
atomism prior to cell theory, and by illustrating the philosophical continuity between 
them (Section 5.2). I will then consider the conceptual development of cell theory 
itself and highlight its atomistic foundations (Section 5.3). Following this, I will 
examine the main criticisms of cell theory, categorizing them according to whether 
they represent efforts to locate the true indivisible unit of life above or below the level 
of the cell (Sections 5.4 and 5.5). I will conclude by reflecting more generally on the 
philosophical value of biological atomism and on its relation to mechanistic biology 
(Section 5.6). 
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5.2. Biological Atomism before Cell Theory 
 
Although atomistic theories of nature were developed by a number of Ancient Greek 
philosophers, such as Leucippus and Democritus, none of them sought to account 
specifically for the constitution of living beings. It is true that Aristotle, in his De 
Partibus Animalum (2001, bk. II, 646a, 10-24), distinguished three degrees of 
composition in animals: the unorganized material composed of the four primitive 
elements (earth, water, air, and fire), the composition of uniform body parts (e.g. 
bone, flesh, fat), and the composition of non-uniform body parts (e.g. face, hands, 
feet). However, this kind of analytical decomposition was not atomistic in the proper 
sense of the term. In order to unearth the genuine roots of biological atomism, one 
must turn to the revival of atomistic conceptions of nature and the popularization of 
corpuscular theories of matter and light in the late seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. 
 
Corpuscles acquired widespread currency as explicative devices in physics largely 
through the work of Sir Isaac Newton. In the rare instances when Newton theorized 
about life, he referred to chemical transformations, especially fermentation, which he 
explained in corpuscular terms (Hall, 1969, p. 18). One of the chief exponents of 
Newtonian natural philosophy in eighteenth-century France was Georges-Louis 
Leclerc de Buffon, and it is to him that we owe the first explicit formulation of an 
atomistic theory of life. Though originally trained in physics and mathematics (he 
published a French translation of Newton’s Method of Fluxions in 1740), Buffon 
made his most important contributions in biology. As a true Newtonian, Buffon 
endorsed the corpuscular conceptions of matter and light, and argued by inference that 
living matter must likewise be corpuscular in nature. In the second volume of his 
Histoire Naturelle (published in 1749), Buffon presented his theory of ‘organic 
molecules’, which stated that organisms are compound assemblages of elementary 
living particles. These biological atoms, common to animals and plants, are primary 
and unalterable, such that the generation and destruction of organisms is in reality the 
result of the association and dissociation of these elementary living beings:  
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The life of the animal or vegetal appears to be nothing more than the result of all the 
actions, all the particular little lives (if I may be allowed to express myself in this way) of 
each one of these active molecules, whose life is primitive and appears to be 
indestructible: we have found these living molecules in all living or vegetating beings: we 
are certain that all these organic molecules are also proper to nutrition and by 
consequence to the reproduction of animals and plants. It is thus not difficult to conceive 
that, when a certain number of these molecules are united, they form a living being: life 
being in each of the parts, it can be in a whole, in any assemblage whatsoever of these 
parts. (Buffon, quoted in Canguilhem, 2008, p. 37)  
 
To explain the confinement of the aggregation of organic molecules in the organism, 
as well as the stable organization of the organic molecules in three-dimensional space, 
Buffon introduced the concept of ‘inner mould’ as a sort of principle of morphological 
constancy. With his theory of organic molecules, Buffon was able to account for a 
number of fundamental biological processes, including heredity, reproduction, and 
development.
48
 Buffon’s friend, the geophysicist Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, 
published a similar atomistic theory in his Vénus physique (published in 1745), 
though the elementary particles of his theory were not just alive but were also 
endowed with psychic properties, such as desire, aversion, and memory (Hall, 1969, 
pp. 18-28). In any event, the idea that living particles are the basic building blocks of 
plants and animals was widely discussed and even generally accepted during much of 
the eighteenth century. For instance, the article on ‘animal economy’ in Diderot’s 
Encyclopédie described the constituents of plants and animals as “living atoms or 
organic molecules” (Diderot, quoted in Grene and Depew, 2004, p. 88).  
 
One of Buffon’s contemporaries, the Swiss physiologist Albrecht von Haller, 
advanced a rather different atomistic theory of the organism—one that persisted in 
various forms well into the nineteenth century: the ‘fibre theory’. Building on earlier 
ideas expounded by Francis Glisson, Nehemiah Grew, and James Keill, Haller 
postulated that the fibre is the elementary unit of all living bodies, famously asserting 
in his Elementa Physiologiae Corporis Humani (published in 1757) that the “fibre is 
                                                     
48
 For example, with regards to heredity, the theory of organic molecules appeared to overcome the 
limitations of the two rival unilateral preformationist theories of animal generation of the time—ovism 
and animalculism—by proposing a bilateral conception of heredity that accounted for the phenomenon 
of hybridization 
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for the physiologist what the line is for the geometer” (Haller, quoted in Toulmin and 
Goodfield, 1962, p. 391). According to Haller, there is only one kind of fibre to form 
all organs. It is the manner in which the fibres are arranged, the texture of the network 
they form, and the quantity of liquid retained by the mesh, that gives each organ its 
distinctive characteristics. Haller conceived fibres as the fundamental units of life, 
arguing that sensibility and irritability, the two sources of all vital activity, are 
themselves properties of the constituent fibres of the body. 
 
At the end of the eighteenth century, the French anatomist Xavier Bichat distanced 
himself from Haller’s fibre theory, and in so doing developed an atomistic theory of 
his own. Bichat argued that the bodily organs “differ, not only in the way in which the 
fibre that forms them is arranged and interwoven, but also, in the very nature of the 
fibre itself; they differ in composition as in tissue” (Jacob, 1973, p. 113). Just as the 
body is composed of various organs, each organ is composed of several interwoven 
tissues, each of which possesses its own distinctive characteristics. But for Bichat 
tissues are not simply the final terms of anatomical analysis; they are the fundamental 
units of structure and function. Like Haller, Bichat identified sensibility and 
contractility (i.e., irritability) as the basic vital properties, but unlike Haller, he located 
these in the tissues rather than in the constituent fibres. Thus for Bichat, each 
individual tissue has individual life. As Claude Bernard would remark years later, 
“Bichat decentralized life and incarnated it in the tissues” (Hall, 1969, p. 129).  
 
A distinctive feature of Bichat’s ‘tissue theory’ in relation to previous forms of 
biological atomism is that the elementary units of his theory are heterogeneous rather 
than homogeneous. Bichat distinguished twenty-one different kinds of tissues, and 
asserted that the particular attributes of an organism are the direct result of the 
different combinations of these tissues. In an explicit recognition of the atomistic 
nature of his theory, in the Anatomie Générale (published in 1801) Bichat compared 
his twenty-one ‘biological elements’ to the thirty-three chemical elements Antoine 
Lavoisier had described in his Traité Élémentaire de Chimie of 1789 (Haigh, 1984, p. 
118). Nevertheless, later anatomists, such as Karl Friedrich Heusinger (who coined 
the term ‘histology’ in 1822), and Philipp Franz von Walther, attempted to further 
reduce the variety of tissues described by Bichat to a single elementary one from 
which all others derived. In 1807 Walther declared that the difference between 
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Bichat’s tissues was only one of degree given that “all tissues contained in the texture 
of the organs of the animal body are formed by the metamorphosis of one and the 
same original tissue”, which he identified as ‘cellular tissue’ (Walther, quoted in 
Jacyna, 1990, p. 165). 
 
References to cellular tissue can already be found in the writings of Haller and other 
eighteenth-century physiologists like Théophile de Bordeu and Johann Friedrich 
Blumenbach, but these authors conceived it as the gelatinous material resulting from 
the association of the body’s constituent fibres, and not as an elementary unit of life in 
its own right (Wilson, 1944, pp. 169-170). In contrast, most of the early nineteenth-
century biologists who theorized about cellular tissue did in fact view it as the primary 
component of all living matter. Jean-Baptiste Lamarck devoted an entire chapter to 
cellular tissue in the second volume of his Philosophie Zoologique (published in 
1809), in which he wrote:  
 
It has been recognized for a long time that the membranes that form the envelopes of the 
brain, of nerves, or vessels of all kinds, of glands, of viscera, of muscles and their fibres, 
and even of the skin of the body are in general the productions of cellular tissue. 
However, it does not appear that anyone has seen in this multitude of harmonizing facts 
anything but the facts themselves; and no one, so far as I know, has yet perceived that 
cellular tissue is the general matrix of all organization, and that without this tissue no 
living body would be able to exist nor could have been formed. (Lamarck, quoted in 
Conklin, 1939, p. 541)  
 
Given assertions like this one, some commentators have argued that Lamarck 
deserves to be credited as one of the forefathers of cell theory (e.g., Gerould, 1922; 
Conklin, 1939; Sapp, 2003). However, this assessment is only correct in as much as 
Lamarck asserted that there is a fundamental indivisible unit of life which forms all 
organisms. But for Lamarck, this elementary unit was not the cell but cellular tissue. 
Consequently, Lamarck is only as much of a precursor of cell theory as the other 
proponents of biological atomism I have considered in this section. One must move 
forward a number of years after Lamarck to find the first attempts to conceptually 
reduce tissues to cells as the basic units of life. One of the earliest to do so was the 
 - 180 - 
botanist P. J. F. Turpin, who in 1826 published a paper with such a long and complete 
title that it can serve as a concise abstract of the novel claims contained within it:  
Observations on the origin and first formation of cellular tissue, on the vesicles 
composing this tissue, considered as distinct individualities having their own vital center 
of vegetation and propagation and destined to form by agglomeration the composite 
individuality of all those plants whose organization is composed of more than one vesicle. 
(Turpin, quoted in Conklin, 1939, p. 541)  
 
Before proceeding to examine the cell theory we need to consider one more 
expression of biological atomism that preceded it, the ‘globule theory’, which despite 
having been the product of flawed microscopical observations nonetheless reflects the 
same atomistic thinking as the other theories I have discussed. Recorded observations 
of ‘globules’ can be traced all the way back to the two seventeenth century Dutch 
pioneers of the microscope, Antonie van Leeuwenhoek and Jan Swammerdam. 
However, it is only with the physiologist Caspar Friedrich Wolff in the eighteenth 
century that we encounter the first formulation of the globule theory. In his Theoria 
Generationis of 1759, Wolff noted that the “constituent particles of which all parts of 
the animal body are composed at their first beginnings, are globules [globuli], which 
always yield to a moderately good microscope.” (Wolff, in Baker, 1948, p. 116) 
Johann Friedrich Meckel was probably the first to discuss the globule theory in a 
textbook of anatomy, published in 1815. In it, Meckel argued that all living matter is 
essentially an agglomeration of elementary globules embedded in a coagulated matrix. 
Still, the most famous account of the globule theory was the one expounded by the 
French zoologist Henri Milne-Edwards, who in 1823 carried out a systematic 
examination of a wide range of animal organs from different species, and concluded 
that they were all made up of globules 1/300 mm. in diameter. (Toulmin and 
Goodfield, 1962, p. 392) 
  
Milne-Edwards’ perfectly uniform globules were almost certainly artefacts of 
observation produced by an optical effect called spherical aberration, caused by poor 
microscopical lenses. In the same way, it is quite likely that many of the previous 
records of observed globules were also the unfortunate result of spherical aberration, 
or of lipoidal droplets produced by inappropriate tissue preparation. Of course, some 
of the globules observed by microscopists may well have been cells or even cell 
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nuclei, but, as Baker (1948, p. 114) concedes, it is extremely difficult for the historian 
to distinguish the occasions on which globules depicted real anatomical structures 
from the times in which they did not. Still, this historiographical limitation need not 
concern us here. What is important for our purposes is the fact that during the 1810s 
and 1820s the globule theory represented a serious theoretical model of tissue 
structure and formation which exerted considerable influence in France and Germany 
(see Pickstone, 1973). Ultimately, the development of the microscope and the 
accumulation of conflicting accounts of globular structure led to the widespread 
rejection of the globule theory. Nevertheless, as Schickore (2009) has recently argued, 
the globule theory should not be regarded as a misguided conception irrelevant to the 
history of cell biology, but rather as a preliminary and tentative atomistic account of 
living matter whose influence and eventual rejection contributed to the consolidation 
of cell theory in the second third of the nineteenth century.  
 
5.3. The Atomistic Foundations of Cell Theory 
 
So far I have reviewed the major episodes in the evolution of atomistic thinking in 
biology up to the first decades of the nineteenth century. I will now show how the 
formulation and conceptual development of cell theory in many ways represented the 
culmination of the search for the biological atom. The cell, just like the organic 
molecule, fibre, tissue, and globule before it, is a notion tailored for the analysis of 
living matter that is meant to capture the ultimate, indivisible unit of life. But whereas 
previous theories of biological atomism had been tentative first approximations to the 
analytic understanding of living structures, cell theory appeared to successfully 
identify the actual minimal units of life and to root all major biological processes in 
the activities and interactions of these units. 
 
I have already mentioned Turpin’s 1826 paper, which sketched what was probably the 
first atomistic conception of the cell in plants.
49
 This same notion was reiterated even 
more clearly and forcefully by the German botanist Franz Meyen in 1830:  
 
                                                     
49
 Around the same time, another Frenchman, Henri Dutrochet, published similar atomistic assertions 
regarding animal cells. However, Dutrochet’s contribution to cell theory is difficult to assess as many 
of his observations of what he called ‘cells’ were most probably of globules (see Wilson, 1947; Baker, 
1948; Pickstone, 1973). 
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Plant cells occur either singly, so that each forms a single individual, as in the case of 
some algae and fungi, or they are united together to form greater or smaller masses, to 
constitute a more highly organized plant. Even in this case each cell forms an 
independent, isolated whole; it nourishes itself, it builds itself up, and elaborates the raw 
nutrient materials which it takes up, into very different substances and structures. (Meyen, 
quoted in Hall, 1969, p. 188)  
 
Meyen elsewhere referred to plant cells as “little plants inside larger ones” and as 
“essential elementary organs of assimilation and construction” (Meyen, quoted in 
Conklin 1939, pp. 541-542). Matthias Schleiden, the co-founder of cell theory, did 
little more than restate in different words Turpin’s and Meyen’s atomistic conceptions 
of plant cells when he asserted, in the oft-quoted passage of his Beiträge zur 
Phytogenesis of 1838, that:  
 
Each cell leads a double life: an independent one, pertaining to its own development 
alone; and another incidental, in so far as it has become an integral part of a plant. It is, 
however, apparent that the vital process of the individual cell must form the very first, 
absolutely indispensible fundamental basis of vegetable physiology and comparative 
physiology. (Schleiden, quoted in Conklin, 1939, p. 543) 
 
The atomistic nature of Schleiden’s conception of plant cells is evident. For 
Schleiden, each constituent cell in a plant is first and foremost an autonomous living 
being. The activity of a plant is conceived as the result of the individual activities of 
each of its constituent cells. In 1837 Schleiden conveyed these ideas to his colleague 
Theodor Schwann, who at once extended them to the animal kingdom. Each cell, 
wrote Schwann, “contains an independent power, a life of its own”. The totality of the 
multicellular organism, plant or animal, “subsists only by means of the reciprocal 
action of the single elementary parts” (Schwann, quoted in Wilson, 1900, p. 58). In 
1839, acknowledging his indebtedness to Schleiden, Schwann formulated the cell 
theory, grounding it on three fundamental principles:  
 
1. All parts of plants and animals are cellular either in organization or in derivation.  
2. Cells are autonomous living units, and although each cell is influenced by its 
neighbours, the life of the whole organism is the product, not the cause, of the life 
of its cellular elements. 
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3. Cells arise inside or near other cells by differentiation of a homogeneous primary 
substance called the cytoblastema in a process analogous to crystallization. 
 
The first principle was promptly corroborated through extensive microscopical studies 
of a wide range of tissues from different species. The second principle, which stressed 
the atomistic nature of the theory, acquired widespread currency and was further 
articulated in the second half of the nineteenth century, as I will show in a moment. 
The third principle, in contrast, was immediately challenged by Schleiden’s and 
Schwann’s contemporaries. For one thing, observations of cell division had already 
been reported by a number of authors before them, including Turpin (in 1826), B. C. 
J. Dumortier (in 1832), Hugo von Mohl (in 1837), and Meyen (in 1838). In the 1840s 
and 1850s, more detailed investigations, particularly those carried out by Robert 
Remak on the early developmental stages of the chick embryo, ultimately confirmed 
that cell division is not just the main, but the only way in which new cells are formed. 
This led to the rejection of Schleiden’s and Schwann’s conception of free cell 
formation, which Remak deemed “just as improbable as the spontaneous generation 
of organisms” (Remak, quoted in Mendelsohn, 2003, p. 16).  
 
The new principle of cell formation was further generalized by the pathologist Rudolf 
Virchow, who in 1855 proclaimed that just as an animal can only proceed from an 
animal and a plant from a plant, wherever a cell may originate another cell must pre-
exist to give rise to it, immortalizing this assertion with the Latin dictum “omnis 
cellula e cellula”—that is, every cell from a cell (Virchow, quoted in Baker, 1952, p. 
436). A few years later, Virchow published his seminal Die Cellularpathologie based 
on a series of lectures delivered at the University of Berlin, in which he updated 
Schleiden’s and Schwann’s cell theory and gave it a formulation which remained 
highly influential in subsequent decades (Sapp, 2003, p. 78). With Virchow, the 
atomistic connotations of cell theory became even more conspicuous. Cells are not 
just the minimal indivisible units of physiological activity, but they are also the seats 
of disease. The disciplines of physiology and pathology in the hands of Virchow 
became unified by the cell as their common elementary unit (Coleman, 1977, pp. 32-
33). 
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By the end of the nineteenth century, the atomistic dimension of cell theory had 
become its single most distinctive feature. In 1893, the German zoologist Oscar 
Hertwig provided the following characterization of cell theory:  
 
Animals and plants, so diverse in their external appearance, agree in the fundamental 
nature of their anatomical construction; for both are composed of similar elementary 
units, which are generally only perceptible under the microscope. Through the influence 
of an old theory, now discarded, these units are called cells, and thus the doctrine that 
animals and plants are composed in an accordant manner of very small particles of this 
kind is called the cell-theory […] The common life-process of a composite organism 
appears to be nothing else than the exceedingly complicated result of its numerous and 
diversely-functioning cells. (Hertwig, quoted in Baker, 1948, p. 105)  
 
Two years later, the English anatomist G. C. Bourne offered a similar account of cell 
theory: “The multicellular organism is an aggregate of elementary parts, viz. cells. 
The elementary parts are independent life units. The harmonious interaction of the 
independent life units constitutes the organism. Therefore the multicellular organism 
is a colony” (Bourne, quoted in Reynolds, 2007, p. 83). The twentieth century brought 
enormous empirical advances in every area of cell biology, but the fundamental 
understanding of cell theory has remained largely unchanged. Indeed, through the 
decades one finds that cell theory has been periodically rearticulated by different 
authors in the same atomistic terms. For example, the Austrian theoretical biologist 
Ludwig von Bertalanffy asserted in 1952 that cell theory has morphological, 
embryological, and physiological meanings, and each of them emphasizes the 
theory’s atomistic connotations in its own way:  
 
Morphologically, it means that the cell is the sole building element of the living world, 
and that multicellular elements are aggregates of cells. Embryologically, the development 
of the multicellular organism is resolved into the actions of the individual cells in the 
embryo. Physiologically, the cell is considered to be the elementary unit of function. 
(Bertalanffy, 1952, p. 35)  
 
To sum up, cell theory tells us that the cell is the basic constituent of living matter; it 
is the fundamental unit of structure, function, and disease; it is the primary agent of 
organization; and it is the locus of all major organismic processes, including 
 - 185 - 
metabolism, development, reproduction, and heredity. In short, the cell, as the 
American zoologist Charles Otis Whitman so perceptively noted, “has come to signify 
in the organic world what the atom and molecule signify in the physical world” 
(Whitman, 1893, p. 639).  
 
Having completed my survey of the conceptual development of cell theory through 
the perspective of biological atomism, I will now employ this very same perspective 
to make philosophical sense of the major objections that have been waged against cell 
theory. I will show that all major criticisms of this theory can be understood as 
attempts to relocate the true biological atom away from the cell to a level of 
organization either above or below it. The next two sections will examine each of 
these two kinds of critique in turn. 
 
5.4. The Cell as the Biological Atom: Challenges from Above 
 
One of the most salient consequences of cell theory’s atomistic conception of the cell 
is that ‘organism’ becomes a biological category possessing little ontological weight 
of its own. According to cell theory the organism is the product of its cellular units. It 
is, in effect, a ‘state’ of autonomous living units which operate collectively to 
constitute it (see Reynolds, 2007). The common point of departure for all the 
challenges to cell theory I will consider in this section is a fundamental dissatisfaction 
with this understanding of the organism. In fact, they can all be classified under what 
Whitman (1893) called the “organismal standpoint”, which later became known as the 
“organismal theory” (Ritter, 1919). Organismal theory postulates that it is the whole 
organism, rather than its cells, that represents the primary unit of life and thus the true 
biological atom. The organism is considered to be the cause, not the product, of its 
cellular constitution. Of course, cells are still regarded as important, but without an 
organismal-level perspective, questions of structure, function, and organization cannot 
be adequately addressed. In brief, organismal theory maintains that the biology of the 
organism is not reducible to the biology of its cellular constituents. In what follows, I 
will consider the three main criticisms of cell theory that have been advanced by 
proponents of the organismal theory. 
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5.4.1. Criticisms 
 
- Criticism #1: The organism is not an aggregate of independent living units, but a 
genuine biological individual in its own right 
 
The fact that the organism is cellular in constitution is not contested by the organismal 
theory. What is disputed is the idea that the organism represents an aggregation of 
autonomous living units. Organismal theorists point out that physiology offers ample 
evidence that the organism functions as a fully integrated whole, and not as a 
collection of individual unities. The harmonious organization existing at the 
organismal level cannot be easily explained in terms of the sum of the individual 
activities of the component cells. One can certainly study biological phenomena at the 
cellular level, but one must ultimately interpret the findings of these studies from the 
perspective of the whole organism to fully appreciate their biological significance. 
Therefore, the fact that the organism can be analytically decomposed into its 
constituent parts does not imply that the organism is ontologically reducible to a 
collection of autonomous entities. Even if the organism is constituted of cellular 
subunits, organismal theory maintains that the organism as a whole remains the true 
individual unit of life. 
 
Given the history of biological atomism prior to cell theory, it is probably not that 
surprising to find that this critique of the conception of the organism as an aggregate 
of individuals actually predates the formulation of cell theory by Schleiden and 
Schwann. What is perhaps more surprising is the fact that one of the authors who 
most clearly expressed this criticism, the Romantic biologist Lorenz Oken, is 
sometimes referred to as one of the forefathers of cell theory (e.g., Singer, 1989, p. 
33). In his Die Zeugung (published in 1805), Oken objected to the idea that 
multicellularity entails multi-individuality:  
 
The association of primitive animals in the form of flesh should not be thought of as a 
mechanical joining of one animal to the other, like a pile of sand in which there is no 
other association than an accumulation of numerous grains. No. Just as oxygen and 
hydrogen disappear into water, mercury and sulfur into cinnabar, what occurs here is a 
veritable interpenetration, an interlacing and a unification of all the animalcula. From this 
moment on, they no longer lead their own lives. They are put to the service of the more 
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elevated organism; they work in view of a unique and common function; or rather, they 
carry this function out in realizing themselves. No individuality is spared here; 
individuality is quite simply ruined. But this language is inappropriate: the individualities 
brought together form another individuality; the former are destroyed and the latter only 
appears by their destruction. (Oken, quoted in Canguilhem, 2008, pp. 40-41)  
 
Like many of the biological atomists I have considered, Oken compares the cells in an 
organism to the atoms in a chemical compound; but what is interesting about this 
passage is how Oken uses this analogy to draw the opposite conclusions. Just as the 
atoms of oxygen and hydrogen lose their independent identities when they combine to 
form a molecule of water, living cells fuse their separate individualities when they 
collectively constitute an organism. For Oken, as for all the organismal theorists ever 
since, the organism cannot be regarded as a ‘cell republic’ (as cell theorists like 
Virchow claimed) given that it is already the minimal individual unit of life. Its 
constituent cells should be regarded not as autonomous individuals, but as “organs of 
the organism just as muscles and glands and hearts and eyes and feet are so regarded” 
(Ritter, 1919, p. 191).  
 
- Criticism #2: A unicellular organism is physiologically analogous and 
phylogenetically homologous to a multicellular organism, not to one of its 
constituent cells 
 
Cell theory has important consequences for microbiology, particularly for the study of 
protists (or ‘protozoa’, as they used to be called). Since multicellular organisms are 
conceived as colonies of single-celled individuals which have undergone a 
physiological division of labour, cell theory suggests a direct evolutionary link 
between unicellular beings like protists and multicellular ones like higher plants and 
animals. Specifically, the ‘cell state’ of a multicellular plant or animal is considered to 
be the evolutionary product of the colonial association of single-celled protists. The 
implication of this view, as noted by Max Verworn and Oscar Hertwig at the turn of 
the twentieth century, is that studying protists provides important insights for 
understanding the cells of multicellular organisms, since the former are essentially 
homologous with the latter (Richmond, 1989). 
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The organismal criticism of this viewpoint is grounded on the recognition that since 
multicellular organisms are individuals, rather than communities of individuals, their 
evolutionary origin must be rooted not in the association of many protists but in a 
single polynucleated protist whose parts subsequently evolved specialized functions, 
gradually forming the various tissues and organs of multicellular organisms 
(Sedgwick, 1896). Protists cannot be homologized with somatic cells of multicellular 
organisms because they are already autonomous individuals in their own right. 
Instead, the protist must be morphologically and physiologically compared with the 
multicellular organism as a whole. Indeed, both are individuals with specialized 
internal regions, and both are capable of independent locomotion, feeding, growth, 
reproduction, and regeneration. 
 
One of the most vigorous exponents of this organismal critique was the English 
protistologist Clifford Dobell. Being so convinced of the fundamental and 
irreconcilable differences between protists and the individual cells of plants and 
animals, Dobell refused to accept even the designation ‘unicellular’ to describe 
protists. He argued that these should be referred to as ‘acellular’ organisms (Dobell, 
1911). This acellular conception of protists exerted a considerable degree of influence 
during the first half of the twentieth century, but it has become largely marginal in the 
present day (see Corliss, 1989). The reason for this seems to be that Dobell’s 
objection to use the term ‘cell’ in relation to protists was based on the rather odd 
assumption that a cell by definition is always a part of an organism and never a whole 
organism. This understanding of ‘cell’ stems from the fact that this concept was first 
used in relation to the component cells of higher plants and animals, and that 
consequently when it began to be used in relation to protists, it carried with it 
inappropriate connotations of parthood which obscured the protists’ individuality as 
autonomous organisms. However, it is difficult to think of a good reason why the 
concept of ‘cell’ should be restricted in its usage in the manner that Dobell prescribed, 
which is probably why the term ‘acellular’ gradually lost its currency.  
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- Criticism #3: Multicellularity is the product, not the cause, of the organism’s 
development 
 
In no area of biological inquiry have the atomistic presuppositions of cell theory been 
more hotly contested than in developmental biology. The implications of cell theory 
for the understanding of embryological development have spawned a wide array of 
dissenting voices. The disagreements again centre on the problematic relationship 
between cell and organism. According to cell theory, cells assemble the organism 
from the bottom up. In the words of Schwann, “the individual cells so operate 
together in a manner unknown to us as to produce a harmonious whole” (Schwann, 
quoted in Weiss, 1940, p. 38). As the multicellular organism is a community of 
interacting and mutually dependent individuals, development consists of a sequential 
multiplication of individualities resulting from the successive cell divisions of a 
primordial individual, the egg. 
 
The point of departure for the organismal critique of this viewpoint is the contention 
that the process of development has no effect on an organism’s individuality. Before 
cellular segmentation, the egg is a whole organism; after segmentation, it is the same 
whole organism, only more differentiated. The egg is an integrated whole within 
which parts gradually arise through cell division. At no time do the cells constitute 
independent units, since from the very beginning they are subordinated to the growth 
of the organism as a whole. From the perspective of organismal theory, 
multicellularity is not achieved by the coordinated aggregation of cells but by the 
secondary chambering of the organism into cellular subunits.  
 
This understanding of the attainment of multicellularity has important ramifications, 
as it implies that cells, far from being the elementary individuals described by cell 
theory, are effectively nothing more than internal subdivisions within the organism. In 
the course of the organism’s development, cells are fashioned according to their 
context within the developing whole. The generation of biological form (i.e., 
morphogenesis) operates above the level of individual cells, and is thus a strictly 
organismal phenomenon. This idea is effectively captured by Anton de Bary’s famous 
aphorism that it is not the cells that form the plant, but rather the plant that forms the 
cells (cf. Barlow, 1982). Instead of being the source of morphogenesis, cells are 
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merely markers of growth. This was essentially the point made by T. H. Huxley in his 
review of cell theory of 1855, in which he poetically declared that cells “are no more 
the producers of the vital phenomena than the shells scattered in orderly lines along 
the sea-beach are the instruments by which the gravitative force of the moon acts 
upon the ocean. Like these, the cells mark only where the vital tides have been, and 
how they have acted” (Huxley, in Richmond 2000, p. 272). 
 
Many of these ideas were brought together and further developed in Whitman’s 
classic paper, ‘The Inadequacy of the Cell-Theory of Development’. Arguing from the 
organismal standpoint, Whitman asserted that the growth and differentiation of the 
developing embryo occurs “regardless of the way it is cut up into cells” (Whitman, 
1893, p. 644). Whether as a single-celled egg or as a multicellular adult, the organism 
maintains its individuality independently of the number of cells present. This 
argument represents an important challenge to the atomistic assumptions of cell 
theory, as the number of cells composing an organism is deemed to be largely 
irrelevant for the understanding of the organism’s form and organization. 
 
A number of developmental studies conducted in the twentieth century provided 
further support for Whitman’s criticisms. One example I already alluded to in Chapter 
2 is Gerhard Frankhauser experiments on the effects of ploidy on newt development 
(Frankhauser, 1945). Frankhauser found that polyploid embryos, generated by 
suppressing early cleavages, had fewer but larger cells. The number and size of cells 
differed in haploid, diploid, and pentaploid embryos, but the whole embryo remained 
the same size in all cases, enforcing the organismal hypothesis that development is 
more appropriately understood as resulting from the internal partitioning of an 
individual rather than from the agglomeration of a community of cooperating 
individuals, as implied by cell theory. 
 
Contemporary research on plant morphogenesis has also helped to substantiate these 
views. Donald Kaplan and Wolfgang Hagemann (1991) reviewed evidence accrued 
during the preceding thirty years from a broad range of botanical studies and 
concluded that multicellularity in plants is better described by the organismal than by 
the cell theory (cf. Cooke and Lu, 1992). If plant cells were responsible for 
organismal form, one would expect there to be a strict correlation between the pattern 
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of plant cell division and the zones of plant growth. However, what one actually finds 
is that the processes of cell division and growth are causally independent in plants. 
The two processes can occur in various combinations, alternately resulting in 
increases in cell number (cell partitioning) and in growth (surface extension). 
Moreover, alternative patterns of the timing of cell division and growth indicate that 
plant bodies are partitioned by the insertion of walls rather than being built by the 
addition of cells, as suggested by cell theory. Because of this internal partitioning, 
patterns of cell division have no significance for plant morphogenesis, and organs 
with different cell division patterns often converge in form. Overall, the constitution 
of plants seems to demand that considerations of growth, differentiation, and 
morphogenesis at the cellular level be placed in the context of the plant as a whole. 
 
5.4.2. Cell Theory versus Organismal Theory 
 
With the examination of the three main organismal critiques of cell theory now 
complete, what can be concluded regarding the nature of the dispute between cell 
theory and organismal theory? Are the two theories incompatible and mutually 
exclusive? Or do they constitute complementary viewpoints? Can the two theories be 
integrated? Finally, is the underlying conflict between the two theories representative 
of a more fundamental philosophical dispute? In relation to this last question, the 
Austrian embryologist Paul Weiss suggested in 1940 that the conflict in 
developmental biology between what he called the ‘egg-equals-cell’ theory (i.e., cell 
theory) and the ‘egg-equals-organism’ theory (i.e., organismal theory) constitutes a 
modern expression of the age-old antithesis between epigenesis and preformation.
50
 
Weiss argued that both viewpoints are correct since ontogeny is to a certain extent 
epigenetic and to a certain extent preformed. The process of development reveals the 
cell “partly as an active worker and partly as a passive subordinate to powers which 
lie outside of its own competence and control, i.e. supra-cellular powers” (Weiss, 
1940, p. 45). In an attempt to integrate the two theories, Weiss concluded that 
Virchow’s dictum of cell theory, ‘omnis cellula e cellula’, should be complemented 
by its organismal theory counterpart, “omnis organisatio ex organisatione” (p. 46). 
                                                     
50
 Cell theory is epigenetic insofar as it claims that the organism’s organization is arrived at through the 
sequential accumulation of cells, whereas organismal theory is preformationist insofar as it considers 
the organism’s organization to be already present in the egg. 
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More recently, Kaplan (1992) has rejected the possibility of reconciliation between 
cell theory and organismal theory on the grounds that they entail opposite causal 
understandings of the constitution and development of the organism. For Kaplan, 
‘there is no compromise between these two theories’ (ibid., p. S29). Deciding upon 
one of them will determine our epistemic priorities and dictate how we approach the 
study of the organism. If cell theory is correct, then we only need to focus on the 
behaviour of individual cells, not the organism as a whole. Conversely, if the 
organismal theory is correct, the study of the properties of the organism becomes 
more significant than a focus on individual cells. Peter Sitte (1992), however, 
disagrees. In his view, there is no real conflict between the two theories, as both sides 
have convincing arguments in their favour that nowhere contradict each other directly. 
Provided that neither of the two viewpoints is overstated, the two theories may be 
regarded as the result of different starting positions, or different methodological 
preferences, with defenders of cell theory favouring the analytical and experimental 
approaches of cell and molecular biology, and advocates of organismal theory 
generally preferring the more holistic approaches of morphology and embryology. If 
this is the case, it is no longer necessary to view the two theories as contradicting or 
mutually exclusive. 
 
It would appear that current research in plant morphogenesis is advancing steadily 
towards the epistemic integration of cell theory and organismal theory (see Fleming, 
2006). The botanist Hirokazu Tsukaya (2003) has indicated that both viewpoints need 
to be combined in a Weissian manner in order to make sense of plant development. 
He shows that the shape and size of indeterminate organs, such as roots and stems, is 
directly correlated with the shape and size of the cells in these organs, as predicted by 
cell theory, whereas in determinate organs, such as leaves, the number of cells does 
not reflect organ shape or size but is rather determined by the plant as a whole, as 
predicted by organismal theory. In an attempt to bring the two theories together, 
Tsukaya has formulated what he calls the ‘Neo-Cell Theory’, which postulates that 
even though cells are the units of morphogenesis, each cell is also controlled by 
organismal-level compensatory systems that govern the morphogenesis of the organ 
of which the cells are a part. 
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5.5. The Cell as the Biological Atom: Challenges from Below 
 
In addition to the organismal critiques, challenges to the atomism of cell theory have 
also been advanced from the other direction. There are biologists for whom cell 
theory is problematic not because it is excessively atomistic (as argued by the 
organismal theorists), but rather because it is not sufficiently atomistic. For them, the 
biological atoms are located below the cell at a more basic level of organization. Cells 
in this view do not represent the minimal units of life as they can be conceptually 
reduced to even more elementary vital units. 
 
This kind of critique has a long and colourful history. Shortly after Schleiden’s and 
Schwann’s formulation of cell theory, some biologists began to express doubts that 
cells really represented the ultimate indivisible units of life. Already in 1841 the 
German anatomist F. G. J. Henle had suggested that the cell might be composed of 
more fundamental biological units (Wilson, 1900, p. 289). In the second half of the 
nineteenth century, this idea was taken up by a large number of biologists, and a wide 
variety of theories were proposed that sought to identify within the cell more 
fundamental multi-molecular systems exhibiting the basic attributes of life. Many of 
the suggested vital units were deemed to be beyond the resolution of the microscope, 
and were hypothesized in order to account for the particular phenomena biologists 
were interested in explaining (e.g., nutrition, heredity, growth, differentiation, etc.). 
(In this respect, these theories are not that different from some of the earlier 
expressions of biological atomism I discussed in Section 5.2, such as Buffon’s theory 
of ‘organic molecules’.) Examples of this class of biological atoms include Herbert 
Spencer’s ‘physiological units’, Charles Darwin’s ‘gemmules’, Ernst Haeckel’s 
‘plastidules’, Karl Nägeli’s ‘micellae’, Julius Weisner’s ‘plasomes’, Theodor 
Engelmann’s ‘inotagmata’, August Weismann’s ‘biophores’, Hugo de Vries’ 
‘pangenes’, Oscar Hertwig’s ‘idioblasts’, and Charles Whitman’s ‘idiosomes’ (see 
Hall, 1969, pp. 313-354). 
 
With the development of biochemistry at the turn of the twentieth century, many of 
these atomistic theories were abandoned. However, some of them were reinterpreted 
as genetic determinants following the rediscovery of Mendel’s laws of heredity in 
1900. In fact, one can find numerous references to genes as the atoms of biology in 
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the literature on genetics between 1901 and 1930 (see Allen, 2007, pp. 146-152). 
Many early geneticists, such as William Bateson, H. S. Jennings, C. B. Davenport, 
and W. E. Castle, appealed to the analogy between genes and atoms in their work. 
Castle, for instance, asserted that genes “are supposed to be to heredity what atoms 
are to chemistry, the ultimate, indivisible units, which constitute gametes much as 
atoms in combination constitute compounds” (Castle, quoted ibid., p. 147). However, 
this atomistic conception of genes does not quite fit the tradition of biological 
atomism I have been considering in this chapter, as the vast majority of atomistic 
geneticists did not conceive genes as living units in their own right. Rather, the 
assimilation of genes to atoms was based on their ability to combine in different ways 
to produce different phenotypic effects (just as atoms combine in different ways to 
produce different molecules), and on the fact that genes, like atoms, arise out of each 
association unchanged in their fundamental properties. Consequently, it may be more 
appropriate to refer to this mode of thinking in early twentieth-century genetics as 
genetic atomism in order to distinguish it from biological atomism. In biological 
atomism the atoms are the units of life, whereas in genetic atomism the atoms are the 
units of heredity. 
 
Interestingly, Richard Dawkins’s famous concept of the ‘selfish gene’ (Dawkins, 
2006 [1976]) appears to stand somewhere in between genetic atomism and biological 
atomism. It is a form of genetic atomism in the sense that Dawkins’s atoms are 
physicochemical replicators, which act both as the units of heredity and the units of 
selection. However, Dawkins’s conception of organisms as passive receptacles for 
genes, built and blindly programmed by them in order to secure their own 
preservation, presupposes an attribution of agency to genes that is usually associated 
with living beings. In this respect, Dawkins’s concept of the selfish gene bears the 
hallmarks of a theory of biological atomism, and can therefore be regarded as a 
contemporary challenge to the atomism of cell theory from below. In fact, Dawkins is 
quite explicit concerning his atomistic reduction of cells to genes: “Some people use 
the metaphor of a colony, describing a body as a colony of cells. I prefer to think of 
the body as a colony of genes, and of the cell as a convenient working unit for the 
chemical industries of genes” (ibid., p. 46). As a theory of biological atomism, 
however, many biologists today find the idea of selfish genes rather objectionable 
given that the view that genes are the primary causal agents of all the phenomena of 
 - 195 - 
organismic life is not well supported by the findings of contemporary biology (see 
Keller, 2000; Morange, 2001; Moss, 2003). 
 
Leaving genes aside, there are a number of other subcellular theories of biological 
atomism that deserve attention. Returning to the wide array of atomistic theories 
formulated at the end of the nineteenth century, it should be noted that not all of the 
proposed biological atoms were inferred; some actually referred to subcellular 
structures that could be observed through the microscope. One of the most notable 
theories of this kind was formulated by Richard Altmann in 1890. Altmann suggested 
that the small granular bodies visible in the cytoplasm of cells, which he called 
‘bioblasts’, are actually elementary organisms capable of nutrition, growth, and 
division. He argued that all major structural features of the cell—nucleus, 
cytoskeleton, secretion vesicles—are either aggregations of bioblasts or products of 
bioblasts. Altmann was convinced that he had found in the bioblast the true atom of 
life, declaring that it “forms the long-sought morphological unit from which all 
biological considerations originally proceed” (Altmann, quoted in Hall, 1969, p. 340). 
Conceiving cells themselves as colonies of bioblasts, Altmann even reduced 
Virchow’s dictum ‘omnis cellula e cellula’ to its bioblastic equivalent ‘omne 
granulum e granulo’. 
 
From a modern perspective, Altmann’s theory is not as farfetched as it may seem. The 
granular bodies that Altmann identified as bioblasts were renamed ‘mitochondria’ by 
Carl Benda in 1898 (Sapp, 2003, p. 90), and today it is generally accepted that 
mitochondria were originally free-living unicellular organisms that at some point in 
their evolutionary history were engulfed within another unicellular organism. This 
means that Altmann’s conception of bioblasts as subcellular ‘elementary organisms’ 
is quite compatible with our current understanding. In turn, the contemporary 
feasibility of Altmann’s basic conception presents a further challenge to cell theory’s 
view of the cell as the minimal structural unit capable of displaying the attributes 
proper to life, even if it is true that a mitochondrion needs to be contained within a 
cellular host in order to exhibit the characteristics of a living system. 
 
A further difficulty faced by cell theory that I have not yet considered is the fact that 
many organisms are not cellular but are actually supracellular in constitution. There 
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are numerous examples throughout the eukaryotic domain of giant multinucleated 
cells known as coenocytes (formed by the uncoupling of mitosis from cytokinesis) 
and syncytia (formed by cells fusing together). In order to account for these 
phenomena, cell biologists are faced with the following dilemma: they can either shift 
their attention to the whole supracellular body and turn to the organismal theory, or 
they can assume, alongside the theorists I have considered in this section, that the cell 
is itself a composite entity and argue that the real minimal unit of life resides in some 
smaller structure within it. 
 
The first biologist to be prompted to reject cell theory and postulate a subcellular 
biological atom in light of the evidence for the coenocytic and syncytial constitution 
of organisms was the German botanist Julius von Sachs. In 1892, upon examination 
of coenocytic algae, Sachs concluded that a nucleus always organizes the area of 
cytoplasmic space that surrounds it, regardless of whether or not it is enclosed by a 
cell membrane. Sachs called this subcellular system the ‘energide’, and postulated that 
it constitutes the minimal autonomous unit bearing the basic characteristics of life. He 
suggested that single-nucleated cells are ‘monoenergidic’, whereas multinucleated 
coenocytes are ‘polyenergidic’. For Sachs, the cell is of secondary significance, as it 
is essentially a chamber which may contain one or more energides:  
 
[The] Energide is represented by a nucleus associated with its protoplasm in such a way 
that the nucleus and surrounding protoplasm form an organic unit, both from the 
morphological and physiological perspectives […] The term Energide does not 
encompass the cell skin; the case is more that each individual Energide is able to enclose 
itself by a cell skin, or that several Energides together can enclose themselves within one 
single cell skin. (Sachs, quoted in Baluška et al., 2006, p. 5)  
 
After Sachs, the energide theory was all but forgotten for a hundred years. However, 
in 2004 the cell biologists Frantisek Baluška, Dieter Volkmann, and Peter Barlow 
published a paper entitled ‘Eukaryotic Cells and Their Cell Bodies: Cell Theory 
Revised’, which has effectively revived Sachs’s energide theory. These authors have 
proposed the concept of the ‘cell body’ as “the smallest unit of life that is capable of 
self-organization, self-reproduction, and of responsiveness to diverse external stimuli” 
(Baluška et al., 2004a, p. 12). The cell body is characterized as an autonomous 
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subcellular structure consisting of a nucleus and a set of perinuclear radiating 
microtubules. It is complemented by the ‘cell periphery apparatus’, which comprises 
the plasma membrane and the actin cytoskeleton, and which encases the cell body and 
protects it from the external environment.  
 
Baluška et al.’s contention is that the endosymbiotic theory of the evolutionary origin 
of mitochondria and chloroplasts in eukaryotic cells needs to be extended to the 
nucleus as well. They thus suggest that the cell body represents the vestige of a 
tubulin-based ‘guest’ proto-cell, which after penetrating an actin-based ‘host’ proto-
cell became specialized for transcribing, storing and partitioning DNA molecules via 
the organization of microtubules. Similarly, they regard the cell periphery apparatus 
as the vestige of an actin-based ‘host’ proto-cell which became specialized for cell 
body protection, motility, and actin-mediated intercellular signalling. Given these 
assumptions, the ‘cell body versus cell periphery apparatus’ distinction can explain 
the striking duality of eukaryotic cells at the level of genomic organization 
(eubacterial versus archaebacterial features), cytoskeleton (actin versus tubulin), 
membrane flow (exocytosis versus endocytosis), and division (mitosis versus 
cytokinesis). Moreover, the cell body theory can explain the fact that the nucleus–
microtubule complex often divides independently of the cell in which it resides, 
resulting in the coenocytes found in eukaryotes. Likewise, syncytia can also be 
accounted for by assuming that nuclei are vestiges of originally free-living cells. 
 
Overall, the similarities between cell body theory and Sachs’s energide theory are 
obvious. The authors explicitly recognize this in a more recent paper (Baluška et al., 
2006), in which they go as far as to drop their notion of cell body altogether in favour 
of Sachs’s concept of energide, recognizing that “the term Energide better invokes the 
unique properties of this universal unit of supracellular living matter endowed with 
the vital energy” (ibid., p. 1). Baluška et al. confidently predict that their ‘neo-
energide theory’ will ultimately displace cell theory and that the energide “will take 
over from the cell as the fundamental unit of eukaryotic structure”, and as the 
“propagule of life itself” (Baluška et al., 2004b, p. 371). 
 
How plausible are these estimations? Is the energide really a better candidate than the 
cell for the designation of the true atom of life? In reflecting on this question, it 
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appears that compelling arguments can be made both for and against the neo-energide 
theory. The case in favour of the neo-energide theory is grounded on four key 
observations:  
 
1. Whilst energide division often takes place independently of cellular division, the 
opposite situation has never been recorded. This suggests that it is the energide 
and not the cell that constitutes the minimal vital unit capable of self-reproduction.  
2. Whereas cells display an extremely wide range of sizes and different structural 
organizations, energides are basically constant structures, always consisting of 
nucleus sheathed within perinuclear radiating microtubules. This indicates that the 
energide is a more invariable unit of biological structure than the cell. 
3. Energides not only explore the confines of their own cells but can also move to an 
adjacent cell if the connecting channels are sufficiently large. This phenomenon, 
known as cytomixis, is difficult to reconcile with cell theory. 
4. The concept of the energide seems to explain better than the concept of the cell the 
distinct morphology and physiology of coenocytic and syncytial systems. 
 
The case against the neo-energide theory is based on the identification of two crucial 
limitations. The first is that the theory is inherently limited in its applicability to the 
eukaryotic domain. Prokaryotic cells do not possess distinct nuclei and consequently 
cannot be accommodated within this theory. So whereas cell theory can claim almost 
universal applicability, the neo-energide theory is simply irrelevant to the archaeal 
and bacterial domains of life. The second limitation is that the basic premise of the 
theory rests on the assumption that eukaryotic cells originated from the endosymbiotic 
coupling of a ‘guest’ and a ‘host’ cell. The problem is that there is at present no 
consensus regarding the origin of the eukaryotic nucleus. Although some cell 
biologists do support the endosymbiotic hypothesis that the neo-energide theory 
requires, others argue that the nucleus was generated autogenously by a single 
prokaryote through the invagination of its plasma membrane, while a third group 
maintain that viruses were the main catalyzers of the initial formation of the 
eukaryotic nucleus (cf. Pennisi, 2004; Zimmer, 2009; O’Malley, 2010). Consequently, 
the extent to which the neo-energide theory can legitimately be claimed to threaten the 
tenability of cell theory even within the confines of the eukaryotic domain hinges on 
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its ability to validate a particular hypothesis regarding the evolutionary origin of the 
nucleus that is yet to be accepted by the cell biology community as a whole. 
 
5.6. Conclusions: Biological Atoms and Biological Atomism 
 
In this chapter I have proposed an epistemological perspective I have call biological 
atomism in an effort to make sense of the foundations of cell theory, trace its 
philosophical antecedents and historical developments, and understand the rationale 
underlying the major criticisms of it. I have also shown that the idea of biological 
atom can be applied to many other biological units besides the cell. What does this tell 
us about the nature of this concept? What exactly does it refer to? Is it a real thing, a 
theoretical abstraction, or a heuristic device? These questions are of no little 
importance, as their answer can help clarify the conditions that need to be met in order 
to resolve current disputes between rival atomistic theories. Indeed, if biological 
atoms are real things, then we can expect that the accumulation of empirical evidence 
will eventually settle the exact level of organization at which the biological atoms are 
actually located. This seems to be the case in the present dispute between cell theory 
and the neo-energide theory. However, if biological atoms are theoretical abstractions, 
then it is unlikely that proponents of a theory can be persuaded to abandon it in favour 
of another solely on the weight of empirical evidence. In this case, we need to view 
atomistic theories of life more as rationalizations of the beliefs of their authors 
regarding the question of whether or not an organism, or a cell, should consist of more 
elementary vital units. Buffon’s theory of organic molecules, Dobell’s organismal 
rejection of cell theory in protistology, and some of the theories of subcellular atoms 
of the late nineteenth century appear to fit this characterization. Finally, if biological 
atoms are heuristic devices, then it is no longer necessary to regard rival theories as 
mutually exclusive, but simply as having different epistemic emphases. If this is the 
case, complementary theories can be integrated to produce more inclusive viewpoints. 
Tsukaya’s proposal of a synthetic neo-cell theory in response to the conflict between 
cell theory and organismal theory in plants seems to be a good example of this 
strategy. On the whole, it appears that each of these answers is correct under different 
provisions, in which case we may conclude that the meaning of the concept of 
biological atom can only be determined in relation to the particular explanatory 
context in which it is employed. 
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Despite the context-dependent nature of the concept biological atomism, it is 
important to realize that the perspective of biological atomism itself always implies 
the same specific expectation guiding biological research, namely the view that a 
particular element within the organism can be singled out as an independent, 
functional, reproducible, ‘serial’ unit. Of course, these units need not be 
homogeneous. We saw that in the case of Bichat’s tissue theory the heterogeneous 
nature of his biological atoms was a fundamental aspect of his conception of them. 
Similarly, the appeal to atomistic thinking in modern cell biology does not imply an 
epistemic commitment to flattening the differences between types of cells. What it 
does imply is an understanding of the organism as a community of individuals making 
up a higher-level individual in which the cells display both the autonomous properties 
of wholes and the dependent properties of parts. In this way, the perspective of 
biological atomism provides a way out of the longstanding dichotomy between the 
conception of organisms as sums of their parts and the conception of organisms as 
fully integrated wholes. Biological atoms (whatever their nature) assert both their 
individuality as semi-autonomous sub-wholes, and their function as parts which 
collectively associate to produce the greater organismal whole. 
 
The philosophical value of biological atomism can be fleshed out by contrasting it 
with the way mechanistic biology epistemically decomposes living organisms for the 
purposes of explanation. As we have seen in previous chapters, mechanistic biology 
proceeds by breaking down organisms to their molecular components and then by 
progressively building up an understanding of them from the bottom up. Although 
biological atomism shares with mechanistic biology this commitment to explaining 
organisms by decomposing them into their component parts, there is nevertheless a 
fundamental difference. This is that the final units of analysis in biological atomism 
(i.e., the biological atoms) are always still living beings in their own right. Instead of 
taking the epistemic reduction all the way down to the physicochemical level, 
biological atomism ends it at the (minimal) living level. As a result, biological 
atomism is able to reductionistically account for an organism in terms of its parts 
without having to surrender the irreducible properties of living systems when dealing 
with those parts. The parts of the organism that are used as the basis for explanation 
are not merely structural elements but functionally organized living entities. In this 
way, explanation in biological atomism does not proceed from the basic ‘building 
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blocks’ of life (as it does in mechanistic biology) but from the basic ‘builders’ of life. 
The consequence of this is that biological atomism greatly enhances the reach of 
reductionistic explanation. Overall, biological atomism and mechanistic biology 
constitute two different interpretations of explanatory reductionism. When they are 
taken together as complementary epistemic perspectives they capitalize on each 
other’s limitations and thereby provide a more inclusive (analytical) understanding of 
the constitution and operation of living systems. 
 
 - 202 - 
Chapter 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
In this thesis I have offered a critical evaluation of the role played by mechanistic 
ideas in shaping our understanding of living systems. I have drawn on a combination 
of historical, philosophical, and scientific resources to uncover a number of problems 
which I have argued result from the adoption of mechanistic thinking in biology. 
Overall, it is clear that there is no single way of comprehensively dealing with 
mechanistic thinking. Indeed, I have shown that the term most commonly associated 
with mechanistic thought, the concept of mechanism, has three clearly distinct 
meanings. In light of this, an appropriate way of coming to terms with the basic 
findings of this thesis is to consider the lessons that have been learnt in relation to 
each of the three meanings of ‘mechanism’ I have distinguished. In the process of 
reflecting on what the present investigation has achieved, I will take the opportunity 
to suggest some possible directions in which future research may be may be oriented.  
 
In relation to mechanicism we have seen that because of the instrumental role it 
played in the establishment of modern science, the scientist’s attitude towards it has 
tended to be one of deference. Indeed, for much of the past three and a half centuries, 
conceiving a physical body as a machine has been regarded as being tantamount to 
conceiving it in a rigorous, scientific way. In biology, the prestige and authority of 
mechanicism has meant that the development of our understanding of organisms has 
been shaped by theories and models grounded on fundamentally different kinds of 
systems, namely machines. The consequence of this has been that biologists have had 
to struggle to reconcile the distinctive features of life with the need to conform to the 
conceptual, theoretical, and explanatory parameters laid out by mechanicism on the 
basis of its understanding of machines. However, because many aspects of organisms 
are effectively explainable in mechanistic terms, the symptoms of the underlying 
problem have not always been readily apparent. In fact, the success of mechanistic 
biology in explaining these aspects of organisms has only served to vindicate its 
epistemological approaches and reinforce its ontological conceptualizations.  
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The mechanistic biologist generally proceeds by breaking down the organism into its 
physicochemical components and then seeking to reconstruct it epistemically from the 
bottom up. I have argued that this approach is effective for understanding isolated 
fragments or spatiotemporal cross-sections of organisms, but it is of little help in 
making sense of their emergent and systemic properties. Given the limitations of 
mechanistic explanation, I have considered two alternative explanatory frameworks. 
One alternative is to retain mechanicism’s commitment to reductionism but modify 
the final units of analysis so that at no point in the course of the investigation does one 
stop dealing with entities displaying the distinctive characteristics of life. I have called 
this perspective ‘biological atomism’, and I have shown that it has been adopted by a 
number of biologists over the centuries—both before and after the formulation of cell 
theory—in order to come to terms with organismic features lying beyond the scope of 
the purely mechanical and physicochemical explanations of mechanistic biology.  
 
The other explanatory framework I have considered is the one I have associated with 
the vitalistic tradition, and which involves dispensing with explanatory reductionism 
altogether and drawing attention to the fact that organisms display properties at the 
level of the whole that cannot be fully explained in terms of parts. This epistemic 
commitment has historically made vitalists especially perceptive to the systemic 
features of organisms, such as their self-producing organization and their intrinsic 
purposiveness, which tend to get overlooked in mechanistic accounts. However, it has 
also meant that vitalists have been at a great disadvantage in relation to the mechanists 
in terms of their empirical productivity. Indeed, if a biologist is committed to 
preserving the organization of the organism under investigation, the possibilities of 
learning much about its internal operation are greatly reduced. It is no coincidence 
that the more experimentally predisposed biologists have tended to align themselves 
on the mechanistic side, whereas the more theoretically (and philosophically) inclined 
biologists have generally found vitalism (broadly construed) more satisfying. Overall, 
it appears that heuristic considerations have tended to be more decisive than 
theoretical ones when taking a standpoint on the mechanicism-vitalism issue. Even 
today, the proven methodological usefulness of the MCO is often considered to be the 
best reason for defending its ontological truthfulness. Nevertheless, I have argued that 
keeping theoretical and heuristic considerations clearly separate is of the utmost 
importance when evaluating the appropriateness of machine models in biology. 
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In relation to the MCO, this thesis has illustrated that one can learn a great deal about 
what organisms are by developing a detailed appreciation of what they are not. By 
highlighting the fundamental differences between organisms and machines, we have 
arrived at a tentative understanding of what makes organisms distinctive. However, 
given the overwhelming influence of the MCO in biology today, the comprehension 
of the nature of organisms remains severely underdeveloped. This understanding will 
not arrive by means of ever more detailed mechanistic analyses but through the 
development of alternative theoretical frameworks which can adequately make sense 
of all the empirical data modern biology has generated. Organicist models such as the 
stream of life may provide useful starting points. However, the most formidable 
challenge facing a theory of the organism is the difficulty of coming to terms with 
what intrinsic purposiveness actually is. Although I discussed this feature at length in 
Chapter 3, it was almost always in the context of comparisons with the extrinsic 
purposiveness exhibited by machines. An exciting avenue for future research would 
involve attempting to make sense of the actual nature of intrinsic purposiveness.  
 
Very tentatively, I can identify four possible strategies for explaining organismic 
purposiveness. The problem is that they are all afflicted by different difficulties. The 
rationale of the four strategies and the potential difficulties I envisage are as follows:  
 
1. A Darwinian strategy for dealing with intrinsic purposiveness could attempt to 
argue that it can be accounted for by the action of natural selection. The problem I 
see with this strategy is that evolutionary theory does not appear to offer an actual 
explanation of the organism’s purposive drive to survive, but rather presupposes it 
as a necessary condition for selection to occur in the first place. There is only a 
‘struggle for existence’ because every organism exhibits an intrinsic desire to 
exist, yet this seems to be taken for granted in evolutionary explanations.  
 
2. A Kantian strategy for dealing with intrinsic purposiveness could involve 
reconceptualizing it as a regulative principle of the understanding, that is, as a 
necessary heuristic that the biologist must postulate in order to make sense of 
organisms. The problem I find with this strategy is that it seems to have some 
rather disconcerting implications, such as the conviction that real objective 
knowledge of life is as a matter of principle forever beyond human capabilities.  
 - 205 - 
 
3. A finalistic strategy for dealing with intrinsic purposiveness would imply 
following Aristotle and the post-Kantian Naturphilosophen in conceiving nature 
itself as ‘alive’ in the sense of being purposive. This strategy would seek to 
conceptualize intrinsic purposiveness as an expression of the general 
purposiveness of nature. The difficulty with this strategy is that it only solves the 
problem by creating another, namely the rather contentious claim that nature as a 
whole is purposive.   
 
4. Finally, an organicist strategy for dealing with intrinsic purposiveness could 
attempt to conceive it as the phenomenal manifestation of the organism’s self-
producing organization. The problem I anticipate here is that this only pushes the 
unknown element one step back, as it is the organism’s self-producing 
organization which would then demand a satisfactory naturalistic explanation.  
 
On the whole, out of these four strategies, it seems to me that the organicist one 
enjoys the most promising prospects. Therefore, a focus on the nature of the living 
organization would seem to be an appropriate first step in formulating an apposite 
theory of the organism which could conclusively demonstrate the inadequacy of the 
MCO.  
 
Finally, in relation to causal mechanisms, which have become so prominently 
discussed in the recent philosophical literature, my analysis has shown that their 
pervasiveness in biological explanations has its basis in the stunning successes of 
mechanistic investigations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I have 
claimed that the mechanistic confidence that all biological phenomena would 
eventually be explained in terms of machine mechanisms caused the term 
‘mechanism’ to gradually lose its distinctive mechanistic connotations, ultimately 
becoming a ‘dead metaphor’ that came to be used in the biological discourse “as a 
mere matter of custom” (Haldane, 1930, p. 59). I have also argued that judging by the 
way biologists today use this term, causal mechanisms are better understood not as 
real things that are discovered, but as heuristic models that are formulated for the 
purposes of explanation. My examination of causal mechanisms has also shown that 
current philosophical accounts of causal mechanisms, despite upholding an ontic 
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conception of them, are actually quite compatible with an epistemic or pragmatic 
understanding of them. Moreover, by conceiving causal mechanisms epistemically, it 
is possible to come to terms with the multitude of different biological contexts in 
which they are featured. Finally, my analysis has revealed that biologists today who 
habitually use the concept of mechanism in their explanations are not committed to 
the ontological and epistemological commitments of mechanicism. Indeed, 
explanations in terms of causal mechanisms need not be mechanistic at all as they 
often deal with organismic or even populational phenomena.
51
 This is why I have 
proposed the term ‘mechanismic’ to distinguish explanations in terms of causal 
mechanisms from the genuinely mechanistic explanations of machine mechanisms. 
 
It is probably fitting to end with some general remarks. At a basic level, mechanistic 
thinking is inappropriate in biology because it refuses to recognize life as an 
autonomous phenomenon deserving its own epistemological consideration. To 
maintain that the living can be completely explained in terms of the mechanical and 
the physicochemical is to implicitly deny the need for an autonomous science called 
‘biology’. The four studies undertaken in this thesis have attempted, in one way or 
another, to examine the grounds for the autonomy of the living, and by implication, 
the autonomy of biology. As I noted at the beginning of my investigation, I believe 
that this constitutes one of the core objectives of a genuine philosophy of biology. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
51
 An example which has been discussed at great lengths in the literature is the phenomenon of 
adaptation caused by the ‘mechanism of natural selection’ (cf. Skipper and Millstein, 2005; Barros, 
2008; Kuorikoski, 2009; McKay and Williamson, 2010). 
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